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Abstract 
Abstract 
Dependability is a composite property consisting of attributes such as reliability, 
availability, safety and security. The achievement of these attributes is often essential 
for the operational success of systems undertaking critical and complex tasks. 
Assurance that the final system will demonstrate the required dependability qualities, 
can be crucial to the acceptance of the system into service. 
Safety cases are a well established concept used to establish assurance about the safety 
properties of a system. However, safety cases focus only on one attribute ot 
dependability. The principles and processes of creating an integrated dependability case 
- that assures all aspects of dependable system behaviour - are less well understood. A 
number of challenges are faced when attempting to support dependability case 
development. These include the systematic elicitation of dependability goals, the 
management and justification of trade-offs, and the evolution of multi-attribute 
arguments in step with the design process. 
This thesis addresses these challenges by defining a rigorous framework, accompanied 
by a set of methods, for establishing dependability cases. Firstly, a method for eliciting 
dependability requirements is defined by extending existing safety deviational analysis 
techniques. Secondly, a method for systematically identifying and managing justified 
trade-offs is presented. Thirdly, the thesis describes the co-evolution of dependability 
case arguments alongside system development - using a dependability case architecture 
that corresponds to system structures. Finally, the thesis unifies these contributions by 
defining a metamodel that captures and interrelates the concepts underlying the 
proposed methods. Evaluation of the work is presented by means of peer review, pilot 
studies and industrial examples. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Dependability is a composite property consisting of attributes such as reliability, 
availability, safety and security. The achievement of these attributes is often essential 
for the operational success of systems undertaking critical and complex tasks. Systems 
of Systems (SoS) is a term increasingly used to represent large complex systems 
consisting of many independent elements. Systems of Systems are designed to solve 
particularly complex and critical problems. Due to the criticality of the problems that 
the SoS solve, system stakeholders need to have confidence that the system will operate 
in an acceptable way. This entails examining the operational behaviour of the system 
from the perspectives of a number of attributes crucial to the success of the operation, 
such as performance, availability and safety. Dependability is an umbrella term used to 
encompass these attributes. 
1.1 Systems of Systems 
An example of an SoS can be found in the integration of the air traffic control regions 
providing automated air traffic management functions for both aircraft and flight 
controllers; another is the concept of Network Centric Warfare which entails individual 
platforms collaborating and sharing awareness to achieve the mission objectives more 
effectively. 
1.1.1 Air Traffic Control (ATC) 
Air traffic control consists of a set of services aiming to direct aircraft through airspace, 
overseeing adherence to separation limits between aircraft [1]. The airspace 
management functions provided by ATC need to cover all phases of a flight. ATC 
functions involve a number of geographically dispersed systems and users, such as 
radars, controllers' terminals, airport towers, and meteorological stations, which need to 
collaborate to achieve the safe and efficient passage of aircraft. 
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In particular, airspace consists of Flight Information Region (FIR) sectors over which an 
Area Control Centre is responsible for controlling all the flights. The FIR can be further 
divided into sectors. During take-off (and initial climb), landing (and initial approach) 
and whilst on the ground, aircraft are controlled by the local tower. When moving from 
one region to another, responsibility for an aircraft is handed over to the corresponding 
controllers. For example, shortly after take-off, the local tower will hand responsibility 
over to the appropriate FIR control centre. Although pilots have ultimate responsibility 
for the aircraft's safety, controllers may require an aircraft to change flight level 
(altitude), reduce or increase speed in order to maintain separation,. or to request 
manoeuvres such as joining a holding pattern. 
Controllers must be able to see information in real time. Precision of navigation data is 
another important requirement, which allows aircraft to cruise with reduced separation 
between them. This has already led to airspace with reduced minimum vertical 
separation between aircraft [2], increasing the capacity of an area for aircraft. The air 
traffic management system has to predict the trajectories of aircraft in airspace over 
time (i. e. 4D trajectories), search for any conflicts between aircraft, and help a flight to 
avoid areas with turbulence or bad weather. 
Operation of the ATC should be both safe and efficient. Not being able to achieve 
either of these two attributes the system will not be fit to operate for its intended 
purpose. The ATC example was used throughout the research to better understand the 
challenges in acquiring confidence for this class of systems. 
1.1.2 Network Centric Warfare (NCW) 
The concept of NCW was introduced as a means of using computing and systems 
engineering technology to achieve more effective military missions. The US 
Department of Defense (DoD) in [3] suggests that "Network Centric Warfareprovides a 
valuable perspectivefor achieving success in a target-oriented warfare situation, where 
timely, relevant, accurate andprecise information is required to automatically engage 
targets expeditiously with the most effective weapons andforces available". 
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NCW involves integration and coordination between all battle, control and decision 
making systems, so that the appropriate tactics and resources are used to efficiently 
achieve mission goals. Each element consists of a battle platform that has a perception 
of its environment, which then is shared among other platforms [4]. Each element is 
capable of independent operation - making its own decisions in order to achieve 
mission objectives. Elements should share their view of the environment in order to 
enrich the overall intelligence 'picture'. Thereby one element may benefit from another 
element's knowledge allowing it to make more accurate and more confident decisions. 
When a mission goal is defined the system has to plan the steps required to achieve the 
goal, the elements that will participate in carrying out these steps, along with the 
contribution and responsibility of each element. After receiving the goals and its tasked 
responsibilities, each clement has to decide upon the resources that it needs, and to plan 
how it will acquire those efficiently. NCW is a paradigm vividly showing the need of 
achievement of dependability attributes. The safety of the participating units, security 
of sensitive information (e. g. communication codes) and availability when a unit is 
required to operate are three attributes of importance in NCW. Moreover there can be 
interaction between these attributes. For example in a NCW system the safety of the 
system's elements is closely dependent to the security of the system, as security 
vulnerabilities can be exploited by the enemy. 
1.2 General Characteristics of Systems of Systems 
The phrase "Systems of Systems (SoS)" has been introduced to describe systems such 
as those described in the previous section. Although there are variations depending on 
the particular domain in which the term System of Systems is defined, in this thesis the 
following essential characteristics have been defined in order to classify a system as 
System of Systems: 
Overall objectives: A System of Systems has a set of high level goals of 
interest to its stakeholders, such as provision of air traflic management (for 
ATC) or accomplishmcnt of a mission (for NCW). 
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Complexity of problem: SoS are typically used in problems of high complexity 
(e. g. aircraft route planning or targeting). 
Multiple elements: A System of Systems consists of many elements which are 
systems in their own right and can or have been developed independently from 
the SoS (e. g. a radar or an unmanned aircraft). 
9 Autonomy: Elements are able to make their own decisions with varying degrees 
of autonomy (e. g. autonomous vehicles). 
e Geographical dispersion: SoS deployed in the real world often involve 
elements that are geographically dispersed and mobile - changing their position 
according to the overall SoS objectives. 
e Collaboration: SoS elements need to collaborate offering some of their 
functions to achieve the overall SoS objectives (e. g. sharing of intelligence 
requires elements sensing and others analysing data). 
Communication: Collaboration between the SoS elements results in exchanges 
of information. 
Elements are heterogeneous: Elements have been developed independently 
from each other, potentially with different technologies and from different 
developers. 
This thesis defines System of Systems in the following terms: 
A System of Systems is an organised complex unity assembled from 
dispersed, highly cooperating, autonomous systems - each of which is 
capable of operating independently. 
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1.3 Assurance of Operation 
In section I we briefly described two examples of Systems of Systems, as well as their 
characteristics. Development and use of such systems can be very beneficial; however 
SoS exhibit emergent behaviour resulting from the interactions between components. 
This behaviour cannot be predicted from observation of any single component. To 
illustrate this problem, the following sections present a number of historical situations in 
which SoS did not operate as expected. 
1.3.1 Examples of Accidents in NCW and ATC 
Friendly Fire Accident in NCW 
After the gulf war, on April 14th 1994, two F- 15 fighter aircraft operated by the US Air 
Force shot down two Black Hawk transport helicopters operated by the US Army. The 
helicopters were flying in the no fly zone, and as a result of the accident, everyone 
onboard the helicopters was killed. This occurred despite the presence of the US Air 
Force Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) which was in control of 
coordinating NATO activity in the region. AWACS fitted aircraft are able to carry out 
airborne surveillance and battle management functions. Leveson cites [5] that as many 
as 130 mistakes could be identified as contributing factors to this accident. In this case, 
failure of individual elements to operate as expected had an impact on the overall SoS 
operation, resulting in compromising its safety levels. Alexander et al provide in [6] an 
analysis from the viewpoint of the SoS characteristics, and how individual failures 
propagated through the different SoS elements and contributed to the accident. 
Air Traffic ControlAccident 
After an accident in 1978 in which two aircraft were involved in a mid-air collision in 
airspace over the airport from which they had just taken off, all aircraft were required to 
install a collision avoidance system - WAS (Traffic Collision Avoidance System). 
WAS continuously monitors the traffic around an aircraft enhancing the crew's 
perception of the environment. It detects and resolves situations in which two aircraft 
are on course for a collision. 
Although the primary responsibility of resolving such conflicts lies with the air traffic 
controller, WAS becomes essential when two aircraft are in such close proximity that 
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immediate action is necessary to avoid collision. In such situations, WAS systems on 
both involved aircraft, after communicating with each other, issue resolution advisory 
messages. These messages ideally will result in opposing (vertical) manoeuvres 
increasing the aircraft separation. On the Ist of July 2002 a cargo Boeing 757 and a 
passenger Tu-154 aircraft collided inside Swiss airspace over Lake Constance near 
10berlingen [7]. Although the two aircraft were the only aircraft in that vicinity, a 
number of circumstances resulted in the controller failing to notice the conflict until the 
aircraft were in close proximity. The controller issued (with substantial delay) advice to 
the aircraft to change altitude. At that time WAS had also issued resolution advisory 
messages, requesting the ascent of the Tu-154 and the descent of the B-757. One 
aircraft followed the controller's advice whereas the other followed TCAS. This 
resulted in the descent of both aircraft and - ultimately -a collision. The accident 
claimed 69 fatalities on board both aircraft. 
The Problem of Multiple, Interacting, Causes 
Analysing the accidents, one cannot conclusively pinpoint a single cause. In both cases 
there were many factors that contributed to the accidents. The safeguards that had been 
designed to contain the effects of possible failures failed to operate properly themselves. 
Furthermore one can also notice different types of failures. For example had the ATC 
controller completely failed to notice the conflict between the aircraft, the crews would 
only have had the (safe) advisory of the TCAS. Instead, the untimely response of the 
controller resulted in conflicting advice, which contributed to the accident. 
1.3.2 Assurance as Obligatory Requirement 
It is now commonplace that developers of safety critical systems are required to produce 
a corresponding safety case - communicating an argument, supported by evidence, that 
a system is acceptably safe to operate. Examples of application domains for such 
systems include the defence and railway sectors. In such domains the description of 
requirements for the safety case product, as well as the processes for development, are 
described in detail by the respective safety standards such as the U. K. Defence Standard 
00-56 [8]. 
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1.3.3 System Dependability Assurance 
Over the years there has been significant research in the safety domain and in particular 
regarding safety cases. However safety is only one of a number of system attributes 
that arc potentially of interest. Other system attributes can be crucial to the stakeholders 
of a system. For example, consider the case of NCW - conceived with the sole purpose 
of improving the effectiveness of force elements in the battlefield. In such a system, 
safety can be of similar importance with other attributes such as performance or 
availability. For example, a defensive system being unavailable in the presence of an 
enemy threat could be considered to be of utmost importance. The importance of 
assuring the achievement of dependability attributes (other than safety) is readily 
apparent in many Systems of Systems examples. Despite the fact that there are 
standards explicitly requiring assurance about safety and the maintainability and 
availability of a system, there are no standards explicitly asking for assurance about the 
overall dependable behaviour of a system. 
1.4 Dependability 
Whilst there is no overall consensus on the exact definition of dependability, many 
agree that it can be described as the "the system's characteristic thatjusti/1'es placing 
one's reliance on it" [9], entailing such attributes as reliability, safety, security and 
maintainability. Prasad similarly defines Dependability as . ..... a variable sized vector 
of attributes describing overlapping desiderata, chosen subjectively, in accordance to 
the stakeholders'particular requirements" [10]. Furthermore, Prasad highlighted that 
despite the fact that dependability attributes can be interrelated, they are not orthogonal 
to each other, and can be in conflict or in harmony. Overall, dependability is a 
composite system property consisting of a number of different heterogeneous attributes. 
1.5 Dependability Cases 
In this thesis the following definition of a dependability case has been adopted: 
A dependability case is a clear, defensible, and traceable argument that a 
system is acceptably dependable to operate in a given operational context. 
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Argument: A dependability case must communicate an argument about the 
achievement of the dependability attributes of a system, providing assurance to 
the developers. 
Context: Context describes the system's intended operation; it is unrealistic to 
attempt to create a dependability case without capturing the envisioned operation 
and operational context of the system. 
9 Dependable: A dependability case should provide confidence in all 
dependability attributes that arc of interest to the system's stakeholders. 
Acceptable: Achieving all the required attributes fully is a utopian goal. 
Stakeholders must trade-off the (sufficient) achievement of multiple competing 
attributes. Justification of this trade-off is an essential element of any 
dependability case. 
* Traceable: It should be possible to clearly trace between the objectives, 
arguments, evidence and trade-offs of the dependability case. Such traceability 
enables systematic review and evaluation of the acceptability of the system 
design. 
1.6 A Roadmap for Systems of Systems Dependability 
Cases 
The research presented in this thesis was performed under the initiative of the Defence 
and Aerospace Research Partnership (DARP) for High Integrity Real-Time Systems 
(HIRTS) - in collaboration with BAE Systems, QinetiQ and Rolls-Royce p1c. As part 
of the HIRTS DARP work the participating companies helped define the main research 
challenges in the field of assuring the dependable operation of Systems of Systems. 
Identification of the challenges took place during workshops, in which participants from 
the partner companies and the University of York discussed academic and industrial 
experience and the state of the art related to the subject. Part of the output of the 
workshops is discussed in [11]. A compiled list of challenges, focusing on 
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dependability cases, was created during these activities. The following challenges were 
identified: 
" Multiple dependability attributes 
" Allocation and apportionment of requirements 
" Conflicting requirements 
" Changing requirements 
" Traceability 
" Interaction of case and design 
" Ownership of the dependability case 
The identified issues are discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
1.6.1 Multiple Dependability Attributes 
Dependability is a multi-attribute system characteristic. Arguing about achievement of 
dependability will include references to achievement of its constituent attributes. There 
are several domains in which there are examples of the creation of arguments for 
individual dependability attributes. One such domain is safety. The practice of safety 
case development and acceptance is relatively mature, and extensively used both in 
military and civil industry. Maintainability and reliability cases are examples of 'cases' 
communicating arguments about dependability attributes. However their use is not as 
widespread as that of safety cases. 
Although the concept of creating cases for the individual attributes of dependability is 
not new, 'simply integrating' all different attribute arguments will introduce challenges 
that are difficult to overcome. A dependability case will need to record the relationships 
between attributes as well as how they were affected by decisions taken during system 
development. For example, the availability of a protection ftinction onboard an aircraft 
(e. g. availability of TCAS) also (positively) affects the safety of the aircraft. In contrast, 
availability and safety can also be at odds with each other. An example of such conflict 
can be found in the development and use of an aircrafts Minimum Equipment List 
(MEL). A MEL provides a detailed description of the minimum systems required to be 
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operational for an aircraft to be airworthy. For example, an aircraft may be allowed to 
be dispatched (for some time) with one processing unit inoperative. Hence, in principle, 
a reduction of safety (due to reduced redundancy) is acceptable, in order for the aircraft 
to perform its mission. 
When designing to achieve multiple dependability requirements certain (design) 
decisions may introduce conflicts between the attributes, which will eventually result in 
trade-offs needing to be made. The dependability case should be able to capture the 
conflicts that occur during system development and the trade-off process - providing 
justification that the design decisions taken constitute the most optimal choice. 
1.6.2 Allocation and Apportionment of Requirements 
The operation of a System of Systems consists of the combined operation of each of its 
individual elements. Identification of requirements with regard to the operation of a 
System of Systems occurs by considering the envisioned operation of the SoS. For 
example, in NCW initially the system stakeholders will specify the overall objectives 
that the system is required to achieve, and not the individual contribution of each SoS 
element. Consequently, the development of a case initially takes place in the context 
of the overall concept of operation. 
In terms of dependability, identification of the context includes identification of the 
criteria of acceptable operation with respect to the dependability attributes of interest to 
the stakeholders. The initial high level objectives constitute the stakeholders' 
dependability requirements that need to be addressed by the proposed system design. 
According to how the system is designed, the system elements can variably affect the 
achievement of the stakeholders' overall dependability goals. For example, the overall 
safety of a system may require certain system elements to achieve a particular reliability 
requirement. 
Following the initial stages of the case development (which regard the SoS in the large), 
the system design process must consider apportionment of the overall SoS requirements 
to individual elements of the system. Consequently, the focus of the case will shift 
towards the individual elements of the SoS. Apportionment of requirements relies on a 
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very clear understanding of the contribution of each system to the overall SoS 
functionality. However, the characteristics of a System of Systems are such that do not 
always favour a clear apportionment of requirements. Collaboration between the 
elements of a SoS and dynamic reconfiguration of its operation, often result in emergent 
behaviour which cannot be revealed by merely analysing the behaviour of each element 
individually. The dependability case should be able to demonstrate assurance regarding 
the contribution of the underlying behaviour of SoS elements, in satisfying the overall 
dependability requirements of the SoS stakeholders. 
1.6.3 Conflicting Requirements 
Dependability attributes are heterogeneous and non-orthogonal to each other. They can 
variably be in conflict or in harmony with each other, according to the design of the 
system. The more complex the system and the larger its scale, the more unlikely it is 
for its requirements to be met without any conflicts arising between them. This is 
further exacerbated by the multiple attributes that a SoS needs to satisfy and their 
interrelationships. 
For example, consider an ATC system, similar to that described earlier. Increasing the 
number of aircraft that an ATC (services) area can support is considered to be at odds 
with safety. A 'busy' sky increases the safety risk. In order to achieve acceptable levels 
of safety, the number of aircraft served at any time may need to be limited - eventually 
resulting in delays. Performance and safety need to be balanced achieving a system that 
is able to handle a satisfactory number of aircraft without increasing the safety risk to 
intolerable levels. However, stakeholders will inevitably need to re-cvaluate and trade 
their initial requirements identifying the most optimum solution for both (in this 
example) performance and safety. Re-evaluation of requirements has to result 
ultimately in an acceptable system, satisfying all the system stakeholders and fulfilling 
its overall purpose. 
1.6.4 Changing Requirements 
The complexity and the time span of the problems that a (typical) SOS addresses, are 
two of the reasons that cause SOS operational requirements will change. SOS 
requirements may change in order to provide the same functionality in a more effective 
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way, or to provide slightly different functionality. This can be achieved through the 
reconfiguration of SoS elements, or the addition of new SoS elements in response to 
capability enhanccments of the SoS. 
Two examples regarding NCW and air traffic control demonstrate the reconfiguration 
and capability enhancement characteristics of a SoS. Consider an existing NCW into 
which UAVs carrying additional sensors are introduced to enhance intelligence 
collection, or the dynamic allocation of responsibility to ATC centres according to air 
traffic volume in a given time period. During reconfiguration the role of certain SoS 
elements may change depending on the operation. For example, a UAV could have 
intelligence collection function as well as suppression of enemy capabilities. According 
to the role the system elements certain dependability requirements may differ, to reflect 
the needs of the particular role. 
Another issue that can result in requirements changes is the change of the operational 
context of a SoS. The most typical example of such a situation is the change from 
peacetime to wartime operations. The relative importance of requirements may change 
to reflect the needs of the operation. For example, in wartime operation some reduction 
in the safety (hence increasing the associated risk) levels of the SoS may be tolerated in 
favour of increased operational effectiveness. 
There is an obvious challenge when attempting to establish a dependability case that 
will communicate assurance about the satisfaction of dependability requirements. The 
dependability case should be able to provide justification for the elicitation of the 
dependability requirements. Different scenarios for the operational context of the SoS 
may result in different sets of requirements. Simply taking the union of the resulting 
requirement sets may result in an impasse or in a suboptimal SoS. Requirements 
elicited for a specific dependability attribute in the context of a specific scenario, may 
not be in line with the requirements elicited for the same attribute in the context of a 
different scenario. 
In order to overcome the problem of ending up with a suboptimurn SoS which satisfies 
requirements for many scenarios, limitations may be imposed on the number of 
scenarios that will be 'targeted' by the SoS. Hence, the resulting system will be 
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optimised for a specific number of scenarios. Alternatively, restrictions on the 
operation of the SoS may be specified in the form of policy. Irrespective of how a 
potential impasse is overcome, the dependability case needs to provide justification in a 
clear and understandable manner. The dependability case could be used to 'inform' the 
reconfiguration process of a SoS, whilst maintaining acceptable assurance about the 
satisfaction of the overall dependability requirements. 
1.6.5 Traceability 
The dependability case of a system can be a part of the evolution of that system. It can 
be used as a means of recording the requirements and their subsequent decomposition 
and apportionment to SoS elements. Also, it can be a driver for evaluating the fitness of 
the design against the required attributes of system operation (a successful design will 
be easier to argue about). 
Overall, the argument contained in a case brings forward many different sources of 
information, such as analysis and testing. The use of all the different elements that will 
be part of the final case should be clearly defined. Definition of a rigorous 
dependability case framework requires well articulated relationships between the 
concepts used during the evolution of a dependability case. 
1.6.6 Interaction of Case and Design 
Based on accumulated experience from the safety domain, many standards (such as 
(13]) suggest that a (safety) case should be constructed in parallel with the system and 
not at the end of the system lifecycle. Creating an argument about the achievement of 
dependability in retrospect, after the end of the system development process can be 
problematic. The design of the system may not be optimised for developers to create a 
strong argument about its attributes (e. g. safety) easily. Instead, developers will 
eventually 'force' the argument to support the overall claim often resulting in a weak 
argument (e. g. relying on operational constraints). Tberefore a case will not be able to 
communicate a satisfactory argument about assurance on the system's required 
qualities. This means that either the system will be delivered with a case that doesn't 
provide a satisfactory degree of assurance - something that may result in rejection of the 
system - or parts of the design will need to be reconsidered so that stronger arguments 
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can be created. Late in the lifecycle, there are limited opportunities for developers to 
easily (and cost effectively) revise the system to address problems identified when 
establishing the safety case. Creation of an argument in parallel with the system serves 
to help evaluate record and justify decisions regarding the evolution of the system. 
1.6.7 Ownership of the Dependability Case 
Traditionally in safety, the contractor of a system is responsible for providing a safety 
case that accompanies the system, which may be reviewed by an independent authority 
and then submitted for approval to the appropriate regulatory bodies. Whereas this is a 
clear allocation of responsibility with regard to the safety case, there is a problem of 
ownership of the case when considering a safety case for a SoS, which increases in 
complexity when considering a dependability (i. e. multiple attribute) case for SoS. To 
begin with, typically there is no single contractor for the SoS, but instead there are 
multiple contractors - responsible for elements (or even parts of the elements) of the 
SoS. Arguing about aspects of the SoS that involve collaboration of elements may 
require input from the different individual contractors that develop the SoS elements. 
Moreover, some of stakeholders may be responsible for certain aspects of the SoS such 
as performance or safety. This results in responsibility that can be traced to many 
different elements of the SoS and their respective arguments in the case. Hence, 
according to the layout of the case architecture, the responsibility of a stakeholder may 
be dispersed. For these reasons it essential that a framework is defined under which the 
contribution of each of the contractors to the dependability case can be clearly and 
traceably identified. Moreover the framework should consider whether an overall 
authority should be overall responsible for the construction of the dependability case. 
1.7 Thesis Proposition 
This thesis demonstrates that it is feasible to establish a structured approach to evolving 
and presenting a dependability case for Systems of Systems through a unified approach 
to eliciting flexible dependability requirements, facilitating resolution of trade-offs 
between competing objectives, and combining and managing these activities using 
structured argumentation. 
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The main characteristics highlighted in this statement arc the following: 
a Structured: The approach is rigorously captured and documented using an 
undcrlying mctamodcl. 
* Evolving: The case evolves in parallel with the system, providing feedback to 
the system development process and influencing design decisions. 
9 Systems of Systems: The type of systems for which the approach has been 
optimised. 
9 Unified: The proposed methodologies solving the identified challenges are 
unified within a single framework, with their associations and synergies defined. 
e Flexible: There should flexibility regarding the specification and achievement of 
dependability requirements. 
Facilitating resolution of trade-offs: The proposed approach identifies and 
documents conflicts between requirements, facilitating selection of the best 
solution with respect to the stakeholders' collective interests. 
* Argumentation: The resultant case is a collection of arguments structured in 
such a way as to provide compelling overall assurance of system dependability. 
1.8 Objectives of the Research 
This section summarises the objectives of this research, motivated by the identified 
challenges, and the means of their achievement. This research focuses on the following 
objectives: 
0 Definition of a rigorous framework by means of establishing the Dependability 
Case Metamodel (DCM). 
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" Identification Of dependable operation (requirements elicitation) by means of 
applying Dependability Deviation Analysis (DDA) method. 
" Resolution of conflicts by means of following a qualitative, argument based 
Trade-Off Method (TOM). 
" Evolving the dependability case in step with system development by means of 
examining the design rational by following the Factors, Analysis and Decision 
Alternatives (FANDA) method; by means of specifying a paradigm 
dependability case architecture encompassing the products of the 
aforementioned methods. 
The objectives of this research - listed above - target the following of the previously 
identified challenges in the management of dependability cases for systems of systems. 
Multiple dependability attributes 
Allocation and Apportionment of Requirements (not considering negative 
emergent behaviour) 
Conflicting requirements 
Traceability 
Interaction of between the system and the case development processes 
The following subsections give an overview of the research objectives. 
1.8.1 Definition of a Rigorous Framework 
A dependability case entails the integration of information concerning dependability 
attributes and derived requirements, arguments, evidence, system models, and 
underlying design rationale. This requires a clear understanding of the underlying 
concepts within a dependability case as well as their interrelationships. The 
dependability case metamodcl, aims to create a rigorous fully traceable framework by 
defining the elements of a dependability case and their relationships. 
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1.8.2 Identification of Dependable Operation 
At the initial stages of the system lifecycle, system stakeholders do not have concrete 
requirements as to the operation of the system. The overall requirements are elicited in 
the context of the system's envisioned operation. In later stages of the system lifecyc1c, 
design decisions are made and the collaboration between the SoS elements in order to 
provide the envisioned operation is defined. According to the design, the initially 
elicited requirements are decomposed and apportioned appropriately. System 
requirements can be stated from the perspective of different dependability attributes. 
Moreover requirements can be interrelated -a requirement stated from the perspective 
of a dependability attribute may depend of the achievement of other requirements stated 
from the perspective of other dependability attributes. Dependability Deviation 
Analysis constitutes a method that elicits requirements for the elements of the SoS, by 
analysing appropriate system models throughout its development. 
1.8.3 Resolution of Conflicts 
It is inevitable for SoS developers to encounter conflicts between the system's 
objectives. Unless resolved, the development of the system will reach an impasse. 
Resolution of conflicts involves compromises during decisions made throughout the 
system's lifecycle, resulting to trade-off between the stakeholder's goals. The Trade- 
Off Method (TOM) provides a systematic qualitative approach during which 
stakeholders share viewpoints and justify the ease with which they can trade their goals. 
The final outcome of TOM is an argument of preference of a decision alternative (e. g. a 
design alternative) that is considered to best satisfy the stakeholders' interests. 
1.8.4 Development of Case 
The dependability case is not developed in isolation from the system. Although a case 
refers to the final artefact, development of the case takes place hand in hand with the 
design. System stakeholders specify what needs to be claimed for the final system and 
accordingly elicit appropriate goals that correspond to each stage of the system 
development. Evolution of the system and the argument involve making decisions 
about the architecture and the design of the system, which need to be justified and 
documented. Interaction between the argument and the design process exists during the 
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evolution of the system. The argument should evaluate the design's fitness to satisfy the 
stated goals. A design that is good satisfying the stated goals will result in a strong 
argument. If the involved stakeholders deem that the argument is not satisfactory, 
changes to the design will have to be made. FANDA examines how the features of the 
proposed design alternatives affect the achievement of the goals. Moreover, the thesis 
proposes a dependability case architecture optimised for the Ministry Of Defence 
Architectural Framework (described in chapter 2), which is used, in particular, to model 
SOS. 
1.9 Thesis Structure 
Chapter 2 provides a literature review of related published work. In brief, the chapter 
addresses nomenclature of Systems of Systems, examines research and practice in 
establishing safety cases and argumentation in general, presents an analysis of the 
notion of dependability, and finally investigates existing techniques in decision making 
- in particular trade-offs and design rationale within the context of systems architecture. 
Chapter 3 presents the basis of the proposed dependability case framework. 
Specifically, it presents the fundamental concepts that were used to creating the 
dependability case framework. Moreover, it explains the approach taken to create a 
metamodel which formally and rigorously defines the framework. 
Chapter 4 describes a technique for methodically eliciting and specifying dependability 
requirements. The technique extends existing analysis methods which focus on 
examining possible deviations from intended system operation. Dependability 
Deviation Analysis (DDA) is introduced as a means of identifying the overall goals and 
concerns of the stakeholders. Furthermore, DDA is used to examine the behaviour of 
the system elements from the viewpoint of each stakeholder's attributes of interest. 
Chapter 5 presents an approach for facilitating conflict reconciliation by trading off 
dependability goals. The Trade-Off Methodology (TOM) is based on the ALARP 
principle in safety (explained in chapter 2). This chapter introduces the concept of 
flexible requirements - necessary for enabling trade-offs to be made. TOM allows 
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stakeholders to evaluate possible alternatives regarding the satisfaction of their goals - 
creating arguments for and against committing to each altcmativc. 
Chapter 6 presents the evolution of a dependability case by integrating the proposed 
methodologies of the previous chapters. It presents the architecture of a dependability 
case for a System of Systems. The chapter describes how this structure can be populated 
according to the information available at each stage of the configuration of a Systems of 
Systems. Factors, ANalysis and Decision Alternatives (FANDA) is introduced as a 
method to facilitate collaboration and exchange of information between the design and 
argument development processes. 
Chapter 7 presents the evaluation of the proposed contributions against the thesis 
proposal. The chapter discusses the findings for the methodologies individually as well 
as for the proposed framework as a whole. 
Chapter 8 prcscnts the ovcrall conclusions drawn from the rcscarch as well as avcnucs 
of possiblc futurc work. 
Appendix A presents an overview of the activities in the safety lifccycle as suggested 
by the civil aerospace guidance document ARP 476 1. 
Appendix B providcs an ovcrvicw of the Dcfcncc Architccturc Framcworks (namely 
DODAF and MODAF). In addition, it prcscnts a documcntcd cxcmplar System of 
Systcrns, uscd as a casc study throughout this thcsis. 
Appendix C presents the Dependability Case Mctamodcl (DCM), capturing the 
elements of a dependability case and their associations. Examples of code used to 
manage dependability case models are also included. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chaptcr dcscribcs background matcrial rclatcd to the work prcscntcd in this thcsis. 
The main arcas rcvicwcd arc the following: 
0 Systems of Systems: this scction includcs ddinitions regarding the conccpt of 
SoS, and ovcrvicw of suitablc of modclling frammorks. 
* Dependability: invcstigatcs approachcs in dcrining dcpcndability. 
* Trade-offs: reviews mcthods supporting system evolution in the context of 
competing design alternatives. 
9 Dependability cases: Although the concept of safety cases is wcll-cstablishcd, 
there is little work available regarding dependability cases. The section reviews 
conccpts rcgarding argumcntation of dcpcndability attributcs. 
The review areas arc presented in the following sub-scctions of the chapter. 
2.2 Systems of Systems 
The tcnn Systems of Systems is often used intuitively when large systems cooperate 
(for example, the tcnn is often used to describe of enterprise networks). Tlicrc arc 
several existing definitions of a SoS. A review of the modelling methods (UML, ADL) 
and architccturc framcworks (C41SR framcwork, Opcnwings) that havc bccn uscd to 
dcscribe SoS arc prcscntcd. 
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2.2.1 Definitions 
The concept of Systems of Systems (SoS) was introduced as a tcnn for complex 
systems, entailing components that were developed independently of the rest of the 
system. Although initially there were no formal definitions, and the identification of 
SoS was based on a common set of characteristics, the concept has considerably 
cvolvcd and cuffcntly is considcrcd to constitutc a class on its own. 
Within the military domain, the term Systems of Systems evolved from the concept of 
network centric warfare [3]; "Systems of Systems comprise a variety of land and air 
assets integrated via network centric technologies and appropriate procedures" [ 13 ]. 
The definition identifics the independence of the Systems that comprise the SoS. 
Integration of the systems requires certain procedures to crisure cffcctivc cooperation 
and exclusion of hazardous and undesirable operation. Morcovcr, the definition 
indicates a close association of the term with networks and communication 
infrastructurc. 
Kotov dcfincd a SoS to bc ". Jarge scale concurrent and distributed systems, the 
components of which are complex systems themselves (e. g. enterprise nenvorks). 
Communicating Structures are hierarchical structures that represent SoS In a uniform, 
systematic way as composition of a small number of bask systems" [14]. This 
definition mainly presents the communications aspect of a System of Systems. 
Communicating with each other the a number of individual clcmcnts can form a SoS. 
The definition provides an intuitive description of a SoS, however it only focuses on the 
network aspect of the SoS not indicating characteristics that could uniquely distinguish 
a SoS from a large network or a distributed system. 
Maier [15] perceives the SoS concept as a natural consequence of the evolution of 
collaborative systems with increased complexity and operational independence. 
Ilowcvcr he does not provide a spcciric definition of a SoS. Maicr states that: "While 
the term System of Systems has no clear and accepted definition. the phenomena are 
widespread and generally recognised'. Maier mentions that the most important 
characteristic that identifies a SoS, is the independence of the elements that consist the 
SoS: "Systems of Systems should be distinguishedfrom large but monolithic systems by 
the independence of their components, their evolutionary nature, emergent behaviours 
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and a geographic extent that limits the interaction of their components to information 
exchange". Even though the author idcntirics some characteristics of a SoS, such as the 
independence of the elements, he too defines a SoS in terms of component 
intercommunication: "Systems of Systems are defined by communication standards. 
Different problems require standards at different levels". Although the idcntiricd SoS 
characteristics arc broader than the 'purc' network view of IIcwlctt Packard, the 
dcrinition is still based on the same principles (i. e. communication means). Maier 
idcntirics three categories of SoS: directed, collaborative and virtual. The critcria for 
defining these categories arc the different levels of operational and managerial 
independence of the SoS elements, which can result in different SoS behaviour. 
A broadcr dcfinition suggested by Pcriorcllis states that: "... a SoS Is a dependable 
system composed of independent autonomous systems. 7he purpose of the SoS Is to 
provide a set of enhanced or improved 'emergent'services, based on some or all of the 
services provided byparticipating component systems" [16]. Pcriorcllis identified that 
SoS elements can support roles that were spccificd without having overall SoS 
objectives in mind. This results in different types of behaviour that cmcrgc from the 
combination of the individual capabilities of the components of a SoS. Moreover, he 
identifies the fact that such systems arc required to have collective mechanisms to 
ensure reliable operation, as theoretically there can be indcrinitc and undcrincd failure 
modcs. This dcrinition highlights a characteristic of SoS components, which is their 
ability to coordinate a collective behaviour. When a SoS is dcrincd by focusing on its 
communication structure (as in [14]) the latter considerations aren't always apparent. 
Independence of the SoS elements poses a major challenge. SoS elements cannot be 
implemented for a specific role or behaviour within a SoS. However some of its 
inherent functions can be used when operating as part of a SoS to achieve some overall 
objective. According to the description of the available functions, collaborating 
elements choose the elements choose to collaborate with SoS elements that can provide 
the necessary functions to fulfil their operational goals . ..... 7he analogy was drast-n to 
planning a city, callingfor simulations to work together as a community, in Systems of 
Systems. To build and operate an efficient city, a governing framework (e. g. street 
plans, building codes) is laid out and certain basic services (e. g. utilities, schools) are 
provided. Beyond that the residents are generally left to their own discretion as towhat 
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type of home or business the build, who to interact with eld" [171. Under this Y 
perspective, a SoS is a collection of services provided by a set of elements that 
collaborate with each other. An important aspect of this definition is that 
communication lines arc not the dcrinitivc element of a SoS. Instead, the SoS is dcrincd 
according to the 'services' its collaborating components can provide. In this case the 
communication infrastructure is considered an equal element of the SoS providing a 
number o services. 
Even though the previous definitions do not just focus on the communications of the 
SoS, but also on the bchaviourat properties of the elements of the SoS, a question 
remains as to when a system can described as a System of Systems. As dcrincd by the 
US Dcpartmcnt of Defcncc (DoD) rcscarch dcvclopmcnt and acquisition officc, a 
Systcrn of Systcrns is: "an asscmblagc of componcnts which individually may bc 
rcgarded as systcms and which posscss two additional propcrtics" [181. The additional 
propcrtics of the SoS arc the following: 
1. Operational Independence of its components: If the SoS is disassembled into its 
component systems, the component systems must be able to operate 
independently. That is, the component systems fulfil customer or operator 
purposes on their own. 
2. Managerial Independence of the Components: The component systems not only 
can operate independently, they do operate independently. Component systems 
are separately acquired and integrated, and maintain a continuing operating 
existence independent of the SoS. 
The definition provided by the DoD gives practical means for distinguishing between a 
large or complex system and a System of Systems. The fact that SoS consist of 
independent elements introduces characteristics such as element heterogeneity, 
autonomy and the capability of an clement to interpret the overall SoS goals according 
to its atomic capabilities. Dcccntraliscd control is also a SoS characteristic that allows 
the elements to take decisions on their own. Such decisions can have an impact on the 
overall behaviour of the SoS. 
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Overall, the presented definitions put forward a unique aspect of SoS. Kotov [14] and 
Maier [15] focus on the communications infrastructure and identify some of the 
characteristics of remote interacting independent systems. Pcriorcllis [16] and 
llollcnbach [17] focuses on the behaviour of the SoS and how it is achieved by 
assembling a system from independent systems. Although the DoD definition [18] 
identifies the characteristics of SoS in their domain, it focuses on an ontological view, 
specifying why an assemblage of components will be called System of Systems and not 
a complex system. 
Even though all definitions have idcntiricd a particular viewpoint of SoS, it can be 
argued that arc not abstract enough and appropriate as a generic dcrinition of the 
subject. Earlier work of the research strand' of which the author was a member, 
produced a more generic and flexible definition of SoS. Defence companies involved 
with SoS development have shared our opinion, throughout comparison with their case 
studies. Therefore the definition that will be used as a basis for further research has as 
follows: 
A System of Systems is an organiscd complex unity assembled from distributed 
autonomous systems, capable of independent provision of services, collaborating to 
achievc an ovcrall systcm purposc. 
2.2.2 Modelling 
The main purpose of modelling is to represent and communicate the structure, the 
architecture and the behaviour of the system. The unique charactcristics of the SoS 
behaviour should be modelled and documented from early stages of the SoS 
development. Kaanich [19] presents the need to accommodate dependability within tile 
model of a SoS from the early stages. This section presents frameworks capable of 
capturing the characteristics of a SoS. 
1 Defence and Aerospace Research Partnership (DARP) strand 2: Dependable Systems of Systems 
(DSoS). Members of DARP include BAE Systems, QinctiQ, Rolls-Royce and the University of York. 
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2.2.2.1 UML 
The Unified Modelling Language (UML) is currently a wcll-cstablishcd and popular 
language in Object Oriented Development. UML integrates diffcrcnt views of a system 
from its early conception to deployment (e. g. Use case view, Implcmcntation View, 
Proccss vicw and Dcployment vicw). UML can providc a scamlcss way of rcprcscnting 
the system during its development lifecyc1c, maintaining consistency between the 
different models. 
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+Mass +SensingRange 
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Fig. 2.1 - UINI L Diagram ror a B, %l D SoS 1201. 
With respect to SoS modelling, UML has been used to represent the SoS elements, and 
to show the data and the data types required in element collaboration. Caffal (20] uses a 
UML class diagram to conccptualise the elements of a Ballistic Missile Defence SoS. 
The top-level design is a conceptual class diagram with abstract classes, classifying the 
type of systems used (e. g. sensors, weapon). The abstract classes have a description of 
data that are needed by the SoS, and are associated with other classes, indicating the 
role and collaborations of each element. For example the control class receives data 
from the sensor class and controls the weapons class. 
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UML has been suggested to be cffcctivc in abstracting the network infrastructure 
modelling the SoS as a single system: "Rather than disparate reasoning about tile 
individual systems of a proposed System of Systems, we propose that we develop a 
sound modelfor reasoning about the System ofSystems a singlefunctional uniV' [20]. 
UML provides a widely adopted modelling framework, with expressive power and a 
variety models capable of capturing capture many aspects of a system's operation. 
Although UML is not optimiscd in representing Systems of Systems, certain UML 
models can potentially be related (in terms of the information that capture) with 
frameworks optimiscd, for SoS such as the ones presented in the next section. 
2.2.2.2 C41SR & Defence Architecture Frameworks 
The identification of the need for global (military) awarcncss has led to the 
idcntification of C41SR (Command Control Communications Computcrs, Intclligcncc, 
Survcillancc, Rcconnaissancc) systcms. In ordcr to makc the transition of SoS from 
conccpt to dcsign, the C41SR architccturc framcwork [2 11 was proposcd. 
The C41SR architecture framework provides 3 different architectural views: 
Operational, Technical and Systems [21]. The operational view describes the tasks and 
activities of concern and the information exchanges required. The systems view 
describes the systems of concern and the connections among those systems in context 
with the operational view. The technical view describes a profilc of a minimal set of 
timc-phascd standards and rules governing the implementation, arrangement, interaction 
and interdependence of system elements. 
A key challenge idcntiricd in C41SR architectures is sharing of data between the 
elements of a C41SR system. This means that cach clcmcnt will share their perception 
of the environment with other SoS elements eventually composing an cnhanccd picture 
of the battlefield. Jameson [22] uses the term data fusion to describe a means of sharing 
information between SoS clcmcnts, and presents an example of how this can be 
achieved between the heterogeneous elements of a SoS. 
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The C41SR framework was superseded by the Department of Defence Architectural 
Framework (DODAF) [23]. DODAF provides a framework organiscd in views similar 
to the C41SP, in which defence systems can be modelled. In particular, systems similar 
to NCW can be organiscd and modelled from every aspect of their operation. The 
Ministry of Defence Architectural Framework (MODAF) is a very similar framework 
used by the UK Ministry of Defence. DODAF and MODAF arc covered extensively in 
appendix B in which an example system (AGO) is modelled using the framework. 
2.3 Dependability 
Dependability is an abstract term describing a system's overall behaviour. 
Dependability as a concept is broadly accepted as being the "... the system's 
characteristic thatjustiftes placing ones reliance on it. " [24]. Littlcwood ct al. state 
that: "We use dependability informally to designate those system properties that allows 
us to rely on a system functioning as required' [25]. Although in abstract terms the 
definitions arc similar there is no overall consensus as to the exact definition of 
dcpcndability. 
2.3.1 Definitions 
McDcrmid satcs that: "-dependability can only be thought of as afinction of a system 
and its environment, not as a property Itself .. the form of specylication usedsometinjes 
depends on the particular dependability characteristic of Interest" [26]. Villcmcur, 
from a systems engineering perspective, gave the following dcrinition for dependability 
[27]: "In its broadest meaning, dependability will be defined as the science offallures: 
it, therefore encompasses the knowledge of these failures, their assessment, their 
prediction, their measurement and their control". According to Villcmcur 
dcpcndability can includc the following charactcristics: 
" Rcliability 
" Availability 
" Maintainability 
" Safcty 
" Durability 
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9 Scrvicc rctainability pcrformancc. 
9 Scrvability pcrfortnancc. 
Villcmcur defines dependability as a composite term, comprising of seven 
characteristics, which arc achieved by being able to predict, control, and assess failures. 
The critcria to assess dependability are associated to the fulfilmcrit of the required 
functions and the conditions in which the system operates. This is in accordance to the 
previous suggestion that dependability is a function of a system and its environment. 
The primary focus of the definition is on the failures of a system. Lapric ct al. extended 
the initial concept and defined dependability for computer systems identifying 
dependability attributes, as well as means of achieving it: "Dependability is the system 
property that integrates such attributes as reliability, safety, confildentiali% Integrity, 
survivability and maintainability, is achieved by means of fault tolerance, fault 
prevention, fault removal andfault recognition and it may be compromised byfaults, 
errors andfallures" [24]. 
Attributes 
- Reliability 
- Availability 
- Conridcntiality 
- Integrity 
- Maintainability 
- Safety 
Flg. 2.2 - Laprie's Dependability Tree 
- Fault Tolerance 
- Fault Prevention 
- Fault Removal 
- Fault Forecasting 
This is the most complete of the dcrinitions as it provides a set of attributes that 
comprise dependability. Laprie recogniscs the causes that can compromise 
dependability, and identifies the means of achieving it. The attributes arc system 
properties that describe the system's overall behaviour in rcspcct to its requirements. 
Lack of conscnsus on a specific derinition is mifforcd by the fcw standards dcrining 
dcpcndability. IEC 50-191 defincs dcpcndability similarly to Lapric: "The collective 
term used to describe the availability performance and its Influencing factors: 
Dtptndability 
I 
'Als 
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reliability performance, maintainability performance and maintainability Support 
performance. " [28]. 
Saridakis ct al [29] give a fault-tolcrant centric definition of dependability based on 
Lapric's observations. According to Saridakis dependability properties fall into two 
groups: 
1. Abstract Properties specified in tcnns of system states, which are defined 
independently of any fault tolerant technique, They serve to charactcrisc the 
dependability behaviour of an overall architecture, when this behaviour is too 
abstract to associatc a fault tolcrancc tcchnique with it. 
2. Concrete Properties specified in terms of system actions, whose dcflnition is 
closely related to some fault tolcrancc technique. They serve to charactcrise the 
dependability bchaviours associated to architectural clcmcnts, with respect to a 
givcn fault tolcrance tcchniquc. 
Saridakis commcnts that "... the most abstract dependability property, simply qualifled 
as Dependability, ensures that a system makes progress despite the occurrence of 
failure" [29]. 
I Dependability I 
i Abstract I 4 Concrete I 
Reliability II Availability II Sarety II Detection II Fault mask 
Fig. 2.3 - Categorlsation of Dependability Properties 
Prasad defines Dependability as . ..... a variable sized vector of attributes describing 
overlapping desiderata, chosen subjectively, in accordance to the stakeholders' 
particular requirements" [10]. Furthcri-norc, Prasad highlighted that dependability 
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attributes can be interrelated, but they are not orthogonal to cach other, and can be in 
conflict or in harmony. Prasad's definition focuses on the behaviour of the system with 
its environment, as suggested by McDermid. Prasad's definition is also the definition 
adopted throughout this thesis. 
2.3.2 Dependability & 'Fault Science' 
As mentioned by Laprie [24], dependability has threats that can compromise it, as well 
as means of achieving it. Taking in account the broader definition of dependability, a 
threat should be anything that will result into the system operating erroneously and not 
as expected. Both Laprie and Villcmcur, as well as a broad range of researchers, adopt 
the opinion that dependability is compromised by faults that exist within the system, 
resulting in failures and hcncc in erroneous behaviour. However, it has been obvious 
that dormant faults within the system arc not the only reason a system's dependability 
can be reduced. Also, the environment can cause the system to cntcr an crroncous 
behaviour due to environmental hazards, operator cffors or malicious attacks. 
A fault is a defect within the system; faults can be random (e. g. a dcfcctivc component) 
and systematic (e. g. wrong design of a system). Not necessarily all faults result in 
failures. Faults may be dormant in a system until activated by one or a sequence of 
events. When activated faults produce failures, which results in the system failing to 
perform its required function. When a failure occurs, if the system's behaviour deviates 
from required operation, then the system has cntcrcd an crroncous state. 
Erroneous 
State 7-* 
Fault Failure 
Flg. 2A - Fault Transidon to Failure 
Fig. 2.4 illustrates an example modelling the propagation of a fault [30]. Failures are 
deviations from expected behaviour and we can identify that a system has failed in 
respect to its environment. Failures arc the result of the fault activation to the system's 
environment. Faults can be classified by the persistence and their source [31]. The 
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SOUrce of a fault depends on the use ofthc system and the crivironnictit within which it 
has been deployed. For example, there can be operator faults, interface faults, storage 
faults etc. According to their persistence, faults have been catcgoriscd as design, 
operational and transient Faults. Design faults are removable and can be corrected by 
aults are non removabic and occur redesign of' the faUlty components. Operational I'l 
when a part ofthe systern breaks (e. g. database corruption). Finally transicnt faults are 
random t`aLIItS that are not deterministic and often cannot be reproduccd. Lapric et al. 
[24] combined all finilt classes and categorised the faults according to the measures that 
need to be taken to eliminate the faults into design, physical and intcraction IaLIItS. 
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The number of' faults in it system has been associatcd With tile reliability of tile system. 
Reliability has been defined as Ahe ptwhahdov that a piect, ol equipment "I- component 
will peqiwin its intended filliclion satislactori4l, /; )I- a prescribed Iunc and under 
stipulated environinewal cona'itions. " 1321. Although it bears similarities to the 
definition ot'dependability, rchability is a mathematical rept-csciiiation of* (lic probability 
of' the components flailing [331. The impact of' a rchahility Iailtire on the system Is 
(1cpcndability can affcct other depoidability attributcs. For cxampic a reliability failure 
ol'a processor may have an impact oil safety il'the processor is used to perform sat'ety 
critical Functions, or it could have an impact oil the performance oil the system. I fence 
it is not tile Cault itsclf'of'prirnary interest to tile system's stakeholders but its ct'icct oil 
the dependability attributes, which describe tile system's behaviour. 
52 
2.3.3 Unification of Safety and Security 
Safety and smirity arc two (1cpendability attrihutcs Miich mc cowidcicd it) dmic 
common concepts. There have been a number of' studies examining the potential of' 
unifying these two attributcs which are presented in tills section. A major dificrence 
between sal'ety and security is the Intent. The methods involved in salcty are conccriml 
with 11011-111,111CIOLIS 1111.11ts and how these can be avoided or mitigatcd. ()n the other 
hand, security is involved with plarmcd malicious attacks to the system. 
Jonsson et al. [341 idcritificd the functional relations bctween sccmity and dclmidability 
threats. I le suggests that the overall objective is: "to arrive at I geticral and clear-cut 
fi-ainewol-k that would ikwrihe how trustahle (dependah/c, securt') a N. 1-stem is. 
I-cKardless 0/ the reavonfin- its not heing lota/h, trustable". [-or examp1c, it should be 
possible it) treat a system 1111ilLirc causcd by an Intentional intriislon or a llai(k%arc fatilt 
using tile sallic frictliodology". Jollsson's analysis is based oil the fact that ..... III the 
del)('11dabilit. l. (ifiscil)II11c, reasons fin. filihin's (11T cilfled fiIIIII. V 1111d vrror%, whereas 
SeCiffitv I)C'ol)lt' Iraditionall. l. ledk abolit (11hick% that caust, hrtw( hv. v wnif vullicnihilitle. v". 
Jonsson also provides an intcgratcd framework I'M dclmidabilaN and "CL-tirltv, 
Illustrated in Fig. 2.6. 
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The framework identifics fivc main areas ill the sysicin and its iclationship ý%ith tile 
environment. A threat (I) ("an environmental subsystem that can possibly Introduce it 
I'llult III dic system") Introduces it litult exploiting it vulnerability (2) ("it place where it is 
Possible to Introduce it fault"). 'I'llis propagates into tile system and causes an cri-or 
(erroneous state) (3), which can have its a conscqLICIICC the occurrcncc of" a Iii1lure (4) 
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that then affccts the system's behaviour (dependability) with respect to its environment 
(5). In general Jonsson's framework provides a gcncralisation and does not accurately 
prcscnt all possible states of a system in presence of a fault. Moreover, the 
gcncralisation cannot be extended in covering other attributes such as safety, for which 
there exist well defined frameworks and descriptions of how faults can cause accidents. 
Ilowcvcr, Jonsson's framework is useful in introducing the concept of interaction 
betwccn depcndability attributcs. 
Another attempt to integrate safety and security is SafScc [35]. The objectives of the 
SafSec project were to evaluate the feasibility of combining current and future methods 
of acceptance of the next generation of military avionics against their safety and 
security requirements. Predominantly, SaiScc seeks to provide a means for joint 
certification of military aircraft for safety and security. A unified approach proposed by 
SaiScc involves simultaneous reasoning about achievement of assurance regarding the 
system's safety and security properties. 
SafScc proposes the integration of safcty and security in the following way: 
Unificd approach to risk asscssmcnt - combining the cffor oricntcd approach of 
Safcty with the action-oricntcd approach of Sccurity. 
Adoption of a risk dircctcd approach throughout the assurancc lifc-cycic - using 
common languagc for spccifying the dcsircd propcrtics of a systcm. 
Usc of modular ccrtification mcthods to providc a common framcwork for 
sating cvidential rcquircmcnts to facilitatc rc-ccrtirication. 
Similar work attempting to integrate safety and security requirements based on unirlcd 
risk assessment was done by Moffett ct al. [36]. The study concludes that: "VOIlle the 
definition of safety or security could be extended to include both concepts, in the 
majority of the situations it is inappropriate to attempt to unJ& safety and security risk 
analysis techniques ...... he also point out that a sarcty case must provide separate 
argument and goals when there is a security and a safety conflict [36]. 
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2.3.4 Measuring Dependability 
Being an abstract concept, it is difficult to examine the dependability of a system as 
there is no metric associated with it. This has implications in decision making because 
of the difficulty in comparing the dependability of two or morc systems. Individual 
dependability attributes have been associated with mctrics; for example it possible to 
identify that a system A is more reliable than a system B, based on quantitative 
representation of reliability. However there were few attempts to provide an overall 
metric for dependability. A notable attempt is from Prasad (101 who integrated the 
individual attribute metrics in order to produce a single metric that will express 
dependability numerically. The suitability of a number of methods and models (e. g. 
additive method, hurt model, multi attribute utility theory) to produce a single metric for 
dependability was investigated. Results showed it is not infeasible to derive a useful 
and meaningful single metric of dependability that will reflect the behaviour of a system 
with respect to its dependability attributes. Prasad cxcplicitly states that: "It is 
infeasible to directly measure dependability as a composite property using a single real 
number, even on a scale as weak as ordinal. This is because any given pair ofsystems 
may not be comparable due to multiple attributes being implicit in the comparison, or, 
may be ordered by different stakeholders" [ 10]. 
2.4 Trade-offs in System Design 
Developing a dependable system involves addressing many (non-ortliogonal) attributes. 
Consequently, having to resolve possible conflicts between the different dependability 
attributes and make trades is an inevitable situation, especially for large-scale systems. 
Lapric states that tradcoffs arc one of the reasons that developmental errors arc 
introduced. "During development, faults result generally from tradeoffs, either a) 
aimed at preserving acceptable performance andjacilitqting system utilisation, or b) 
induced by economic considerations" [24]. Establishing a dependability case for a 
system necessitates reasoning about those possible trade-offs. In some circumstances 
trade-offs can be made relatively straightforwardly. For example, consider the 
availability and safety of an airliner. Flying an aircraft with all its systems operational 
would require repair times that would make the aircraft unavailable. On the other hand 
'loss' of functionality has an impact on the sarcty levels of the aircraft. This 
compromise has been historically resolved by consulting the Minimum Equipment List 
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(MEL) of the aircraft. A MEL specifics the systems that must be operational so that the 
aircraft can take off. The list is populated aftcr assessing the impact on risk (probability 
and sevcrity) when a system is unavailable. By comparing the resultant risk with the 
maximum acceptable it is possible to specify whether the aircraft is airworthy and the 
time interval within which the system has to be rcpaircd. Ilowcvcr, there can be cases 
when simultaneously attempting to trade-off a large number of different goals in a 
context where the priorities may not be so clearly defined (e. g. the defence domain as 
opposed to the civil domain where safety is ideally the highest priority). In such cases, 
in order to establish justificd, trade-offs a methodical approach is required, 
systematically addressing a number of considerations. 
By identifying the tradeoffs between the dependability attributes and their rclation to the 
design of the system, an acceptable balance can be found. Three main strands were 
investigated under the trade-off section. 
Methods used in systems cnginccring to make trades between system 
requirements. ATAM is one of the most prominent methodologies used for 
trade-offs and is presented in this section. Several other methods arc bricfly 
described in chapter 5, along with discussion rcgarding idcntiricd conccpts used 
in trade-offs. 
Design Rationale is used during the development of a system in order to 
facilitate clicitation of design decisions and achieve agreement between the 
different balancing their requirements. 
As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) is an approach imposed by the 
UK 11calth and Safety Executive (IISE), requiring developers to justify trade- 
offs involving safcty. 
2.4.1 The Architecture Tradeoff Analysis Method (ATAM). 
ATAM is a method developed by the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) in Carnegie 
Mellon University. The objectives are to understand the tradcoffs of candidate system 
architectures and select the one that will satisfy the best, the requirements of the system. 
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ATAM is a structurcd tecluilcitic 1'()r understanding the tradcol'I'S inlici-ciit III the 
archaccturcs ot'sollwarc intcnsivc systcIlls. 'I'lic flictliod was dcvelopcd to: "providt, a 
principled waY to evaluate 41 vo/twwre art -Iiitt, (*tlll*(, '. v with 11) 111111tiph, 
compett . ng qualitY alfributes" 1371. According to the (1cf-mition adoptcd III ATAM, 
quality attributcs ol'a systcm constitute Its bchavIOUr with rcspect to thc environment. 
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1011 
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Fig. 2.7 - System Qualio kitrilm(c owigaijoll., 
Quality attributes represent the cxpcclcd hcha%lour ()I' I sysicin, ob. sci%ablc at 
boundary as pi-cscilled III F,,. 2.7 13,841. This obsmation introduces the notion of' I 
contract between the system and its environment, hased on the succcss of the , ýstcjlj to 
provide the environment the expected bc1laviout. Although the Concept Is Intioduccd 
1'rom the viewpoint of' quality, tile overall objective (i. e. 111c sN*.., tcli, I)CII; I%c jis 
cxpcctc(l) of, defilling quality attributes Is the saille as III (ICI)CII(labilitY. 
According to ATAM, quality attribute 1whaviour is rclatcd to the design oftlic syocin 
scveral (Icsigns may satisfy onc attributc but not anotlicr, wlicii a tradc ot'l'cxi,, t-.,. "llic 
A TA IV is Incant to be it risk idt'l II Ili('( Ili wI int'lliod, (I It It 'i II IN 0I di 'fd '( *1111.1ý t It'( 'I IA i )/ 
polcillial risk withill Mc an -h ift, clure 0/ a comph"t v"flivart, IIII(VISIVC 'ýVvftwl ... 
Risks 
IWC ell'Chilectural4l, importatil deci. vions Milt have Ito/ been madc or '14-clsioll. v Iililt have 
heell madc. /)III whost, consequetices art, not JuIll, undervioOd' 1391, Hic tradcolfs M, c 
then resolved by prioritising the systcnis actions to the external slimid, accold"19 to tile 
sevcrity of' the scenario, and licncc by priormsing the quality attributes that correspond 
to the respective scenario actions. Fig. 2.9 depicts the inpuls and outpuls of ATAM 
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ATAM makes an important contribution that could bc related to the SoS conccpt, thc 
ldclitilicatioll of' Sensitivity Points. According to ATANI wnsitivity poink are: 
"... paralpleters ill /he archilecture to which NOMC /M WSUI*i lb/c quil/Ifl. (110,11,111t, re. sponst, 
is hjghýv correlated. - [391. 
Thcrcilore we can see that the behaviour of' it system is related to the design decisions 
that are made. Possible use of' the concept III a SoS dc1mitlabilily case would he lo 
relate the arguments about the dependability attributes to evidence dlIcctlv Coming 1'roill 
tile SOS design. ldclit I ficat loll of' sensitivity points call facilitate III uIldclstall(ling lio%% 
the design decisions made during system development, Call llclp achimlig the 
goals described in the depcii(lability case. 
ATAM is a very usefid method that identifics tradcoll's between sysicin atuibuics that 
are related to tile design ol'the system and provides it methodology in order to scicct tile 
most suitable design according to it set of" scenarios the system 
has to satisf'y. This 
could I'Orni a basis I'Or tile concept of"delmidahility case. I 1()%%, c%-ci- tile incthod docs no( 
mention interrelation of' it system's components and ho%ý otic's behaviour af'I'Ccl,, tile 
other Moreover tile ATAM methodology rcpoiI explicitly mentions that ATAM is not 
it structured method that can be used for formally reasoning about it System, bill it is a 
method to evaluate the effect of' different scenarios in combination \% ith the design on 
tile quality attributes. 
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2.4.2 Design Rationale 
Design Rationale aims to provide the rationale for design selections throughout the 
system development process. "Design rationale (DR) expresses elements of the 
reasoning which has been invested behind the design of an artefact. A DR answers 
why ... ? Questions of different sorts, depending on the class of DR represented. 
" [40]. 
Apart from providing the design options necessary to evolve a system, there is also the 
need to justify the selection of a specific option. Some design rationale approaches use 
argumentation techniques to justify design selections based on a set of criteria, 
concerning a particular problem in the system [41]. Argumentation based design 
rationale is claimed to help in the problems such as [40]: 
9 Clarify vague requirements, and tracking the rationale for their inevitable 
evolution. 
Represent multiple stakeholders' viewpoints, including that of end-uscrs in 
participatory design. 
9 Negotiating trade-offs between multidisciplinary analyses, such as software and 
user criteria. 
* Maintaining consistency in decision-making, e. g. through propagating changes 
through networks. 
* Communicate rationale to other designers. 
9 Building cumulative design knowledge, through systematic re-use of rationale. 
The ability of DR to allow negotiation of trade-offs can be used to show how a 
dependability attribute is traded off against another based on a design decision. This 
bears similarities to the ATAM method. The objective of the ATAM is to evaluate the 
different design selections and identify the (design) sensitivity points that affect the 
achievement of the quality attribute. Design rationale representations can be formal, 
semiformal and informal (Fig. 2.8). The more informal the representation is the easier it 
is for humans to conceptualise the rationale behind any design decisions (Fig. 2.9). 
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Fig. 2.9 - Design Rationale Representations 1401 
In this chapter semiformal representations of design rationale are examined, since they 
are more suitable to accommodate argument based rationale [40], [41 ]. Design rationale 
captures the dependency each requirement of the attributes has, oil design options. The 
following pages provide a brief description of DR representations that were studied. 
2.4.2.1 QOC 
Tile Question Option Criterion (QOC) is a graphic representation Ior design rationale 
used for design space analysis. Fig. 2.10 illustrates QOC. Questions used to describe 
the system's required behaviour, which arc answered by design options which are 
considered to be able to achieve the question indicates. 
Argument 
Aigume. tit ----- At Timent 
pt, by rQ t--, - C. rit 1ý-r iF 
OUestion W: (-: t iterion 
W4, 
Opfi Criterion 
Con, ecluent C)Ljesficmi 4< 
Fig. 2.10 -The QOC Method 1401 
60 
Chapter 2- Literature Review 
The best design option is selected by arguing for each of the available options based on 
certain criteria, which can support or object selection of a particular design option. 
After the assessment of the relationship between options and criteria (supports or 
objects to) the arguments are used to conduct debate about the design option that 
satisfies the best the required question. 
Debate as a product of the QOC method could provide discussions about tradeoffs. 
Options are linked to consequent questions, and therefore inherently the best design 
option that satisfies the most the questions is selected. However tradeoffs are not 
explicitly mentioned and there are not any defined procedures used to identify the 
tradeoff point as in ATAM and its impact on all the required attributes. 
2.4.2.2 SIBYL 
SIBYL is another tool used for design rationale. Lee describes SIBYL as "a system that 
supports group decision making by representing and managing the qualitative aspects 
ofdecision making; such as the alternatives, the goals to be satisfied and the arguments 
evaluating the alternatives with respect to these goals" [42]. 
The two main motivations for SIBYL are knowledge sharing and qualitative decision 
support. SIBYL uses the decision representation language (DRL). Using DRL, a 
decision problem represents the problem of choosing the alternative that best satisfies 
the system goals. Each alternative is related to a goal via an 'achieves' relation. A 
relation in DRL is a subclass of claim. The overall evaluation of an alternative is 
presented by the plausibility of the relation. The structure of the DRL vocabulary and 
the achievement of the rationale capture are shown in Fig. 2.1 1. Selection of an 
alternative is based on whether the alternative associated with a goal can credibly 
achieve that goal. Justification is provided supporting each association between 
alternative and goal. Being a goal-based approach, SIBYL supports decomposition and 
refinement of goals into sub goals. Although SIBYL captures the rationale behind some 
design decisions, the trade off points of a system cannot be easily evaluated. 
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The decision problem does not provide relations to other attributes so as to evaluate 
architectures based on a collective view of tile attributes as ATAM does. I lowever a 
useful conclusion of DRL is that claims can have both a negative and a positive cf! 'ect 
on a goal or sub goal. 
2.4.2.3 gIBIS 
gIBIS is the last design rationale approach presented. -gIBIS is a hypertext system 
designed to capture early design considerations" [43]. gIBIS is based on the IBIS 
method, which helps providing arguments for the different stakeholders' viewpoints 
during the design process. The gIBIS structure is shown in Fig. 2.12. IBIS is concerned 
with 'issues' that need to be resolved during the design process. An issue is questioned 
or suggested from a position. A position is a statement or assertion, which resolves the 
issue. Each position is related to one or more arguments that can support or object it. 
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Issues can be parallelised with goals and questions in other DR methods, whereas 
positions and arguments are similar to the 'achieves' and 'supports' associations in 
SIBYL. As with the rest design rationale methods reviewed, IBIS is used to facilitate 
communication between stakeholders in the early design stages., It identifies the 
concept of the design objecting to a goal of the system but there is no structured 
approach for a collective view of a system based on its requirements. 
2.4.3 As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) Principle 
ALARP is a principle applied in safety critical systems, imposed by the UK Health and 
Safety at Work (HSW) Act of 1974. According to HSW, system developers have a legal 
obligation to demonstrate to the safety governing bodies that the risks have been 
reduced to a level that is As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) [44]. According 
to ALARP risk falls into three major categories; broadly acceptable (negligible), 
intolerable and within the ALARP region. The ALARP region is defined by a target 
and a limit value. When developers of a system accept a risk that falls in the ALARP 
region, they need to show that the cost of fin-ther risk reduction would be grossly 
disproportional to the actual risk reduction achieved. Decisions made are based on an 
argument about disproportional benefit (although according to law there should be a 
bias to safety), and on justification about the target and limit that define the (ALARP) 
region of tolerability of risks. Walker underlines that ALARP "requires a comparison 
of risk and the sacrifice involved in taking measures to avert the risk" [45]. When 
making a decision, the system stakeholders need to justify their incentive for making the 
decision, which in this case will take the form of an argument about the disproportion 
between safety improvement and cost sacrifice. 
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Fig. 2.13 shows an adapted example of the categories for classification of risk used in 
safety standards such as (46]. Risk can be classified in three major categories: 
Negligible, Intolerable, and within the ALARP region. The safety 'target' is to achieve 
risks that are considered negligible. Additionally, a limit on risk is defined. Risks 
exceeding the defined limit are considered intolerable (i. e. unacceptable). The region 
between these two values (target and limit) deftes the risks that can be considered to be 
intolerable if they can be argued to be As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). A 
risk is considered ALARP if costs of ftu-ther risk reduction options can be shown to be 
disproportionate to the risk reduction that would be achieved. 
Improbable 1 1 1 1 
Unlikely 2 2 1 1 
Possible 3 3 2 1 
Frequent 3 3 3 
.2 
KEY 
3: Intolerable Risk 
2: ALARP 
1: Negligible Risk 
j Intolerable Risk 
Limit 
ALARP 
7Target 
L 
egligibl 
Fig. 2.13 - ALARP Categorisation and Risk Acceptance 
The resultant system risk can be classified in the following categories: 
1. Intolerable Risk, Risk cannot be justified except in extraordinary circumstances. 
2. Undesirable Risk, tolerable only if reduction is impractical or costs are 
disproportionate o improvements gained. 
3. Tolerable risk if cost of risk reduction would exceed improvements gained. 
4. Negligible risk. 
Categories 2 and 3 belong to the ALARP region, where the risk has to be reduced as 
low as reasonably practicable. 
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ALARP is a principle indicating a 'pure' tradeoff between safety and cost; the rationale 
as well as the methods that are used in safety assessment could be extended to 
accommodate more attributes than just safety. ALARP is used to assess the overall 
system safety. 
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Fig. 2.14 - GSN Pattern for the ALARP Principle [471 
Kelly [47] has formalised the principle by providing a pattern for ALARP arguments, 
based on the Goal Structuring Notation (explained in the following sections of the 
review). McDermid states that especially for software, ALARP cannot be quantified 
and it would be better to look for a qualitative approach: "Perhaps more realistically, 
the above says that we cannot apply ALARP in a quantified manner and we should 
instead lookfor qualitative arguments to decide when risk has been reduced ALARP. " 
[48]. This statement, along with Prasad's conclusions provide strong indication that 
arguing the relation and the tradeoffs between the dependability attributes should be 
based on qualitative approaches. 
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2.5 Dependability Cases 
Standards such as the UK Defence Standards 00-552 and 00-56 have an explicit 
requirement that systems should be accompanied by a safety case, communicating a 
comprehensible argument that a system is acceptably safe in a given operational 
context. However there are no standards requiring a dependability case. The only 
association of dependability case with a standard is by Froome and Jones [49], who 
describe the dependability case as a possible supportive document for a system 
developed widi the IEC-61508. 
Maxion suggests that "dependability cases comprise an organising framework and 
methodologyfor thinking about exceptions and the conditions under which they occur" 
[50]. In this definition, the author identifies the association between assurance 
regarding the dependability and system failures. The definition identifies the need to 
understand exceptions. This refers to Laprie's statement that in order to achieve 
dependability, faults in a system must be understood and controlled. However, he does 
not provide any guidance on how to structure arguments regarding the attributes of 
dependability. 
Further work by Maxion identifies the dependability case as a basis for reasoning about 
the "dependability" behavioural characteristics of a system stating that: "... a 
dependability case is a documented body of evidence that provides a convincing and 
valid argument that a system is adequately dependablefor a given application" [5 1 ]. 
Established practice regarding reasoning about a system involves well defined and 
researched methods in the area of safety cases, which can be found in a variety of 
industries (e. g. nuclear, defence). However safety cases represent only one aspect of 
dependability. There are examples of standards and practices that require or propose a 
'case' regarding the rest dependability attributes. 
2 00-55 has been superseded by 00-56 and at the time of writing up this thesis has been made obsolescent. Ilowevcr it is a good source for some of the principles used in this thesis and their rationale. 
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2.5.1 Safety Cases 
Adelard define Safety Case as "a documented body of evidence that provides a 
convincing and valid argument that a system is adequately safefor a given application 
in a given environmene, [52]. This definition is almost identical to the definition given 
by Maxion for dependability cases. Kelly having analysed numerous defence and 
public standards concludes that: "A safety case should communicate a clear, 
comprehensive and defensible argument that a system is acceptably safe to operate in a 
particular context" [47]. 
Safety cases have been used both for public and military projects. Guidance on railway 
[53] safety cases underlines that the aim of a safety cases regarding public transport 
systems should: 
1. Give confidence that the operator has the ability, commitment resources to 
properly assess and effectively control risks to the health and safety of staff, 
contractors, passengers and public. 
2. Provide a comprehensive core document, with links to other more specific 
documents, rules and procedures against which management and the department 
can check the accepted risk control measures and the health and safety 
management systems that have been properly put into place and continue to 
operate in the way originally intended. 
The Adelard Safety Case Manual presents the safety case structure as a set of claims 
which, using an argument, are supported by evidence (Fig. 2.15). An argument 
represents a set of inference refining the original claim. The argument can be 
deterministic (true/false claims) or probabilistic (e. g. MTTR, MT7F). DEF STAN 00- 
55 provides a required list of contents that a safety case should have to comply with the 
standard. Initially safety cases were text based. However especially for large systems a 
text-based arguments can often be difficult to understand [47]. This has led into 
enhancing the text based argument with tabular based arguments (e. g. 00-55), and 
graphical notations (e. g. GSN [47]). 
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The Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) explicitly represents the Individual elements of' 
any safety argument (requirements, claims, evidence and context) and (perhaps more 
significantly) the relationships that exist between these elements (i. e. how individual 
requirements are supported by specific claims, how claims are supported by evidence 
and the assumed context that is defined for the argument) [47]. The main symbols of' 
the notation arc shown in Fig. 2.16. 
The principal purpose of a goal structure is to show how goals (claims about the system) 
are successively broken down into sub-goals until a point is reached where claims ciln 
be supported by direct reference to available evidence (solutions). As part of' this 
decomposition, using the GSN it is also possible to make clear the argument strategics 
adopted (e. g. adopting a quantitative or qualitative approach), the rationale for the 
approach (assumptions, justi fi cations) and the context in which goals are stated (e. g. the 
system scope or the assumed operational role. The Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) 
[54], considerably improved the expressiveness of safety cases, as it provided a 
graphical way of representing the elements of the case. Fig. 2.17 presents an example of 
a goal structure arguing the fault free implementation of an industrial control system. 
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Fig. 2.17 -'Control System' Example CSN Argument 
In order to manage complex safety cases - in which there arc complex relationships 
between arguments - the principles of compositional, modular, safety cases have 
already been established [55]. In this approach, the safety case for an overall system 
can be divided into a number of modules - containing the separate arguments and 
evidence for different aspects of system safety. For example, for a complex avionics 
platforrn the overall safety case can be reasoned about as the composition of separate 
arguments for each of the separate avionics subsystems. However, as described above 
for the dependability case, these arguments cannot be reasoned about in isolation. For 
example, it may only be possible to argue about the safety of one avionics subsystem in 
the context of assumed safe behaviour of another. To help manage the relationships that 
exist between safety case modules the concept of modular safety case interfaces 
(defining clearly the objectives, evidence, and assumed context of the case together with 
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any dependencies on other cases) and safety case contracts (recording how the 
dependencies between safety cases are resolved) have been defined. 
Establishing a safety argument and creating a safety case is not a single process that 
takes place at a single defined point of the system's lifecycle. Safety standards, such as 
the U. K. Defence Standard 00-56 issue 4 [8] and the Ship Safety Management 
Handbook JSP430 [12], require that safety case development be treated as an 
evolutionary activity that is integrated with the rest of the design and safety lifecycle. 
For example, Defence Standard 00-56 states that: "The safety case should be initiated at 
the earliest possible stage in the safety Programme so that hazards are identified and 
dealt with while the opportunitiesfor their exclusion exisf '. 
In addition, JSP430 specifies that at least three versions of the safety case should be 
constructed: 
4p Preliminary safety case - After definition and review of the system requirements 
specification. 
9 Interim safety case - After initial system design and preliminary validation 
activities. 
Operational safety case - Prior to in-service use, including complete evidence of 
requirements satisfaction 
At each stage of the evolution of the safety case, the safety argument is expressed in 
terms of what is known about the system being developed. At the early stages of project 
development the safety argument is limited to presenting high-level objectives, as 
design and safety knowledge increases during the project these objectives (and the 
corresponding argument) can be expressed in increasingly tangible and specific terms 
(as depicted in Fig. 2.18). 
70 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
Safe 
General safety objectives 
(e. g- standards, design concept 
safety) 
Specific safety objectAtes 
(e. g design hazards, enacted 
requIrements) 
vonfication fargots 
(o. g failuro rato, NSPF, 
des4n propothes) 
Safety Evidence 
(e g Test Results, 'ýýEvfdwnce 
Fauff Trees, Design 
Information) 
Safety 
Planning 
Prelim. Design 
& Safety Analysis 
Further 
Design & 
Safety 
Analysis 
F] 
Evidence ) Evidenc* 
Fig. 2.18 - Evolution of an Argument 
Although safety cases focus only on one dependability attribute, often there arc relations 
identified to other attributes. However the rest of the attributes have a secondary role 
acknowledged only if they affect the system's sallety goals. 
2.5.2 Reliability and Maintainability Cases 
Defence Standard 00-40 requires the construction of a reliability and maintainability 
case. As defined by the standard, a R&M Case is "a reasoned auditable argument 
created to support the contention that a dcfincd system satisfics the R&M requirements: 
"... is also producecl progressively thiring (i pr(ýject /ý/ý cycle wul will ývpiceillv be 
summarizeclin ti R&Mcase t1ocument in the entiql'thepheise" [561. 
The R&M case is required to provide assurance that the R&M requirements of the 
systems have been met. The standard requires the case to be reviewed and updated in 
case: 
The system is modified 
The context of its operation is modified. 
The R&M requirements are modified, 
If there is deviation between the actual and intended performance 
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Fig. 2.19 presents the elements of a R&M case. 
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Fig. 2.19 - Elements of the R&M Case 1561 
An important aspect of the R&M case is that evidence of the R&M case can also be 
used as input to the safety case, as suggested by the Defence Standard (I)Stan) 00-42 
[57]. As already described dependability attributes are not Independent to each other. 
A reliability or performance failure may lead to a safety or security 111111irc. For 
example consider an ATC SoS delaying processing of' aircrall data. I lence claiming 
achievement of acceptable safety or security may depend oil arguments regarding tile 
reliability or perfon-nance of the system. Collaboration between cases representing 
different system attributes is essential in order to establish assurance about tile overall 
dependability of a system. 
2.5.3 Security Cases 
It is widely accepted that security is a composite attribute consisting ofaSpeCtS Such as 
reliability, availability and confidentiality. Security failures are usually related to 
malicious attacks from persons that deliberately attempt to exploit system 
vulnerabilities. 
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The concept of security case has not been explicitly defined similarly to sat'ety or the 
R&M case. However, there are attempts to provide an argument of security. An 
example is security Methodically Organised Argument Trees (MOATs) which are 
"... used to document and communicate the assurance argument that establishes a 
security property for a system under consideration" [58]. MOATs are based on 
hierarchical fault trees [59]. Each node contains an assurance claim and the interior 
nodes document how these assumptions compose to establish the required claim 
(Fig. 2.20). 
User's e-mail is 
kept private 
User's e-mail k User's e-mail User's e-mail kept private in kept private in private on disk transmissio memory 
Encryption Key known only 
- mail stored in 
08 prevent,, 
ensures sent to sender and encrypted form access 
by other 
e-mail privacy receiver programs 
Fig. 2.20 -A Security MOAT 1581 
The goals are identified based on a security risk analysis of the system, evaluating the 
consequences of possible security failure. The risk analysis provides the goals the 
system must satisfy, in the same sense as a hazard analysis. MOATs are accompanied 
by a methodology in order to produce an effective and valid argument concerning the 
security of a system. 
Other approaches include the Network Visual Rating Methodology (NVRM) developed 
by the US naval research laboratory. NVRM is derived from GSN providing a set of 
"decomposable" goals that using a justified strategy are supported by evidence. "The 
VNRM is a toolset and language, for developing and evaluating a map qI'an argument 
that mission critical information is adequately protected by a system in its larger 
operational environment" [60]. 
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The methodology combines the three attributes of security (confidentiality, integrity and 
availability), as well as four security disciplines (Physical, Technological, Operational, 
Personnel) in order to compose an effective argument about the security (Fig. 2.2 I). 
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Fig. 2.21 - VNRM Concept 1601 
Fig. 2.22 -AL VNRNI Nlap Combining FaultTrees and CSN 1561 
VNRM constructs argument maps (Fig. 2.22), which contain claims interrelated via 
dependencies, assumptions and design decisions. Moreover, sub-claims of a map can 
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have their own argument in a separate map in a style similar to modular GSN. An 
important feature of VNRM is its ability to show the associations between different 
claims based on design decisions. 
2.6 Summary 
The chapter presented a survey of related work in the areas of Systems of Systems, 
dependability, systems design and trade-offs, and cases as a means of achieving 
assurance about the operation of a system. Concerning Systems of Systems, several 
definitions were presented, each having its own unique viewpoint. Moreover certain 
modelling methods and frameworks were reviewed. Dependability was another topic 
examined. Definitions are not always aligned, each approaching dependability from a 
different perspective. However, some common assumptions, upon most of the 
definitions, were identified. Finally system assurance cases were reviewed. In order to 
make a dependable SoS, the development process should be structured, and we should 
be able to determine how any design decisions will affect the SoS behaviour. Safety 
cases are the most mature and widely used concept. 
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Chapter 3 
Establishing a Dependability Case 
Framework 
In the previous chapter a number of concepts were reviewed suggesting the creation of 
an argument about dependability attributes such reliability, security and safety. 
However, little has been done about integrating all dependability attributes in a single 
case. This chapter lays the foundations for integrating dependability attributes by 
establishing a dependability case framework. Firstly, the characteristics of a 
dependability case are discussed. Then, key challenges are identified introducing the 
work done in this thesis to address them. Finally, the chapter presents the technical 
approach undertaken in creating a dependability case metamodel, rigorously defining 
the concepts and their associations. The dependability case metamodel is used 
throughout the thesis to clearly present the concepts of each of the proposed methods. 
3.1 Dependability Arguments 
Although the dependability case is a relatively new and untested concept, the idea of 
developing 'cases' for system attributes other than safety is not unprecedented. 
Maintainability cases are a requirement of the U. K. Defence Standard 00-40 [56]. 
Defence Standard 00-40 defines the reliability and maintainability (R&M) case as "a 
reasoned auditable argument created to support the contention that a defined system 
satisfies the R&M requirements". The Common Criteria for security [61 ] suggest a 
document explaining why a system has met its required security level. Similarly, the 
US Naval Research Laboratory whilst not explicitly using the term security case; have 
described the development and evaluation of "a map of an argument that mission 
critical information is adequately protected by a system in its larger environment" [60]. 
In all cases the argument communicates how the available evidence can support an 
overall claim about the acceptable behaviour of the system regarding the respective 
attribute. Table. 3.1 shows typical claims, arguments and evidence required when 
reasoning about different dependability attributes. 
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Tnhip-3-1 - Claimv- Arpuments and Evidence for Denendabilitv Attrihutes 
Attribute Overall Claim Typical Argument Typical 
Evidence 
Safety System is adequately Hazard mitigation II azard 
safe argument Analysis, Causal 
analysis 
Reliability System meets Adequate redundancy, Testing 
reliability resilience of components Simulation, 
requirements Markov analysis 
Maintainability System meets Modular cohesive Expert opinion, 
maintainability design, ease of simulation. 
requirements installation, ease of 
replacing components 
Security Mission critical Assets protection Access control, 
information is argument policies, 
adequately protected M0ATs3 
Despite the fact that there are attempts to create cases for other attributes, all of' them 
focus on a single dependability attribute. Also, none of them have been the Sub - Icct of' 
as extensive research and development (e. g. tool support) as safety cases. 
3.2 Dependability Attributes and Non-functional 
Requirements 
It is common for the dependability attributes to be characterised its noti-ftinctional 
requirements (e. g. Robertson's classification of non-functional reqUircnicnts [62]). This 
classification separates the concerns of the stakeholders into Functional and non- 
functional, with the former describing what the system has to do, and the latter 
describing properties of the system such as safety, performance and usability. 
However this distinction between functional and non-functional requirements is not 
always clear. Non-functional and functional requirements can be related to each other. 
For example, in order to achieve a safety requirement, further functionality may be 
needed that contributes to increasing the safety levels of the system, such as the 
functionality provided by WAS which mitigates failure to maintain the prescribed 
aircraft separation. Furthermore although to some degree dependability properties arc 
3 Methodically Organised Argument Trees (MOATs) are described in chapter 2 
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inherent, their implementation to acceptable levels will require certain design 
characteristics. For instance, it is common practice to ensure the availability of a 
function by adding redundant components that provide the function. Hence, 
establishing acceptable dependability levels can have impact on both the 
implementation and the design/architecture of a system. Therefore it is often the case 
that such attributes may have to be planned from the beginning of the system 
development. This was recognised by Prasad [10] and Bass et al. who also add that 
'ýyou can't get functionality right and then go back andput in qualities. They have to 
be designedftom the start" [63]. 
Dependability can be thought of as a composite system property describing the system's 
behaviour with respect to different viewpoints, with ultimate objective the reliance on 
the system's operation. A dependability case communicates assurance about acceptable 
operation of the system. According to Prasad's (more generic) definition, which has 
been adopted in this thesis, dependability entails any requirement that the stakeholders 
perceive to be important with regard to their interests. 
A key challenge is to maintain the multiple attributes of dependability at acceptable 
levels, addressing the achievement of each attribute in context of the others. 
Engineering practice has shown that it is impossible to achieve all dependability 
requirements without compromise. Satisfaction of the requirements depends on design 
decisions during system evolution and contextual information about the operation of the 
system. This task requires definition and justification of clear levels of acceptability for 
each dependability requirement, as well as traceýbility of the requirements' rationale 
throughout the entire lifecycle. 
3.3 The Role of Argumentation in System and 
Requirements Evolution 
A safety case exists to communicate an argument. It is used to demonstrate how 
someone can reasonably conclude that a system is acceptably safe from the evidence 
available. A safety case is a device for communicating ideas and information, usually to 
a third party (e. g. a regulator). In order to do this convincingly, it must be as clear as 
possible. The safety argument is that which communicates the relationship between the 
79 
Chapter 3- Establishing a Dependability Case Framework 
evidence and objectives. Both argument and evidence are crucial elements of the safety 
case that must go hand-in-hand. An argument without supporting evidence is 
unfounded, and therefore unconvincing. Evidence without an argument is unexplained; 
it can be unclear that safety objectives have been satisfied [47]. Although the argument 
of a case can be presented in a textual form, experience has shown that this is 
inefficient, often resulting in weak arguments that are hard to comprehend. For this 
reason the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) was introduced to structure and present 
clear and comprehensible cases [47], which was described in chapter 2. 
The Goal Structuring Notation is used in a dependability case to structure the argument 
about acceptable fulfilment of the system's dependability goals. In most goal-based 
requirements engineering (RE) methods, goals represent something that a stakeholder 
hopes to achieve in the future [64]. Often in RE, Goals refer to something general and 
abstract that cannot be directly verified, as opposed to requirements that can be 
validated and verified by the end of a system's development lifecycle. Thus goals need 
to be refined until they can result in specific requirements. However, in a GSN goal 
structure, goals are phrased as propositions. This means that they are statements that can 
either be true orfalse. 
Evolving in parallel to the system development, goals are decomposed until they can be 
directly supported by evidence collectcd during the development and testing phases of 
the system. GSN goals are specific claims that a system has achieved a particular 
requirement. Being able to explicitly represent and associate all the elements of an 
argument, GSN helps to articulate post-conditions for the initially identified 
requirements of the system in question. In a dependability case, GSN is used to create 
arguments supporting claims of sufficient achievement of the dependability attributes. 
Fig. 3.1 presents a dependability adaptation of the evolution of a safety argument 
illustrated in Fig. 2.18. Fig. 3.1 shows how a high level dependability claim can be 
decomposed during development of the system. At each stage of the evolution of the 
safety case, the dependability argument is expressed in terms of what is known about 
the system being developed. At the early stages of project development the 
dependability argument is related to the high-level objectives as conceived by the 
stakeholders in the concept of operations (CONOPS). As design knowledge increases 
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during the project, these objectives (and the corresponding argument) can be expressed 
in increasingly tangible and specific tenns. 
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Fig. 3.1 - Evolution of a Dependability Argument 
Analysis identifies the required behaviour of each component of the system in order to 
satisfy the overall dependability goals that were identified by the stakeholders. The 
goals are decomposed in context of the system as the latter evolves, which includes 
specification of requirements and design decisions that will eventually affect the final 
structure of the dependability argument. 
3.4 Creating and Capturing Argument Context 
One of the mcrits of GSN is its ability to explicitly capture the context in which the 
claims of an argument are stated. In GSN context can be captured in two different 
forms. The first is by using the context element, which can contain a reference or a 
statement of contextual information. For example, a goal in a safety case claiming 
acceptable safety can be stated in the context the definition of' acceptable safety. A 
reference to contextual information can point to resources available from other 
processes such as system models or inforination available in other documents. The 
second type of context is represented by GSN (argument) modules. The argument Is 
stated in the context of the top level claim of the GSN module which is supported by 
argument and evidence. In this way the main dependability argument can be 
decomposed in the context of other decisions or processes which need to be argued. 
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The contextual information which affects the evolution of the dependability argument 
and should be captured in the dependability case is the following: 
Component dependability requirements: These represent the (derived) 
requirements of the system components in order to maintain an overall 
acceptable behaviour as envisioned by the stakeholders. 
* Design rationale: Information on how the various characteristics of a design 
can help achieve the specified goals. 
e Trade-offs: Identification of competing objectives documentation of 
compromises within acceptable margins and justification of selection of 
most suitable design option among candidate design alternatives. 
Contextual information, whether represented by the GSN 'context' element or as GSN 
modules, are created by three methods: 
Dependability Deviation Analysis (DDA): DDA (described in chapter 4) 
provides a systematic analysis of the system identifying the effects of deviations 
from the normal operation of the system. In the context of dependability cases, 
the purpose of DDA is to elicit acceptable behaviour of the system with respect 
to dependability and identify associations between failures under the viewpoints 
of each dependability attribute. 
Trade-OffMethod (TOAI): TOM (described in chapter 5) describes a methodical 
way of using the established space of admissible requirements to trade-offs goals 
and resolve conflicts. TOM ultimately creates arguments of preference between 
candidate decisions, in the context of which the dependability argument evolves. 
Factor ANalysis and Decision Alternatives (FANDA): FANDA (described in 
chapter 6) complements GSN in developing arguments. The method can be 
thought of as a catalyst between the argument and the design. It assists analysts 
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to examine the system goals, record and manage rationale, and elicit candidate 
options for decisions taken during the system lifecycle, such as design decisions. 
The three methodologies in addition to the existing GSN method compose the overall 
dependability case framework presented in this thesis. The methodologies are not 
independent to each other but are associated and collaborate during the development of 
the case. In order to provide a clear and rigorous description of the framework the 
Dependability Case Metamodcl (DCM) has been created, capturing the concepts, their 
attributes, their legitimate associations as well as constraints that need to be applied 
when creating a dependability case instance. 
3.5 Rigorous Definition of the Framework 
At present, cfforts to formalise cases, and in particular argumentation, are largely tool- 
driven and mostly limited to the safety community (e. g. The ASCE toot [65]). 
Existence of a rigorous metamodel that captures the concepts existing in the assurance 
cases domain in an open and standard format, can deliver a number of benefits. Most 
importantly, it offers a common vocabulary and consensus on the concepts involved in 
the task of assurance case development and their semantics. This can contribute to 
avoiding 'deviant' implementations across tools from different vendors. Moreover, 
evaluation of a toot implementation can be difficult as there is no common point of 
reference. Also, a uniform serialization format can provide a tool-independent platform 
to facilitate information exchange between different vendors' tools. Finally, 
establishing a dependability case metamodel can provide the basis for further 
introduction of concepts such as metrics management. 
Fig. 3.2 shows the technologies employed in defining the DCM as well as their use in 
defining and managing dependability case models (based on the DCM). Initially the 
metamodel was defined using the Kernel MetaMetaModel (KM3) modelling language. 
Using tools built in Eclipse (a software and modelling development tool) [66], the KM3 
metamodel was transformed to an Ecore metamodel. Ecore is an implementation of the 
Object Management Group (OMG) standard Meta Object Facility (MOF) 2.0 
metamodelling architecture. Using Eclipse's EMF visual editor it is possible to 
83 
Chapter 3 -- Establishing a Dependubili(v Case Framework 
instantiate the defined dependability case metamodel, and create and edit new models 
(each created model is an instance of a dependability case). 
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model management (with 
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GraphViz presentation qf 
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Fig. 3.2 - Technologies Used in Dependability Cases 
Epsilon [67] is a platforin consisting of a number of model management languages 
which were used to manage and verify the created model. In particular, the languages 
used were Epsilon Object Language (EOL) and Epsilon Validation Language (EVL). 
The implemented functions included among others, the automated generation of 
GraphViz [68] code, a package used to create graphical representations of the models, 
automated production of reports and logs of the dependability case and automated 
support for the proposed methods. 
3.5.1 Definition Using Kernel MetaMetaModel (KM3) 
KM3 is a modelling language used to define metamodels [69], employed by the author 
to define the dependability case metamodel. KM3 was selected mainly for its case of 
use. KM3 consists of a relatively (to other languages) small number of classes, and its 
simple syntax allows straightforward definition and editing of the metamodel. 
Moreover the fon-nally defined semantics make verification of the metamodel possible, 
eliminating potential errors. Fig. 3.3 shows an extract of the DCM in KM3 code 
defining elements of GSN. The extract presents the class Sj)inafflement (goals, 
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strategies, solutions are all types of spinal elements), and the class SolvedBY which 
represents the decomposition of a GSN spinal element. A class can have either 
references to other objects, or attributes. The oppositeOf keyword dcfines bidirectional 
associations between two classes. Hence by selecting a spinal element we can navigate 
the model and find its parent and objects (e. g. parent strategy or goal). A spinal element 
can have many references to solved by objects, denoted by [*]. 
package GSN ( 
abstract class SpinalElement extends ModelElement ( 
reference solvedBy [*] container: SolvedBy oppositeOf parent; 
reference inContext0f [*] container : InContextOf oppositeOf parent; 
I 
class SolvedBy 
reference parent : SpinalElement oppositeOf solvedl3y; 
reference child container : SpinalElement; 
attribute cardinality : Integer; 
attribute optional : Boolean; 
datatype String; 
datatype Boolean; 
datatype Integer, 
Fig. 3.3 - Extract of G. SN in KM3 
Fig. 3.4 - UML Modelling of Basic GSN 
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Using EOL, the KM3 metamodel can be transformed to UML for better v1sualisation of 
the concepts. Fig. 3.4 shows the metamodel of GSN (as described by Kelly in [47]), 
without the extensions for modularising GSN, as proposed by Kelly in [55 ]4. 
Throughout the thesis, excerpts of the metamodel represented in UML will be used for 
better understanding and illustrating the relations between the concepts. The metamodel 
defined in KM3 can be found in appendix C. 
3.5.2 Eclipse Modelling Framework (EMF) 
The Eclipse Modelling Framework (EMF) is a modelling framework built on top of 
Eclipse, an open development framework with extensive user base. The KM3 
definition of the metamodel is transformed to the Eclipse Modelling Framework (EMF) 
allowing the creation of instances of the metamodel, which can then be edited with the 
EMF editor. Fig. 3.5 shows an example of the model of a GSN structure in the EMF 
editor (by instantiating the DCM objects representing GSN). 
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Fig. 3.5 - GSN Press Argument in the Eclipse EMF Editor 
The modular GSN extension has been defined in KM3 (appendix 
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The editor does not show the graphical representation of the GSN elements, but it shows 
the objects that have been created by instantiating the appropriate (GSN) classes of the 
metamodel. Similarly, the rest of the concepts introduced in the proposed 
methodologies can be modelled by instantiating the appropriate classes. 
3.5.3 Model Management Using EPSILON 
EPSILON is a platform of model management languages for tasks such as model 
merging, model transformation and model validation [67]. It was used to manage the 
instantiated dependability case models. Among the purposes for using EPSILON were: 
9 Automating the creation of parts of the dependability case (where possible) 
e Automated reporting of warnings or errors spotted in the model 
* Checking the constraints of the metamodel 
Transformation to GraphViz code [68], a graphics tool, that was used to 
graphically present parts of the dependability case. 
Fig. 3.6 demonstrates a GSN constraint example using the epsilon verification language. 
context Goal ( 
constraint HasUniquelDescription : 
Goal. allinstances. forAll(glg. descdption = self. clescription implies g= selo 
fall: 
'Goal'+ self. clescription +'has not unique ID') 
} 
Fig3.6 - Example of Constraints Using EPSILON 
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Fig. 3.7 - Press Argument in GSN (produced in GraphViz) 
The constraint is applied on objects of type 'Goal' and it checks whether a goal has a 
unique ID. The attribute (lescription represents the ID of the goals. If tile constraint 
fails the code will report an error. Fig. 3.7 shows the (graphical) GSN structure of the 
press argument example presented in Fig. 3.5after transformations using the Epsilon 
Object Language 5. 
3.6 Summary 
The chapter has defined the concept of dependability cases, identifying prominent 
characteristics, such as typical arguments and evidence for each dependability attribute. 
Also the chapter describes the fundamental concepts of the proposed work. Ill addition 
a dependability case metamodel has been defined, using the KM3 language, and then 
transformed to the Eclipse Modelling Framework (EMF). The metamodel can be 
instantiated enabling the creation of dependability case models. The Epsilon Object 
Language was used to create scripts that will manage the created dependability case 
models 
5 
The graphical representation of some GSN elements (i. e. context and context association) differs from 
original GSN. GraphViz required definition of some of the shapes not included in its library, which was 
considered to be outside the scope of this thesis. The example demonstrates the application of GraphViz 
for future reference. I lowever throughout the thesis GSN structures are represented in a proper manner. 
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Chapter 4 
Requirements Elicitation Using 
Deoendabilitv Deviation Analvsis 
4.1 Introduction 
When examining the required system behaviour overall, system stakeholders can 
identify some overall goals for the system. However, during evolution of the system 
designers need to examine how their initial requirements and concerns can be related to 
the behaviour of the more detailed layers of the system design. In safety, requirements 
for a system are typically elicited through following a structured safety assessment 
process during each stage of the lifecycle [70]. 
Among other techniques and methodologies used, the safety assessment process 
includes deviation analysis techniques and methods such as Hazard and Operability 
Studies (HAZOPS) [71]. Deviation analyses are used to identify possible deviations 
from intended behaviour and their effect on the overall safety levels of the system. 
Hence, the required behaviour for the elements of the system which are under analysis 
is identified. Even though other attributes are recognised during the analysis such as 
performance, the main focus is on safety. However eliciting dependability requirements 
necessitates a more explicit analysis from the viewpoint of each dependability attribute. 
Stakeholders interested in an attribute need to identify the effects of the behaviour of the 
system (or an element of the system) with respect to that attribute. This entails possible 
effects to other attributes that are of interest to other system stakeholders. 
Dependability Deviation Analysis is a method for eliciting dependability requirements, 
by identifying how dependability attributes affect each other. Establishing the required 
operation of a system element in terms of the dependability attributes of interest, allows 
creation of a dependability profile for that system element that encapsulates all derived 
dependability requirements. 
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4.2 Deviation Analyses 
Deviation analyses are commonly applied in the safety domain in order to achieve a 
better insight about possible safety implications of system deviant behaviour. Deviation 
analysis methods aim to identify the causes and effects of deviations from intended 
operation. Delivery of a service different to the one intended can be described as a 
failure. Ultimately a failure can be characterised in terms of risk - the severity of the 
outcome combined with the probability of the failure occurring. 
Fig. 4.1 shows a bow tie model [72] used in safety. The focus of the model is commonly 
a hazard, represented by the 'knot' of the tie. The bow-tie model consists of two 
elements: a causal model that describes the causes of the hazard and a consequence (or 
outcome) model that describes the effects of the hazard (alongside other contributing 
factors). Deviation analyses are used to explore variations around the intended 
behaviour of a system design and identify deviations with unsafe consequences (i. e. 
'hazardous' deviations). 
Fig. 4.1 - Bow-Tie Analysis 
4.3 Analyses during the System Lifecycle 
Application of analyses is affected by the analysts' knowledge about the design in 
question. At first, during the initial stages of the system design the analysts do not 
possess a great deal of information about the design. Furthermore at early stages the 
design is still volatile as it undergoes a large number of changes in accordance to the 
results of the analyses. During the latest stages of design evolution the analysts have 
more data about the system as well as more detailed data. This is reflected on the type 
of analysis that is employed during the safety lifecycle stages. Airborne Recommended 
Practice 4761 (Appendix A) provides guidance on the safety lifecycle and its activities 
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in the context of safety analysis for complex aircraft systems. The following sections 
provide an overview of the main methods that influenced development of DDA. A 
common characteristic of the reviewed methods is the fact that they use deviations from 
intended operation, to probe the system design and examine whether the deviation can 
credibly affect the safety of the system. Deviation based techniques have been applied 
extensively to safety and are considered very successful during analysis of the system. 
Although these techniques have been developed with the intention to be used in safety 
analysis, there have been examples of deviation techniques applied in security [73]. 
The following subsections present an overview of the most notable safety analyses, the 
principles of which and their application in dependability are discussed in §4.7 
4.3.1 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) [74] is a method that considers deviations 
that are known to occur to the components examined, and assesses their effect. 
According to the design of the system, deviations affect the operation of the overall 
system. 
4.3.2 Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOPS) 
The HAZard and Operability Studies (HAZOPS), is a methodology introduced in the 
chemical industry domain by the Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) [75]. HAZOPS is 
a systematic analysis of the flows between the different parts of a chemical plant by 
considering deviations from the intended behaviour of the flows' attributes. HAZOPS 
uses a set of guidewords with which the design is probed. The guidewords identify a 
possible deviation. The aim of the technique is to identify the effects and the possible 
causes of the deviation. HAZOPS is nowadays a very popular technique used 
extensively in the safety domain. Technique was primarily for the process industry it 
has been extended for other uses, most notably by the Defence Standard DStan 00-58 
for application on programmable electronics. Furthermore Purnfrey extended HAZOPS 
for safety analysis of software, specifying the Software Hazard Analysis and Resolution 
in Design (SHARD) [76]. Despite the fact that HAZOPS is a safety technique its 
popularity has prompted its application in security analyses [73] in which the deviations 
are substantiated in the context of security. 
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4.3.3 SHARD 
A prominent characteristic of SHARD is that it uses a simplified set of guidewords 
compared with HAZOPS. The guidewords used in SHARD are optimised for software 
failures, eliminating potential ambiguity in interpreting the existing HAZOPS 
guidewords for software. The subject on which the SHARD guidewords are applied, 
consist of the attributes of the services provided by the components of a system. These 
include provision, timing and value of the provided service. When applying SHARD 
the guidewords (omission, commission, early, late, coarse value, subtle value) are 
applied on the services of the software. A service is defined as the "communication ofa 
piece of information, with a specific value, at a particular time" [76]. Table-4.1 
presents the main steps of SHARD. 
Tahle. 4.1 - SHARD Prnripce 
I Understand the Design 
2 Select Infonnation Flow 
3 Describe Flow and its Intended Behaviour 
4 Ensure Intended Operation is Safe 
5 Use Guideword to Suggest Deviation 
6 Investigate Causes 
7 Investigate Effects 
8 Examine Detection Protection and Mitigation 
4.3.4 What-if Analysis 
A method akin to HAZOP is 'what-if' analysis [74]. However the involved 
stakeholders can be more flexible than analyses such as HAZOPS, as the deviations 
considered can be the result of brainstorming, or previous experience. 
4.3.5 Sneak Analysis 
Sneak analysis found widespread use in Boeing [77] as a means to systematically 
analyse electrical systems for unintended situations. Commonly there are five 
conditions for which the circuit is analysed: 
e Path, examining for current flow along an unintended route. 
* Open, examining lack of flow along an intended route. 
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9 Timing, that prompts the circuit for flow at an incorrect time or lack of flow at 
the correct time. 
* Indication, examining the false or ambiguous indication about a system. 
Labels, which prompts for a false or ambiguous label at the controls of the 
system. 
Sneak analysis is limited in considering conditions regarding the clectrical/electronic 
circuits of systems. This bears similarities to HAZOPS and SHARD in that the 
participants need to consider specific conditions and their respective causes and effects. 
4.4 Dependability Deviation Analysis (DDA) 
The Dependability Deviation Analysis (DDA), proposed by the author, is a methodical, 
exploratory, deviation based system analysis approach. Its purpose is to elicit multi- 
attribute (dependability) goal-based requirements, by being applied throughout the 
stages of the system lifecycle. 
4.4.1 Overview 
A failure that occurs during the operation of the system may impact on the achievement 
of a dependability attribute, which in its turn may have an impact on other attributes or 
result in unacceptable system operation. DDA extends deviation analysis techniques, 
investigating the system from the standpoint of each attribute. For example, a safety 
hazard can lead to accident due to a number of different 'types' of contributing factors 
such as the reliability of a component, performance of an algorithm or human error. 
Fig. 4.2 shows a generalisation of the bow-tie analysis diagram used in safety, showing 
the interaction between dependability attributes. In safety the 'knot' of the bow-tie 
represents safety hazards. Wilson ct al. [78] in attempt to model and relate all concepts 
in safety analysis described hazards as conditions. Generalising for dependability, the 
knot of the bow-tie represents potential failure to meet the required dependable 
operation, and in this thesis is dcfined as failure condition. The diagram also illustrates 
a significant characteristic of dependability; a failure to achieve a dependability attribute 
can be caused by and may result in failures regarding other attributes. 
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Fig. 4.2 -A Nlulti-attribute Perspective of the Bow-tic Concept. 
Reasoning about the overall behaviour of a system, necessitates considering the failure 
conditions with respect to the attributes of interest to the stakeholders, and their impact 
on the overall operation of the system. This requires understanding of how each of the 
attributes of interest can have an effect on another, as well as their contribution to the 
system's operational behaviour that is required by the system stakeholdcr. The 
projected effects of a deviation should not only be restricted to one dimension just by 
focusing on only one attribute. Instead, wider consequences should be assessed 
understanding how a deviation from the viewpoint of an attribute can affect the 
operation of the system. Fig. 4.3 presents a schematic of the DDA, using the bow-tic 
diagram. 
Deviations probing the 
system from the 
viewpoints of ---- 
attributes of interest 
Performance e ects 
Availability ir 
effects 
Securitv 
Safety effects 
---------------------- 
Fig. 4.3 - Schematic Overview of DDA 
DDA is an analysis method used to identify potential failure conditions with respect to 
dependability attributes and examine how these interrelate. It is an exploratory method 
focusing on the effect analysis part of the bow-tie diagram. The main 'questions' that 
the method aims to answer are: "What dependability failure conditions will affect the 
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required operation of the system? ", and "What is the required operation of the system 
given the identified failures? ". In the fashion of already established safety techniques, a 
representative set of deviations (discussed later during the presentation of the DDA 
process) is used to prompt the elements of the system, in order to reveal possible 
failures from the viewpoints of a dependability attribute (of interest to the stakeholders). 
The effect of the deviation may constitute the cause for a failure regarding a different 
dependability attribute. DDA provides a methodical way of identifying the relation 
between failures, which have been revealed after examining the design from the 
viewpoint of each attribute of interest. Ultimately, the DDA will result in afailures' 
map showing how the failures of the system are interrelated and how they can affect the 
overall behaviour of the system. DDA (using the failures' map) results in identifying 
how the deviations from intended behaviour of the system elements affect the overall 
behaviour of the system. This helps defining a profile for the system elements, 
specifying the required behaviour of that particular system element. The requirements 
are specified with respect to the identified dependability attributes from the viewpoint of 
which, the contribution of the system element to the overall operation was identified. 
The failures' map and the profiles of the system elements are the two DDA products. 
DDA has been defined in two levels. The underlying framework that presents the 
concepts and their structure, and the process that explains the necessary steps in order 
to perform he analysis. 
4.4.2 Structure and Elements 
The structure and relations of the concepts that make up the dependability deviation 
analysis have been defined in the dependability case metamodel. Fig. 4.4 presents the 
metamodel of the DDA in UML. The following concepts are part of the DDA 
metamodel: 
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Fig. 4.4 - DDA structure in the dependability case metamodel 
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4.4.2.1 Dependability Attributes 
The class dependability attribute represents the dependability attributes of interest to 
the stakeholders. There are two main motives identified in this thesis, as to why a 
dependability attribute can be of interest to the stakeholders; in terms of analysis and in 
terms of overall objectives. In the first case the focus is on examining the system from 
the viewpoint of the attribute of interest, whereas in the latter the attribute is one of the 
overall objectives of the stakeholders for successful operation For example it is 
common during a safety analysis to examine whether the performance of a system can 
affect safety. However, the overall objective of the stakeholders is safety. Hence 
performance is an attribute of interest because of its impact on the acceptable operation 
of the system, whereas safety is a dependability attribute of interest because it 
constitutes what the stakeholders have specified as part of the dependable operation of 
the system. This distinction resulted in the definition of typical issues and concerns, 
with which the (dependability attribute) class is associated. 
4.4.2.2 Issues and Concerns 
Dependability attributes are abstract and difficult to substantiate when eliciting 
requirements. Issues and concerns are used to define in more tangible terms the 
properties affecting the stakeholders' interests with regard to a dependability attribute. 
The main distinction is the motive for their use, as explained in the previous section. 
When analysing a system from the viewpoint of an attribute, stakeholders examine the 
system regarding certain issues typical to the attribute. For example, a typical issue 
when examining a system from the perspective of performance can be overload. Issues 
constitute typical problems that may affect the system under analysis. However typical 
issues may not always be of interest to the stakeholders regarding the high level 
operation of the system. For example, although performance of parts of a system may 
be crucial for the achievement of safety, performance itself may not be a high level 
requirement described in the concept of operations of the system. The significance of 
concerns lies to the fact that a concern relates to the overall envisioned operation of the 
specific system under analysis. For example, consider the performance regarding the 
number of incoming requests of an online system. In this case overloading of the 
system will directly affect the envisioned operation of the system. Hence the 
performance of the system is an attribute in the stakeholders' envisioned system 
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operation. A concern is any potential occurrence with an unwanted impact on system 
operation. A dependability attribute issue may constitute a concern if it can be said that 
its effects impact the envisioned concept of system operation. 
4.4.2.3 System Elements, System Element Types and System Models 
The class system element represents any system entity that exists in the models of the 
system. A system element type is a class that is used to specify the type of the system 
elements such as activities, classes, actors, flows. Hence a system element refers to a 
unique entity in the design; for example 'information exchange I' and 'information 
exchange 2' are two unique system elements of the same system element type. The 
system element type class was introduced in order to provide the capability of creating 
DDA templates that would not have to refer to system elements of the particular system. 
System elements types belong to system models. For example a use case diagram would 
be a system model having as system elements actors and functions. 
4.4.2.4 Deviation and its Children Classes 
A deviation is an abstract class representing possible behaviour of an element of the 
system in a way that was not intended. Similarly to HAZOPS a deviation is associated 
with a guideword, which indicates the nature of the deviation. Deviations are used in 
DDA to prompt the system revealing the possible effects of the specified issues. 
Deviation is specified in the metarnodel as an abstract class, which means that it can be 
instantiated in a model. Instead the children class suitable deviation and applicable 
deviation can be instantiated. The difference between the two classes is the subject of 
the deviation, which is prompted by the guideword inherited by the parent abstract 
class. A suitable deviation is associated with system element types whereas an 
applicable deviation with system elements. A suitable deviation is one that can 
cfficiently reveal the effect of an issue by prompting the appropriate system elements 
types with the appropriate guidewords. When a suitable deviation is applicable to the 
system examined then an applicable deviation is created for each system element of 
system element type as the one related to the suitable deviation. 
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4.4.2.5 Guidewords 
These are the guhlewords used in deviations. They are used to prompt the appropriate 
system elements in order to establish the deviations that will reveal the (possible) effects 
of the identified issues. In methods such as HAZOPS and SHARD there is a standard 
set of guldewords, perceived to be capable of revealing failures common to the domain 
in which they are applied. However it is often the case that the set of guidewords 
prescribed by a method may not be optimised for all system models and potential failure 
conditions. Although guidewords used in existing methodologies can be used different 
guidewords may be selected more intuitive to probe the system for the issues that they 
reveal (further discussed during the description of the 'definition of suitable deviations' 
DDA stage). 
Guideword Omission 
Guideword Early 
Guideword Less 
Guideword Late 
Guideword Fake 
Guideword Value 
Guideword Public 
Guideword Damage 
Fig. 4.5 - Example Guidewords used in DDA 
Fig. 4.5 shows an exemplar set of guidewords, consisting of a mix Of gUidewords taken 
from existing methods such as SHARD, and guidewords derined (hiring an example 
DDA process. 
4.4.2.6 Failure Conditions 
A fifilut-e contlition describes a possible state of the system, which results to 
consequences unwanted to the stakeholders. A failure condition can be perceived as it 
credible manifestation of a deviation regarding a dependability attribute. Failure 
conditions can be associated with concerns and other failure conditions. Associations 
between failure conditions and concerns are declarative, implying that the stakeholders 
have identified cases, which can be justified to directly compromise their concerns. 
Associations between failure conditions imply that the stakeholders did not identify a 
direct compromise of a concern. The effects of a failure condition can result in other 
failure conditions, contributing indirectly to the overall behaviour of the system. The 
manner in which a failure condition will propagate in the system depends on the design 
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of the system. Associations between failure conditions are derived not declared, since 
they refer to eventualities of an existing system. 
4.4.2.7 Traceability of Effect 
Traceabiliýv qfýlftct captures tile effect of a failure condition. The concept captures the 
rationale, explaining the operation of the system in the presence of a failure and how 
this will propagate. Traceability of effects works as an association class between two 
failure conditions. Deriving the traceability of effect can be done manually through 
analysis of the design, or by use of more mechanistic approaches (an example of a 
mechanistic analysis is given by Mauri in [79]), according to how the system elements 
cooperate resulting in the overall system. This requires the existence of a more 
sophisticated traceability approach, capturing the relations between the system elements 
and how they are combined to produce the overall system. In order to be compatible 
. 
Jýct) abstract, with different means of traceability, the class (traceability qj' 
constituting the interface to other metamodels (e. g. the MODAF metamodel for a 
system described in MODAF). Initially DDA used a simple textual representation of 
traceability, represented by the Textual Ti-aceability o . 
7ýct which extends the class 
traceability qf qflýct. However later applications of DDA included a semi-automated 
approach using a basic traceability model. 
4.4.2.8 Dependability Profiles and Dependability Requirements 
The ultimate purpose of applying DDA is to elicit requirements For system elements 
from the viewpoints of the dependability attributes of interest. During deviation 
analysis, the participants identify the behaviour that would compromise their concerns, 
recording in the same time how the system element should perform to avoid unintended 
behaviour. The dependability projile represents a collation of requirements that define 
the behaviour of the system elements. The dependability profile was introduced to 
facilitate the evolution of the dependability argument (chapter 6), by grouping the 
acceptance criteria of a system element. A dependability profile is associated with the 
system element to which it belongs and to the dependability requirements it contains. A 
dependability requirement can be thought of as a specific declaration of the required 
target for the system element's behaviour with respect to an attribute. However as 
explained in chapter 1, conflicts between requirements will result in compromises of the 
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original targets. Dependability requirement limits is a fundamental concept used in the 
trade-off method (presented in chapter 5), representing the limit to which a requirement 
can be compromised whilst maintaining the overall system dependability to acceptable 
levels. DDA helps eliciting the rationale for the dependability requirement limit. 
4.4.2.9 System Tasks 
System tasks are the highest level tasks of the system that can be identified by the 
stakeholders. The class represents the direct interests of the system in terms of 
functionality. The collection of system tasks represents the (in MODAF terminology) 
SoS operation scenario. System tasks can be thought of as the highest level system 
activities that can be directly identified by the stakeholders. An alternative 
representation in terms of the metamodel would be systems tasks to be a separate 
system element type. Although earlier versions of the dependability case mctamodel 
followed this approach, a distinction was made for two reasons. Firstly, system tasks 
are used in a different type of analysis (which is part of DDA) with the purpose to 
identify the concerns of the stakeholders. This type of analysis, similar in principle to 
Functional Failure Analysis (FFA), has different purpose and characteristics to the rest 
of DDA (which resembles the analyses during PSSA as suggested by ARP 4761), as it 
takes place very early in the system lifecycle. Separating the concepts provides better 
context for the DDA participants making the overall approach more intuitive. 
Secondly, tasks constitute the overall concept of operation of the system, and inevitably 
are abstract and stated in an ad-hoc way. Furthermore in MODAF, which was the 
modelling framework mostly used in the thesis, as well as in the tried case studies, tasks 
were (often) described in plain text making it difficult to represent high level tasks as 
system elements. 
4.4.2.10 Task Issues 
Task issues are used to identify the concerns of the stakeholders. Its function is to 
juxtapose the top level tasks with typical dependability issues, identifying whether they 
constitute concerns to the stakeholders' interests. A task issue is associated with a 
system task and an issue. Despite its similarities to a deviation, a distinction was made 
for the same two reasons as system tasks. 
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4.5 Overview of the DDA Process 
This section presents the main stages that constitute the overall DDA process. During 
the process the participants instantiate and use the concepts that are defined by the 
metamodel. 
4.5.1 Using the Metamodel to Create Templates 
Some of the concepts in DDA do not need to be recreated with every application ofthe 
DDA but can be reused in analysis of many systems (e. g. typical issues). Instantiation 
of the concept using the metamodel allows 'storage' as objects in EMF (Fclipse 
Modelling Framework). This is a useful capability allowing reuse of certain parts of the 
DDA. 
....... 
....... 
.... . case 
Package DDA 
Package Attributes 
. . 0. Dependability Attribute Availability 
- . 0ý Dependability Attribute Performance 
Issue Latency 
issue Througlwut 
Issue Synchronisation 
++ Dependability Attribute Reliability 
. . 0: ý Dependability Attribute Security 
+ -0ý Dependability Attribute Safety 
+ Package Models 
Package Overall Tasks 
+ Package overall Task Issues 
Package Concerns 
+ Package Guidevoords 
- Package Deviations 
+ Package Suitable Deviations 
+ Package Applicable Deviations 
+ Package Failure Conditions 
Packaae Acronyms 
Fig. 4.6 -A DDA Template in the EMF Editor 
Fig. 4.6 shows a DDA template used by the author in a number of analyses. It colitaills 
the initial packages that need to be populated during DDA, the attributes of interest, 
their issues as well as suitable deviations (with the respective system element types and 
guidewords) able to reveal the identified issues. The template was a starting point of 
the analysis as it contained all this information that did not have to be recreated. 
However concepts such as the applicable deviations, the system elements, and the 
failure conditions depend on the specifics of the system under analysis and therefore 
cannot be used as templates. 
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4.5.2 Overall DDA process 
The DDA process consists of seven stages. Each stage is composite, consisting of a 
number of steps. Fig. 4.7 presents the overall DDA process and its stages; each DDA 
stage (apart from identification of issues) is described in more detail with a dedicated 
flow diagram. The sequence of the stages depends on reuse of existing templates. For 
the purpose of describing the process, we assume no use of templates. This implies 
application of all possible stages. The process starts with identification of typical issues 
for which the system is analysed. Following identification of issues, the stakeholders 
need to examine their overall dependability objectives by defining what is of primary 
concern to their interests. 
Start 
Have the typical Issu 
,;, 
s, forwbicbb,, 
the I will 
probed beende n nod? 
r- - -- --I 
Identify Issues 
Identify 
Concerns 
Are there deviations 
suitable to reveal 
the Issues In the 
system In question 
Identify Define suitable Applicable deviations Deviations 
Ide ntify Failure 
Conditions 
Define 
Traceability of 
Effect 
Define 
End Dependability 
Profile 
Fig. 4.7 - Overall Stages of the DDA 
............. 
KEY., 
Templates can be 
usedinthese 
stages 
Stage tha t needs 
to be reapplied for 
....... 
different systems 
..................... 
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After completion of identification of concerns the participants specify the deviations 
suitable to reveal the typical issues in the model types used in for the system design. 
Once the participants state which of the suitable deviations are applicable for the system 
in question, the resultant failure conditions are described examining their effect to the 
system. Finally, after identification of the possible failure conditions, the participants 
identify the required behaviour of the system. The required behaviour is specified in 
terms of the dependability attributes of interest, in order to satisfy the stakeholders' 
overall objectives. 
4.6 Underlying Principles of DDA 
DDA exercises the following two principles, which have influenced the definition of its 
structure and concepts: 
9 Commonality of concepts between dependability attributes. 
Dependability attributes have commonality between their concepts which are 
generically represented in the metamodel. 
9 Extensibility of (deviation) guidewords and representation of typical issues. 
In traditional deviation analyses (HAZOP) as well as in application of deviation 
analyses in specific domains (SHARD, security deviational analysis), the 
guidewords prompt for issues from the viewpoint of a particular attribute. 
4.6.1 Similarity of Concepts between Dependability Attributes 
The Dependability Case Metamodel (DCM) encompasses the dependability attributes, 
by generalising on some of their common concepts. Security and safety are two 
dependability attributes which have interested developers extensively, and as a result 
have well-established concepts. Table. 4.2 juxtaposes similar concepts in safety and 
security and presents the concepts with which parallelisms can be drawn in the 
dependability case metarnodel. 
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Table. 4.2 - Comparison of Concepts In Safety, Security and the DCM 
Safety S curity DCM 
Asset Asset System Element 
Hazard Threat Failure Condition 
Fault Vulnerability Issue 
Accident Attack Concern 
Similarity of concepts in safety and security is a position asserted in the SafScc project 
[35], which was an attempt to establish a framework for jointly reasoning about the 
safety and the security of military systems. SafSec adopts a risk based approach 
according to which both security and safety threats are evaluated in terms of their effect 
on the assets. This is achieved by defining the concept of loss; a generic term for any 
unwanted system state that can occur from either a (safety) accident or (security) attack, 
which is the ultimate concem of the stakeholders. 
Assets in both safety and security represent entities of the system whether this is 
humans, other systems or monetary value. In order to meaningfully analyse how 
deviations may affect them (entities) they should be part of the system model. IIcnce 
during the deviation analysis, whether the subject of the analysis are entities such as 
humans data or other systems, they are all part of a container system model and are 
represented by the system element concept. 
Hazards and threats are two similar concepts that in some instances have been used 
interchangeably. SafSec [35] uses the two terms to refer to occurrences that can have 
unwanted impact on either safety or security. Laprie [9] used the term threat to describe 
anything that can compromise the behaviour of a system in terms of dependability 
attribute. Hazard is a concept tightly associated with safety. Purnfrey, among other 
hazard characteristics, mentions that hazards are "conditions which can be mitigated, 
butfrom which an accident can arise through a sequence of normal events or actions" 
[76]. Similarly afailure condition can lead to compromising dependability attributes by 
contributing to the realisation of the stakeholders' concerns. 
Issues represent potential occurrences, under the viewpoint of any of the dependability 
attributes, which can result in compromise of dependable operation of the system. 
Issues can result in failure conditions. Srivatanakul examines in her thesis the 
application of deviation analyses to security of a system. Similarly to safety, the 
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analysis is done by interpreting the HAZOP guidewords from the perspective of 
security. Of interest is the addition of a column for identifying vulnerabilities that when 
exploited could threaten the system. A threat to a computer system is defined as any 
potential occurrence, malicious or otherwise, that can have an undesirable effect on the 
assets and resources associated with a system [80]. Similarly to hazards being 
conditions that can result in an accident, threats constitute the potential for an attack. 
Firesmith [81] also identifies the similarities and further describes threats and hazards as 
types of danger for the system. A vulnerability is a weakness in a system that may be 
exploited by a threat, resulting in an attack [82]. Correspondingly a fault in the system 
can be the cause of a hazard that may result in an accident. Firesmith uses the term 
vulnerabilities to describe internal system conditions that may impact both safety and 
security [81]. Finally, similarly to SafSec, both Firesmith [81] and Srivatanakul [73] 
contend that an asset is any component of a system which is of value to its stakeholders. 
4.6.2 Extensibility of (deviation) Guidewords Representing 
Typical Issues 
HAZOPS uses a set of guidewords to probe the design for possible deviations. A 
deviation occurs when the system does not operate as the designers intended it to. 
However in safety analysis all deviations do not necessarily constitute hazards. The 
examined deviation may affect stakeholders with interests towards other attributes, 
however from the viewpoint of safety they are not examined. 
An issue with HAZOPS is completeness of the guidewords. There is a question 
whether the guidewords can identify all possible deviations than may occur. Kletz [75] 
stresses that batch plants (as opposed to continuous flow plants) require a different set 
of guidewords in order to comprehensively probe the design. Being a methodology that 
emerged from the chemical industry, the set of guidewords in IIAZOPS is optimised to 
identify failures relating to the flows and containers in a chemical plant. However the 
types of failures that the original set of HAZOPS guidewords covers is not 
representative of all systems, which can demonstrate other classes of failures. Related 
to more specific applications, Purnfrey [76] indicates the existence of a set of 
guidewords adapted to probe for failures relating to human factors. Defence standard 
00-58 proposes an extended set of guidewords that covers failures common in 
programmable electronics. 
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Furthen-nore, SHARD [76] uses an alternate set of guidewords suitable for identifying 
failure conditions related to software. In all approaches, definition ot'guidewords relies 
on an underlying failure model. This is defined taking into account a number ot'sourccs 
including previous experience domain knowledge and existing failure models. F Ig. 4.8 
presents the deviations in three analysis methods; HAZOPS, SHARD and sneak circuit 
analysis. 
HAZOPS SHARD Sneak Analvsis 
- No 
- More 
- Less 
- As well as 
- Part of 
- Reverse 
- Otherthan 
- Omission 
- Commission 
- Farly 
- Late 
- Value 
- Opens 
- Patlis 
- Timing 
- Indications 
- Labels 
Fig. 4.8 - Cuidewords used in IIAZOPS SHARD and Sneak Analysis 
Comparing the guidewords with dependability we can observe that the guldcwords 
represent a set of issues from the viewpoint of diff'crent dependability attributes. For 
example guideword NO could be seen as representing an availability issue. In otlicr 
words, the analysts are prompted to investigate the condition in which the system 
element is not available. Despite the fact that the three methods were developed for 
different domains (IIAZOP for process industry, SHARD lor sollwarc and sileak 
analysis for electrical circuits) there are similarities in the underlying deviation 
guidewords. Omission of a service in SHARD (e. g. no data flow between two 
processes) could be seen as the equivalent of 'NO' in I IAZOPS and an open circuit (i. e. 
no current flow along an intended route). In all three cases the examined deviation was 
related with the availability of functionality, whether this wits data or messages or 
current. Table. 4.3 presents how the deviations in IJAZOP, SHARD inid sneak analysis 
can be interpreted as being associated with the domain of particular dependability 
attributes. This table shows how, for example, service provision guidcwords (such as 
'omission' and 'no') relate to the domain of service availability. 
IN 
Chapter4 Requiremetit. vElic-ii(itiotiU. vingDel)en(itibilit. t, Devitilioii., In(ill-sis 
Tahle-4.1 - Nimmim, Between Guidewords and Attrihu(cN 
Deviation 
No 
Attribute 
A,, allabilily 
Deviation 
()IIIISsioll 
Attribute 
A,, adabihty 
Deviation Attribute 
Path Rchahiljlý 
More Reliability Commission Reliability Timing Performance 
Less Reliability Early Perfon-nance Indication Reliability 
Partof Performance Late Performance Label I luman Iliclors 
Reverse Reliability Value Reliability 
Otherthan n/a Open Availability 
In HAZOP, the guidmords were defined in the context of tile chemical industry 
domain. The resultant set was broad enough and generic enough to be applied in a 
number of domains and it is being applied confidently by the sallety community. 
However limiting the probing of a model to this set OfgUidewords may CIILISC problems 
during the analysis. Being generic, the guidewords require scoping, imagination and 
extensive experience on interpreting the deviations. Srivatanakul in [73] uscs I IAZOP 
in order to perforin a security analysis of a design. Again, the need Im appropriate 
interpretation is highlighted. SHARD is an example in which the guidewords were 
altered to be compatible with software failure models. Furthennore the Dcpartment of' 
Trade and Industry (DTI) safety case for the parson's current limiter [831 indicates the 
use of concems such asfidlure qfpower sqppýv directly as guldewords probing clements 
of the design models. Definition of the guldewords is important when analysing a 
system. Care needs to be taken, as the guidewords have not necessarily been specified 
taking into account the classes of failures that an analyst may want to probe the modd 
for. It is important for the participants of the analysis to havc a clear understanding of 
the scope of deviations that the defined guidewords cover. Fven though a set of' 
guidewords (representing a set of possible deviations) can be reused, once delined 
caution must be taken when the analysts intend to investigate the system I'or different 
issues which may not be revealed effectively. 
4.7 DDA Stages 
This section describes the individual stages of DDA as presented in Fig. 4.9. The 
description entails the steps followed in each stage as well as the decisions need to be 
taken. Application of the DDA stages is illustrated using the AGO scenario example. 
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4.7.1 Identification of Typical Issues 
Each of the dependability attributes represents a unique viewpoint regarding the 
operation of the system. There is no universal definition of typical issues. Instead the 
stakeholders of a system decide what is important to them regarding the operation of the 
system. For example in the safety case report for a current limiter device, the analysis 
identified typical issues prevalent to electrical devices, such asfailure ofpower supply, 
and electricity contamination. These are not issues that would appear in analysis of 
other systems. However the system was designed primarily for being used in electrical 
networks, a domain in which these are typical issues that can result in failures affecting 
the (in this case) safe operation of the system. Stakeholders may be influenced with the 
definition of typical issues according to the domain in which the system is deployed. 
This is apparent in the descriptions of some defence standards which identify typical 
issues that have been inherited from accumulated past experience. 
Standards often provide guidelines about what needs to be addressed in a system, 
echoing experiences and typical issues gathered over a period of years by a relatively 
large sample of practitioners. There are several examples of standards and good 
practice guides which can constitute sources for typical issues regarding the 
dependability attributes. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) (safety) Standard 00-56 
(which supersedes 00-55 [84]), in its definition of safety identifies issues such as 
physical injury and material damage. Defence Standard 00-25 [85] which addresses 
human factors, mentions among others fatigue and workload. Pumfrcy identified failure 
classes applicable to operating systems, such as incorrect value and deadline miss, 
which resulted in definition of the respective guidcwords in SHARD (As discussed in 
§4.1 and §4.2, these failure classes can be modelled in the DCM as issues related to 
dependability attributes). The Common Criteria for security [61] suggest issues such as 
unauthorised value and identity assurance. Finally, Quality Attribute scenarios [86] 
allow identification of issues regarding a number of attributes. Table. 4.4 presents 
example issues for the dependability attributes, identified in the aforementioned 
standards and practices. 
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Incorrect value physical 
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Data integrity pollution 
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Performance Latency Security Unatithorised 
Access 
Human 
Factors 
Conitort 
Deadline miss Repudiation of 
transaction 
Mistakes 
Throughput Identity 
assurance 
latigue 
Although indicative, according to the type ofthe systems the stakeholders can specify a 
different set of issues. DeGan-no in [87] identifies issues regarding the operation of' 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). Furthermore a different set of' issues was used 
during a case study involving High Altitude Platforms (11APs), which are unnianned 
aerial vehicles with the purpose to provide broadband communications over a large 
area. These included issues common to communication aspects ofthe system such as 
denial of service, interference and power emissions. 
4.7.2 Identification of Concerns 
During this stage of the DDA the stakeholders identify the possible impact of' the 
concerns on the system's concept of operation. Subjcctivity of' tile stakeholders' 
requirements needs documentation of the rationale based on which the concerns are 
defined. At this stage it is essential that the acknowledged attributes of' interest and 
their concerns are related to the concept of operations. I lencc, reasoning rcgarding 
possible compromise of an attribute can be evaluated in tile context of' the system's 
operation. 
The stakeholders of the system recognise a concern because it principally affects their 
interests regarding the envisioned operation of a system. In contrast, failure conditions 
are recognised as potential contributing factors to systems concerns. Fig. 4.9 shows the 
sequence of steps that need to be taken and decisions that need to be made in order to 
establish the concerns during DDA. 
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Fig. 4.9 -identification of Concerns Stage 
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Table. 4.5 summarises the identified tasks, the typical issues and the resultant impact 
from the task issues for the AGO scenario (Appendix B). The box next to a task issue 
with the letter "C" implies that the task issue raises a concern. This corresponds in the 
DCM to setting the Boolean variable isAConcern of the class TaskIssue true. The initial 
aim of this stage is to define the TaskIssues, which will elicit possible concerns of the 
stakeholders. This prerequisites definition of the system overall tasks ideally at the 
initial stages of the SoS conceptual design. Otherwise participants need to define the 
overall system tasks. Next in this stage, participants need to examine whether the 
TaskIssues can raise a possible concern in the context of the system operation. For 
example latency (issue 2) combined with the task "transfer of forces" (system task 4) 
will lead to identifying that this may allow the enemy to escape because of the delay. 
The combination of task and issues is used a means of identifying the end results with 
which the stakeholders are interested. 
Conditions described by task issues that are thought to be significant need further 
deliberation in order to assess whether a concern can be identified. Participants in the 
analysis are required to support the initial supposition explicitly identifying the 
projected impact on the system operation indicated by the task. However this step of 
the analysis is not intended to focus on how the identified task issue may affect the 
operation. (This is performed during the identification of failure conditions stage). The 
objective is to identify cases that can compromise the system stakeholders' primary 
interests in the system operation. For example "Loss of life" (issue 8, system task 4) 
directly interests the system stakeholders, hence issue 8 also constitutes a concern. By 
contrast, a possible "Enemy Sabotage" (issue 7, system task 5) can have significant 
effect on the system. However, the significance of the task issue lies in the fact that the 
effect will result in possible casualties due to enemy sabotage. The identified condition 
is a contributing factor to a safety concern but it does not represent the stakeholders' 
ultimate interest in the system, and therefore cannot constitute a concern. Following the 
identification of a concern stakeholders aggregate the concerns caused by the same 
issues. For example "unauthorised access" is a concern revealed from two task issues 
that the stakeholders have identified significant for different reasons, which need to be 
recorded. Justification of significance can be used to further elaborate on the concerns 
during construction of the dependability case. The steps are followed until all possible 
task issue pairs have been examined. 
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4.7.3 Definition of Suitable Deviations 
One of the challenges applying the deviation guidewords for dependability analysis is 
the use of the appropriate system models. For example the UK defence standard 00-58 
(HAZOP studies) provides guidance on the type of models that can be used to model 
programmable electronics (referred in the standard as PES). The IEEE STD 1471-2000 
[88] recommended practice for architectural description of software intensive systems, 
suggests that some models are more appropriate in expressing specific system 
viewpoints (e. g. engineering viewpoint, decomposition viewpoints). The recommended 
practice identifies a number of concepts that are necessary for models to effectively 
capture the proposed viewpoints. Instantiation of the deviations should be done using 
suitable models in order to achieve a meaningful analysis. For example, data flow 
diagrams are suited to revealing timing concerns whereas human factor concerns can be 
revealed more easily in use cases. Representation of concerns in system architecture 
views focuses on particular aspects of the system. Apart from suitable system clement 
types, suitable deviations also entail the guidewords, which in combination to the 
system element type will reveal the dependability issues. The combination of system 
element type and guideword should result in suitable deviations that are meaningful and 
unambiguous in terms of their interpretations. For DDA, we identify exemplar suitable 
deviations for system clement types, in accordance to the Ministry Of Defence 
Architectural Framework (MODAF) - in which the AGO scenario was captured. 
4.7.3.1 Defence Architecture Frameworks (DAF) 
The US Department of Defence initially specified DODAF in order to "define a 
common approach for DoD architecture description development, presentation, and 
integration for both war fighting operations and business operations and processes" 
[23]. The framework consists of a number of products organised in views, which 
ultimately describe the complete operation of the system. 
The products describe various aspects of the system and essentially constitute the 
models of the system. DODAF products are organised in four views; "operational", 
"systems", "technical", and the "all-views" view which is used as reference to maintain 
consistency between the views and the products. MODAF is the equivalent framework 
defined by the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD). The MoD tailored MODAF to its 
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particular needs adding two more views; the "strategic" and "acquisition" views. 
MODAF and DODAF models are very similar and the views that arc common share the 
same set of products. 
Being primarily a framework for modelling enterprise architectures, MODAF does not 
have a particular language in which it is modelled. Although the guides describing the 
framework provide examples for implementing each of the products, it is stated (in 
DODAF definition documents) that the users can employ any modelling language as 
they see fit. Furthermore, the MODAF documentation [89] as well as further studies 
(such as [90]), provides a description of how each of the products could be modelled in 
UML. Table. 2 in appendix B shows a summary of the UML models that can be used to 
represent MODAF products. 
4.7.3.2 Process Walkthrough 
Definition of suitable deviations is a systematic process examining the potential of the 
modelling language - in which the system design is documented - to reveal the 
identified issues. Fig. 4.10 presents the steps of this DDA stage. The steps arc 
applicable for any modelling framework. However, the walkthrough provides examples 
that were based on use of MODAF. Selection of models is a process that ought to be 
performed by the involved stakeholders according to a number of criteria. Firstly, the 
stakeholders need to evaluate the suitability of each system element type to reveal the 
specified dependability issues. This involves subjectivity from the stakeholders that 
make the evaluations. One such evaluation is whether the issue can be manifested at the 
system clement type being examined. This requires understanding of what the system 
element type represents in the system models. In order to achieve this we used the 
MODAF mctamodel (W). The meta-model of a language documents the concepts, that 
are modelled and how these are associated with each other. The classes of the meta- 
model can assist with unambiguously documenting what each class represents in the 
model language that was used. The MODAF meta-model (M3) provides an insight into 
all products of all views explicitly identifying the concepts entities and data that each of 
the products describes. Although both the DODAF and the MODAF mcta-models are 
incredibly similar, in order to avoid confusion due to possible minor difference we have 
focused on MODAF. 
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Table. 4.6 presents an example of analysing several classes from the node connectivity 
(OV-2) product. The table contains some of the classes of the product OV-2, their 
description as well as assessment of suitability with regard to two example 
dependability issues. The classes examined in the table represent system elements types 
that appear in the OV-2 MODAF models. After understanding what each of the 
elements represents (based on the definition of the classes in the M3), the classes are 
juxtaposed with the dependability issues in order to understand how the issue call 
manifest oil the particular system element type (Table. 4.6). 
1,11111c. -I. 0 Nletaniodel Elements and Failm-es 
J ,ýII1, \ , 1,, -Iýol Im t 11ý1,1(11, ql ,Iýý!. I 
I. C. liot all autoillated to aC11% IIN 
function. 
Needline A relationship specifying the need to Unatithorised access Rate of' 
exchange infortnation between to the inforniation transimss toil of' 
nodes. The needline does not exchanged between information. 
indicate how the transfer is nodes. 
implemented. 
Infi)rmationExchange A specification of the infortnation UIlaUthoriscd access Rate of' 
that is to be exchanged. to the inforniation transmission of 
exchanged between information. 
nodes. 
Node A logical entity which creates Unauthorised access Node cannot 
consurnes or manipulates to node. process tile 
information. information fast 
enough. 
Once the potential of the system elements to capture the dependability issues is 
established, participants need to identify the guidewords that will be used to prompt the 
system element during the analysis. Existing guldcwords are examined 1'()i- their 
suitability to reveal the required issue. Expressiveness of' the dcfincd guideword is 
important. It is crucial to the DDA that guidewords can be interpreted unambiguously 
so that analysts can understand the viewpoint under which the system element is 
prompted. 
Upon identification of an appropriate guideword the suitable deviation is recorded. 
Fig. 4.11 shows the properties of a 'suitable deviation' instance in the EMF editor. The 
deviation has been associated with other instances of the metamodel representing the 
used guideword, the system element type and the issue for which it has been optinliscd 
to reveal. 
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Problems Console 
Description 
Deviation Is Applicable True 
Guideword 2 Guideword Public 
Name 2 Public:: Information Exchange 
Reveals Issue MIssue Unauthorised access 
System Element Type =ý System Element Type Information Exchange 
Fig. 4.11 - Properties of a Suitable Deviation in the EMF Editor 
a 
Fig. 4.12 shows the properties of the issue "unauthorised access" in the EMF editor. The 
issue which was identified from the viewpoint of the security attribute is revealed by a 
suitable deviation (i. e. Public:: Infon-nation Exchange) which consists of the guldeword 
"public" and the system element type "Information exchange" (the properties of this 
deviation are shown in Fig. 4.13). 
Problems Console 
Issue Of Attribute Dependabihty Attribute Security 
Name Unauthorised access 
Revealed By Suitable Deviation Suitable Deviation Public:: Information Exchange 
Fig. 4.12 - Properties of an Issue in the ENIF Editor 
Following the examination of existing guidewords and specification ofnew ones, the 
process examines the completeness of suitable deviations regarding the identified 
dependability issues. In some cases there is a possibility that the defined suitable 
deviations do not cover all issues (i. e. some issues have not been associated to a suitable 
deviation despite the have been examined). This can be the result in case the available 
models of the system do not have the necessary characteristics to clearly reveal the 
issues (combinations of system element types and issues for which the result of the first 
decision node in Fig. 4.10 is 'No'). To more easily understand this, we can consider 
trying to define a deviation suitable to reveal synchronisation issues, using a model in 
which temporal characteristics (e. g. sequence of events) are not present. 
Following identification that the identified models cannot satisfactorily participate in a 
suitable deviation, the participants need to identify the models that would help to 
complete the analysis. Initially the participants are asked to identify the 'inadequacies' 
of the identified models, by brainstorming the characteristics that the models lack in 
119 
Chapter 4- Requirements Elicitation Using Dependabiliti, DeviationAnalvvi. s7 
order to define a suitable deviation. Table. 4.7 presents a table of derived characteristics 
after considering example model characteristics that would help reveal the identified 
dependability issues. The table is the result of 'forcing' the process in this stage of' 
DDA to consider model characteristics. The suggested characteristics are not definite 
but a generic example of the 'kind' of models that may be used for analysis. 
Subsequent to suggestion of a model, the model should be analysed and tile system 
element types included identified, following assessment of its suitability. 
W-1.1- AI V11.111A 12ýaliirptl to Upt, oni lIvriond-iltililt I-aw, 
Possible Model 
Characteristics 
Possible Mod I 
Characteristics 
Latency I'Cinporal Unauthorised Functions, data. Physical mnpom-Ws 
diagranis, (Function/Data) CoMponents failure 
lunctions, Access 
processors 
Deadline Temporal Repudiation of Interaction Incorrect Data, 1/0 
miss diagrains, I10 Transaction (tnessaKinK) value 
events models 
Throughput Communication Assumed Identity Actors, messages Data 1)(11a. InessaKes 
I lines, processors integrity 
Functionality Function Comfort Actors ___ Incorrect State dhý41-anls 
unavailable state 
Mistake Actors, input Fatigue Actors 
Completion of the stage implies that all dependability issues have been associated to a 
suitable deviation. Failure to associate all issues to a deviation will compromise tile 
completeness of the analysis, as possibly important issues will be overlooked. 
4.7.4 Identification of Applicable Deviations 
The suitable deviations defined in the previous stage are generic, relaning to the 
identified dependability issues. In this stage of the DDA the applicability of' suitable 
deviations to the system under analysis is examined. The stage is responsible I'or two 
main functions; confon-nance of suitable deviations templates and documentation of' 
applicable deviations. 
Templates documenting suitable deviations are created with the purpose of' identifying 
deviations capable of revealing the dependability issues. It may be the case that tile 
available models that represent the system to be analysed do not contain the system 
element type described in a suitable deviation. flence, although a suitable deviation 
may exist for a particular issue, it can not be applied on the actual system being 
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examined. Possible inconsistencies should be detected and corrected before using the 
template. 
Additionally in this stage all the applicable deviations which will be analyscd are 
created and recorded. The system elements represented by the system elernent type in a 
suitable deviation arc instantiated and an applicable deviation is created for each onc of 
them. Fig. 4.13 illustrates the overall process of this stage. 
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Fig. 4.13 - Identification of Applicable Deviations Stage Process 
The stage starts with identification of the system element types required by the defined 
suitable deviations. Next the participants study the models in which the system (under 
analysis) is represented. Subsequently to successful identification or the saine system 
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element types an applicable deviation is created for each system element of that type. 
Recognition of an applicable deviation is captured in the metamodel by setting the 
isApplicable attribute of the SuitableDeviation class to true. The process repeats until 
all suitable deviations have been examined. 
Ensuring that the system element type in the documented suitable deviations and the 
available models are the same (i. e. represent the same concepts) is highly important in 
order to avoid inconsistencies. In case a model contains system element types similar 
but not the same as the suitable deviation, the suitable deviation should be redefined 
with the available system element type in mind. Upon completion, the defined 
applicable deviations will be examined whether leading to a credible failure condition 
during the following DDA stage. 
4.7.5 Identification of Failure Conditions 
This stage involves failure analysis of the system by examining the applicable 
deviations. The overall purpose of the step is to identify and understand the relations 
between all credible failure conditions. The resultant failures will then be analysed in 
the next stage in order to understand how a failure condition can cause another. 
Fig. 4.16 shows the process of this DDA stage. At the beginning of this stage the 
participants identify the available models in which the system is represented and the 
system elements that are contained in the model. In this example we analyse the AGO 
MODAF OV-2 (node connectivity) and OV-5 (activity diagram) models, which consist 
of Table. 4.8, Fig. 4.15 and Table. 4.9 and Fig. 4.16 respectively. UML was chosen as the 
language in which to implement the MODAF models as it is easier to understand, and 
more broadly recognised in comparison to the MODAF specific graphical 
representations. 
Next, a system element is selected to be analysed, for which there exists an applicable 
deviation that has been associated with it (during the previous stage of the DDA). The 
analysis focuses on two types of elements for the respective models; needlines and 
activities, which we probe for deviations using the defined guidewords, in order to 
identify possible failures. As in 'traditional' HAZOP, it is important for the analysts to 
122 
Chapter4 Requirements Elicitation UsingDependabilitv DeviationAnalv, sis 
understand the model and the intended behaviour of the system, so as to be able to 
describe the effect of the deviation. MODAF describes a needfine as "A rclationship 
specifting the need to exchange injbrmation between nodes. The needline does not 
indicate how the transfer is implemented'. An activity is described as "a process 
carried out by a person or organisation " [89]. 
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DDA tý DDA stage 
Are there any 
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Fig. 4.16 - Identification of Failure Conditions Stage Process 
Famillarisation with the models and the intended operation ofthe system is all important 
facet of the analysis. SHARD also highlights this necessity [76]. This task assists 
understanding the contribution of the element being prompted to the overall operation of' 
the system. Contrary to previous methods such as SHARD which analyse specific 
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model elements of the system, the focus of the DDA may differ. For example whereas a 
needline focuses on abstract data exchange between participating systems, an activity is 
concerned with functional contribution of each system to the overall mission. 
Following the description of the intended system operation, participants prompt the 
system element with the guidewords, as suggested by the respective applicable 
deviations. The guidewords suggest deviant behaviour ofthe system element. Analysis 
participants should examine the resultant system behaviour as Suggested by the 
deviation and describe the impact on the system element's operation. Ifthe deviation is 
credible, the impact of the deviation on the system element operation is documented as 
a possible failure condition. Identification of a credible deviation is captured in tile 
metamodel by setting the isCredihle attribute of the ApplictibleDevicition class to true. 
-------------> Needline 1z 
Needline 4 UAV Flock 
Mission Control, ý-, 
Needline 3 
<------------------> 
Needline 7 
<-------- -- I 
Infantry 
Needline 2 
Mi lie ry N aedl ine 6 
Needline 5 
Helicopters 
Fig. 4.15 - OV2 for the AGO using U NI 1, 
Table. 4.8 - DescriDtion of the OV2 Needlint-, 
Information Exchange 
Flight path 
Producer Consumer 
'VIIs. "loll Collilol 
(Fusion) Sensor data UAV Flock Mission Control 
2 Map Mission Control I lelicopters 
Target area Mission Control I lelicopters 
(Fusion) Feedback Helicopters Mission control 
6 Theatre support Helicopters Int'antry 
7 Target location Infantry Artillery 
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Table. 4.9 shows summary of this stage in tabular form. The first and second columns 
define the system element under analysis. In this case all system elements are of the 
same system element type (i. e. needline). The third column shows the guideword with 
which the system elements are probed; the parentheses underneath the guidewords 
indicate the dependability attribute from which the deviation has descended. 
Table. 4.9 - ON'2 Failure Idenlitication 
S, *Istcm 
Element 
Guideword Failure Condition Failure 
Condition ID 
11) 
I Public Disclosure ofaircraft position 
(Security) FCl 
7 Overload Slow transmission of target data FC2 
(Perfon-nance) 
Fake Artillery receive fake target data with FC3 
(Security) malicious intent 
Public Enemy receives firing intent and target FC4 
(Security) information 
Omission Artillery will not receive any target data FC5 
(Availability) 
Value Artillery will receive the wrong FC6 
(Reliability) location/order 
Late Delay or possibly loss of request of FC7 
(Performance) I target data 
0 
I nitwsteM issi on 
v ' upon wvWion at minion, 
l. UAVstake ff 3. Sd4jp Stand-by force3 it not knoyin vOwOw 
enemy forces At be 
detected 
2. UAVs m ove to the enemy area 4. P strmo I Ar e-a 
6. Suppress Enemy After moAng troops 
to the ttw4mtre of 
operations, the helicopters 
5. Transport Specied Forces ------------ join enemy supprenkm 
7. Deplane SF 8. Fuse operdicnsft*eatre information 
Numbers for achOtles = :i 
are tr :t 
ýý 
Cwo not 
yf 
sequence 
9. E ngage E nemy 
Fig. 4.16 - OV-5 Node Connectivity Diagram Using UML 
Taking in mind the dependability attribute of origin at this stage contributes in defining 
the viewpoint for the system's operation, and helps participants to describe the impact 
of the deviation unambiguously. Finally the last two columns of the table document the 
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failure condition. Similarly, Table. 4.10 summarises the (credible) deviations and failure 
conditions for the activity system element types of MODAF product OV5. 
Table. 4.10 ()N'5 Failure Identification 
I-, system System 
: 
Guideword Failure Condition Failure 
Element Element Condition 
Type ID ID 
Acti\ itý 4 Omission There is no patrolling filliction 
available, cannot notify of enemy 
forces 
4 Mistake Users mistakenly identify enemy FC9 
6 Mode A location is not suppressed FCIO 
when it is being expected that it 
does 
A location is suppressed when it FCI I 
should not 
6 Late Delays in suppressing enemy FC 12 
Scoping is important at this stage; the description of a fallure's effect should be limited 
to the model that is being analysed. Interpretation ofthe failure condition depends oil 
how the system element is used in each model. Scoping the failure condition DDA is 
not limited to the consideration of deviant behaviour of system elements frorn the 
perspective of the attributes of interest. Failure conditions may be associated with each 
other affecting the overall behaviour ofthe system. The next stage of DDA examines 
how failure conditions affect each other. 
4.7.6 Definition of (Failure) Traceability 
The previous stage of DDA identifies how deviant behaviour can affect tile system 
elements within a local scope. This step of DDA entails tile creation of a map showing 
how failure conditions are associated with each other, affecting the overall dependable 
operation of the system. The effects of a failure condition may constitute causes or 
contributing factors for other failures conditions originating from different attributes and 
models. Traceability between failure conditions is necessary in order to understand the 
associations between failure conditions. This involves consideration of how the system 
elements are combined composing the overall system, which inevitably requires 
examination of the system models. Fig. 4.17 presents the process overview of this DDA 
stage. Initially the participants identify a system model (model A) and its respective 
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failure conditions and a system model associated with it (model B). Next the failure 
conditions of 'model A' are examined, initially for their potential to directly impact the 
concerns of the stakeholders (identified in the 2 Id DDA stage). 
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further models 
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model (A) 
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s)item model (B) 
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Select failure 
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Identify common 
System element 
tvpes 
Describe operation 
of models and 
common system 
element types 
Selec( a failure 
condition from (he 
associated model (B) 
VEN 
Arethere 
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in mudel (A)? ------------------------------- 
Select concern 
VIN 
NO Are there 
uncxarnined 
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Can the failure 
NO 
condition result 
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Declarathin i sociations it a association 
between failum , ondifions 
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--------------------------------- ------- 
I PIN 
Can the failure 
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Pro%ide rationale 
for association 
Are there 
unexamined failure 
sco 
nditions in 
>N 
0 a socia(ed model 
(B)? 
Docu in en( 
association 
Fig. 4.17 - Definition of (Failure) Traceability Stage Process 
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Associations between failure conditions and concerns are declarative and not the 
product of an analytical method. This happens because concerns are not associated with 
a system element but with the overall operation of the system -a fundamental 
difference of the concepts of failure conditions and concerns. I fence effects ofa I'ailLire 
condition cannot be traced to concerns using the models of the system. In practice this 
implies that such association is based on the subjective judgement of the stakeholders, 
evaluating what constitutes direct compromise of their concerns. Following association 
with concerns, associations with failure conditions of related models are examined. 
Table. 4.11 provides a summary of possible associations between the identified failure 
conditions for the AGO scenario. The two dimensions of the matrix are populated with 
failure conditions associated with system elements belonging to OV2 and OV5. Its 
purpose is to examine whether the respective failure conditions are credibly associated. 
The rationale supporting the associations is elicited by the traceability model (explained 
in the next section) that has been established during the earlier stages ofthe DDA. 
Table. 4.11 - Associations Bel%wen Failure Conditions in OV2 and OV5. 
Although the associations between the failure conditions are presented in a tabular 
format, the results are also recorded by instantiating the mctamodel (creating a model 
for the AGO DDA example). One of products of this stage is the I'ailure conditions 
map. The failures condition map (Fig. 4.20) showing the failure conditions map for the 
AGO scenario) is a visual representation of the associations between the failure 
conditions. A failure conditions map is created by generating (directly from the 
metamodel) code for the Graphviz tool which then produces the v1suallsation of the 
model, created during the processes of the DDA. The failure conditions map of 
Fig. 4.18 shows the deviations (ellipses) that prompted the identification of the failure 
conditions (rectangles). 
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Concerns can also be shown but have been left out in the example to preserve the clarity 
of the illustration. The map was automatically generated from the instance of the 
metamodel that corresponds to the analysis of the AGO scenario. The graphviz tool 
was used for production of the graph. The code for the graph was generated using the 
Epsilon Object Language (EOL). The colour of the deviations' border denotes the 
MODAF view (i. e. blue for operational view) whereas the colour of the text the element 
examined (i. e. purple for needlines and green for activities). The criterion for failure 
condition colouring was the number of associations to other failure conditions 
(including the associations not shown in this example visualisation). 
Although the failure conditions map is a means of presenting the DDA, and not a 
fundamental concept in the framework, it has proved useful in surnmarising the analysis 
by showing: 
9 An overview of the failure conditions and their associations 
e The deviant behaviour of the system elements that was considered important. 
e The (dependability attribute) context in which the failure condition was 
identified. 
Overall the failure conditions map has been very useful in identifying how the 
behaviour of the system from the viewpoints of different dependability attributes affects 
the overall system. 
4.7.6.1 Using the MODAF Metarnodel to Understand Traceability 
Traceability between the models under analysis can be established using the MODAF 
meta-model. By examining the common elements (i. e. meta-model classes) between the 
MODAF products we can identify how the models are associated. For example, an 
information exchange identified in OV2 is also used in activities in a MODAF activity 
diagram (OV5). 
Fig. 4.19 shows the links of the OV2 product with other MODAF products. The 
MODAF products that appear in Fig. 4.21 share common classes, which are used as 
prescribed by the specification of each product. 
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Table. 4.12 summarises the common classes between the MODAF products, which 
resulted in identi FyIng the relationships of OV2 (Fig. 4.2 I). 
Fable. 4.1 2M2 
-1111m lnolloll[ ý, h, III, -, 'c 
-Node 
-OperationalActivilY 
-ActivifyConducled., ItNode 
lý jh/Ný 
-Neeilline 
, 
Nl at ri x 
-Node 
Op, 
-OperalioizalA ctivitv 
Although the products are not explicitly associated, the common classes allow us to 
identify and understand the role or a system element from other viewpoints of' the 
system operation. For example, a performance failure at the needline may give tile 
artillery a command to engage the enemy at the wrong time. Hence the effect of a 
performance failure regarding the needline constitutes the cause for a reliability failure 
with respect to the activity. Textuaffraceabilitv IF, #ýýct the class that represents the 
justification of how system elements are used in the system and how a I'ailure condition 
may result in another. 
4.7.6.2 Semi-automated Approach for Establishing Traceability 
Textual representation of traceability presents certain disadvantages in its use. Firstly, 
description of traceability is ad-hoc and depends on the DDA participants for clarity. 
This can result in complex and often weak reasoning. The problems of text based 
reasoning have been well documented by experiences in the safety case domain in [47]. 
131 
Fig. 4.19 - Associations of the OV2 MODAF Product 
Chaptcr4 Requirements Elicitation Using Dependabilit v, De viot ion A nUI. VS i's 
Moreover identifying the association of a system element with others manually is a 
tedious and time consuming task. Automation of the task even to some degree can offer 
significant reduction in the time required to complete the task. This was achieved by 
building a basic dependency model for system elements. Fig. 4.20 shows an extract 
from the revised DCM with the addition of the class and the associations supporting the 
basic traceability model. The difference with the initial extract of the DCM capturing 
DDA, is the addition of the UseclBy Traceability class. This class serves as an 
association class between system elements. The association class denotes the 
dependencies between the system elements during operation. Consider OV2 (Fig. 4.17); 
needline 2 depends on needline 1, hence ncedline I is usetl by needline 2. Associations 
between system elements are declared during definition of the system models. 
Fig. 4.20 - "Used-by" Association in UML 
Participants can use a variable degree of granularity in which the model is represented. 
For example only the needlines could be modelled, omitting the system elements of type 
node. However if more detail is required the intermediate system elements can be 
added; furthermore, this approach of providing traceability can be extended by 
'hardwiring' to the dependability case metamodel, classes of the modelling framework 
in which the system is represented, that correspond to lower level, and more detailed 
models. Epsilon scripts were created to benefit from the provided basic traceability in 
the following manner: by selecting the system elements (consider a hypothetical system 
element A) the deviant behaviour of which triggered the definition of a failure 
condition, the script identifies the system elements (consider hypothetical system 
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elements B and C) that are using system element A, by navigating the 
UsedByTraceabifity associations. The script then identifies the failure conditions that 
resulted from deviations associated with system elements B and C. The two resultant 
sets of failure conditions are suggested to the participants to examine the credibility of 
possible associations between a pair of failure conditions belonging to each set. The 
participants do not have to exhaustively check the combinations of all failure 
conditions. The pairs prompted by the script include only failure conditions that could 
be associated based on traceability. Providing this degree of automation in the analysis 
proved to be very efficient, especially during analysis of large scale systems. 
4.7.7 Definition of Dependability Profile and Preliminary 
Identification of Goals 
This is the last stage of the deviation analysis. Having understood how unwanted 
behaviour can affect the operation of the system elements and the system overall, 
participants elicit tangible dependability requirements. For the system elements, the 
identified requirements constitute the dependability profile, which can be characterised 
as a multi-attribute envelope of intended operation. Furthermore, this stage serves as a 
preparatory stage, in which the participants are involved in a preliminary identification 
of goals that will form the dependability argument. Fig. 4.21 shows the overall process 
of the final DDA stage. The stakeholders motivated by identification of unwanted 
(deviant) behaviour define dependability requirements. Concerns and failure conditions 
are the concepts that capture the unwanted system operation. Consequently, the process 
can be seen as having two threads corresponding to concerns and failure conditions. 
The process starts with selection of a concern or failure condition. Although either can 
be chosen in the beginning, ideally all concerns should be examined first. Priority of 
concerns over failure conditions is something that will occur naturally by applying DDA 
during the system's lifecycle. 
133 
Chapter4 RequiremenisElic-iltitionUvingDel)endabilitvDevi(itionAtitil. t, sis 
( 
Start/ Pre%ious ý, 
111/1PII. 
I.; 
ý 
Conc 
Se I ect. a. fai Iur" -'ýFailure 
condition condition or 
XOR) concern 
ldentifý related 
es , attribute of intei attribute of interest 
Identify rclated I 
(descent of FC) (descent of concern) 
Identify source 
(cause) and target 
(effect) Association, 
Arc there defined 
110 No depenclabiliaN 
requirements 
ifor 
the target failure 
condi ion,? 
Select target failure r 1f 
11 condition 
Describe un. anted 
ldvntif. ý sýstcvn 
%Nslvm beha%iour element 
de%iant 
CAP(U red b % concern 
beha, iour leading to 
- FC 
IdentifN %)%Acnt g al 
ýdc 
n 
-ti 
f) %),. %Iem element' u 
(haied on ru es) le') goal 
( (ta based (it GSN rules) I 
II 
Specify, mean% (if SpvcifN nicans (if 
ei, aluating goa 
I 
v%alua ing goal 
SpecifN criterion for Specif. ý criterion for 
succes sum - of the gual 
Justify and document Justify and document 
success criterion success criterion 
Are there concerns 
Are there failure 
y 
without a iated conditions without 
dependsasbilitý 8, S oc iated 
requirement? 
dc pendability I 
requirement? 
>1 
Fig. 4.21 - Definition of Dependability Profile Stage Process 
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Next, the participants should identify the attribute of interest with which the concern or 
failure conditions is associated, providing the appropriate perspective to the analysis. 
Following this, the participants identify the unwanted behaviour captured by the 
concern (e. g. loss of life) or the unwanted behaviour of the system element that 
corresponds to the failure condition (e. g. public access of needline I data). A 
prerequisite in this step, is that the target associations of the examined failure condition 
should have an already defined dependability profile. This is a necessary step that 
allows the dependability requirements to be elicited in the context of operation of the 
system. Consider failure conditions FC2 (slow transmission of target data) and FC12 
(delay in suppressing enemy) of the AGO scenario, which are failure conditions 
identified from the perspective of performance. Subsequent to the creation of the failure 
map it was identified that FC2 could lead to FC12. If during the process FC2 is 
examined before FC12 a requirement for FC2 cannot be justifiably derived. Althoughit 
is possible to understand the nature of the requirements that will be elicited during the 
next steps of the process (for FC2 rate of transmission and for FC12 speed of enemy 
suppression), it is difficult to justifiably project the target rate of transmission without 
knowing the target speed for suppression of the enemy. This constraint is in line with 
the top-down apportionment of requirements as suggested by the ARP 4761 [70]. For 
this reason the process participants will have to define the dependability profile of FC 12 
before examining FC2. Concerns are not subject to this check as the requirements 
elicited from concern would correspond to the highest level of the system operation and 
hence are defined directly from the stakeholders. 
Following identification of unwanted operation, goals for the behaviour of the system 
need to be identified. This is a preliminary effort for stakeholders to describe in 
tangible terms goals derived from the DDA analysis. Although these goals may not be 
integrated 'as-is' in the arguments, they constitute candidates for the dependability case 
arguments. Stakeholders should dcfine the goals using the syntax and scope rules 
guidelines described in GSN step 1 [47]. In the case of the AGO scenario a goal elicited 
from concern would be 'Overall scenario should be acceptably safe' whereas for a 
failure condition would be Weedline should provide acceptable bandwidth'. 
Identification of the goal should not be confused with the criteria for the satisfaction of 
the goal, something also highlighted in the GSN methodology. In the case of FC2, 
specifying that needline 7 should have I Mbps bandwidth is not a correct goal. The 
goal is the provision of adequate bandwidth and I Mbps is the target requirement for the 
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satisfaction of the goals. The two next steps of the process are responsible for 
identifying the means of evaluation of the goal (risk for the goal regarding acceptable 
safety and transmission rate for adequate bandwidth) and the goal satisfaction criterion 
(I death inIO'hours of operation, I Mbps). Finally stakeholders need to present the 
rationale based on which the acceptance criteria of the goals were specified. For failure 
conditions this may prove to be easier as it depends on the collaboration of system 
elements. For concerns such rationale may be justified by appeal to sources such as 
business objectives, mission plans and legacy systems. 
Upon concluding the process the system stakeholders will have identified requirements 
associated with system elements and with concerns, as well as a set of goals that could 
be used in the dependability case arguments. The set of the dependability requirements 
associated with one system element constitute the dependability profile of that system 
element. 
4.8 Other Sources of Requirements 
The main purpose to of DDA is to acknowledge the dependability attribute viewpoints 
and understand how the system should behave with respect to those dependability 
viewpoints. Application of DDA does not single out use of other analysis 
methodologies. Instead other method can be used to complement the analysis. This is 
one of the reasons for the adoption of the dependability profile. Using the dependability 
profile requirements originating from other methodologies can be recorded and later 
used in the dependability case. The DCM is extensible to accommodate other processes 
for requirements elicitation, which however acknowledge and conform to the multi- 
attribute view (requirements for each attribute) used in this thesis. 
On the same tack, the goals elicited during application of DDA are not the only goals 
that will be used in the dependability case arguments. The goals elicited during DDA 
contribute in establishing product argument(s). This means that they mainly related to 
the actual system (i. e. product). According to the architecture of the arguments and the 
strategies based upon which the argument is developed, various types of goals can be 
used such as goals asserting the correctness of the system process. For example, 
consider an argument about quality control of the lifecycle processes (process 
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argument). The goals elicited during DDA are but a subset of the total goals used in the 
final dependability case artefact. 
4.9 Summary 
This chapter has defined Dependability Deviation Analysis, a technique for eliciting 
dependability requirements. DDA supports identification of system requirements from 
the perspective of any dependability attribute. In order to understand how a 
dependability attribute can influence another, the concept of failures maps was 
introduced. In order to capture and collate the requirements of the SoS elements DDA 
introduces the concept of dependability profiles. Finally the DDA stages are 
demonstrated throughout the chapter using the AGO scenario. 
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Chapter 5 
Facilitating Trade-offs Between 
Dependability Requirements 
5.1 Introduction 
A dependability case entails arguments about achievement of dependable operation of 
the system. This involves reasoning about achievement of acceptable system behaviour 
with respect to the dependability attributes of interest to the stakeholders. Establishing 
an argument about the dependability of the system involves justification and 
documentation of the decisions made during system evolution, in order to achieve the 
required dependability attributes. However, decisions that favour achievement of an 
attribute may conflict with other attributes. These occasions are common and inevitable 
especially in large systems, resulting in an impasse. Resolving such situations often 
necessitates trading-off the achievement of a requirement in favour of another. 
Decision making is an integral part of the development of a system. This chapter 
examines concepts applied in decision making, examines application of one such 
methodology in the context of dependability cases, and finally it introduces the trade-off 
method (TOM), an argument based method that facilitates trading-off conflicting goals. 
5.2 Trade-offs During Evolution of the Dependability 
Case 
Construction of a compelling argument requires explicit consideration of contextual 
information such as the design of the system or possible assumptions made during the 
creation of the argument. For example, arguing about a requirement concerning the 
availability of a system could result in adopting an architecture with redundant 
components. Hence, that design decision would allow an argument to be constructed 
combining the availability of the two components, assuming that the components will 
not fail simultaneously. Similarly, tackling this last concern may lead to adopting a 
diverse implementation of the two components, avoiding simultaneous failures due to 
implementation faults. 
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Evolution of requirements and design takes place in parallel. A representative example 
of this is the twin peaks model [91]. During the evolution of a system, developers are 
continuously faced with decisions which need to address the already specified 
requirements and serve as the basis for the derivation and apportionment of more 
detailed requirements. Satisfying the specified requirements of a system can be 
achieved with a number of possible different alternative designs. 
Degree of satisfaction of a goal is the degree of achievement of a goal by a candidate 
design alternative, with respect to the defined criteria ofachievement. 
Variability on how each design alternative can satisfy the system goals implies that any 
decision will inevitably result in trading-off satisfying a set of goals in favour of others. 
Trade-offs can be described as a "balance achieved betneen tno desirable but 
incompatible features; a sacrifice made in one area to obtain benefits in another, a 
bargain, a compromise" [92]. Generally, in order to make such decisions, system 
developers need to examine the advantages or disadvantages of each design alternative 
on the operation of the system, aiming to choose the optimal. 
5.3 Review of Concepts and Methodologies in Decision 
Making 
There arc numerous methodologies and approaches that have been employed by system 
analysts, not only in the engineering domain but also in other disciplines. Some of the 
main concepts in decision making arc common in more than one methodology. 
However cvcn subtle differences can signify a distinctive approach towards thinking 
about decision making, and in specific about managing the process of making trade- 
o ffs. 
5.3.1 ATAM 
ATAM is a method developed by the Software Engineering Institute in Carnegie 
Mellon University [37]. The purpose of the method is for participants to propose 
candidate architectures and prioritise them according to which will satisfy the best their 
goals. Ile stakeholders' goals that the system needs to achieve arc defined during a 
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complementary process to ATAM, the Quality Attribute Workshops [39]. The aim of 
these workshops is to brainstorm scenarios about the use of the system, and the required 
reaction of the system to certain events dcfmcd by the scenario. For example, in the 
context of a network system, in the event of a hardware failure the network should 
detect and recover the failure within 1.5 seconds. The output of the process is a utility 
tree, which provides a top down model for directly translating business drivers of a 
system into quality attribute scenarios. The overall ob cctives of the system are 
decomposed into more concrete criteria. Fig. 5.1 presents an example extract from a 
quality attribute utility tree with final criterion from the point of security and, in 
particular data confidentiality. Tle resultant criteria arc charactcriscd by a priority and 
risk indication according to the projected importance to the stakeholders' interest and 
their risk (indicating diff iculty) of implementation. 
Performance: ] 
(Priority, Ri7sý7k) 
J Modiflabili 
Transactions Data 99.999% 
I Confid! iali -11-1 nt secure 
, [----Data -I! 
- 
Integrily 
Fig. 5.1 - Quality Attributes Utility Tree 
The participants of ATAM discuss the possible architectural approaches and how they 
can contribute to achieving the elicited scenarios. The final selection of the appropriate 
architectural strategies takes place after voting conducted by the stakeholders, selecting 
the strategy with the highest score. Voting takes into account the priority of achieving 
cach scenario as well as possible risks. An important activity of ATAM is the 
idcntirication of sensitivity points. Sensitivity points are architectural decisions which 
significantly affect the achievement of the attributes. An example of a sensitivity point 
given in [86) is the level of confidentiality in a virtual private network, which is 
sensitive to the number of bits of encryption. Identification of sensitivity points allows 
the participants to undcrstand the architectural characteristics responsible for the 
141 
Chapter 5 Facilitatitkiz Trade-olls Benveen Dependabilin Rt-quirernents 
achievement of the stakeholders' goals. The objectives are to analyse and communicate 
the objectives of a systern and understand the means of their achievement. 
5.3.2 Cost Benefit Analyses 
in gencral. coý, t henct-It anlilý ses compare the expected return of an iný estment against 
the initial monetary value required of the implementation of the alternative. One 
application of the principles ofcost benefit analysis in systems engineering is the Cost 
Benefit Analysis Method (UBAM) [861. CBAM compares the benefit from 
implementing an architectural strategy against its implementation cost. Ultimately, the 
purpose of the implemented architectural strategy is to achieve the required quality 
attribute. The return of investment is the calculation of the achieved benefit over the 
cost required to achieve that (benefit / cost). Rctuni of investment is a numerical 
measure used in CBAM. In order to calculate it (since cost is also numerical) CBAN1 
suggests quantification of utility. Utility represents the benefit with respect to the 
required quality attributes resulting from implementing a candidate architectural 
scenario. Fig. 5.2 presents a schenia of how the return of investment is calculated. The 
stakeholders assess the improvement in the systern in ternis of the required quality 
attributes and subjectiNely specify the utility on a scale from 0 to 100. 
Performance 
Business %rchitectural 
Benefit 
C Strategies 
k 
Usability 
Cost i 
Utility 
Return Of Investment 
Fig. 5.2 - O%er,. iei% on CBANI 
Although importance of implementation of each attribute can be added as part of the 
analysis using weights, CBAM remains a pure numerical comparison of utility of each 
attribute against cost. Cost benctit analysis is a straight Fonvard process and although 
the results are compelling analysts should be circunispect. as the numerical 
representation ot'all quality attributes may mask the importance of a quality attribute. A 
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case in which cost benefit analysis has been misapplied taking into account only 
economical results is discussed in the ALARP section. 
5.3.3 Easy Win-Win 
Easy win-win is a process for eliciting and negotiating system requirements [93]. The 
objective is again to engage system stakeholders in understanding each other's 
viewpoint and collectively agree a set of compatible requirements. In order to achieve 
this state each stakeholder describes a set of win conditions. Win conditions are 
statements about the successful operation of the system as it has been envisioned by the 
stakeholders. Stakeholders examine the win conditions and identify whether they can 
impact other stakeholders negatively. A condition which can impact stakeholders 
negatively is called a lose condition. Wntification of win and lose conditions allow the 
stakeholders to negotiate through the win-win process an alternative set of 
requirements, ultimately resulting in conditions that would be characteriscd as win 
conditions by all. 
The method identifies trade-off points. Unlike ATAM win-win points are statements of 
conflict between requirements and do not suggest how the architecture can influence the 
achievement of the requirements. Trade-offs are not explicitly analysed and recorded 
but the method focuses on describing the result of the negotiations between the involved 
stakeholders over an acknowledged conflict. Win conditions are described in terms of 
importance and case of implementation, which is the product of voting among the 
participants of the analysis. An important aspect of easy win-win is the classification of 
the win conditions and their subsequent prioritisation. According to the values assigned 
to importance and case of implementation, win conditions can be classified in four 
categories [93]: 
* Low hanging ftuits (important, easy): Win conditions with a high business 
importance, which seem to be feasible. 
* Important with hurdles (important, difficult): Crucial win conditions difficult to 
implcmcnt. 
AVbe later (unimportant, easy): Low-priority win conditions that may be 
considered latcr because of their low difficulty of rcalisation. 
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e Forget it (unimportant, difficult): Unimportant win conditions that are difficult 
to achieve. 
The importance and case of implementation are two criteria that motivate the system 
stakeholders to implement some win conditions over others. For example, an 
unimportant and difficult is considered to be something that will not be implemented on 
the grounds that is difficult to implement, and that the perceived utility of the 
achievement of the condition is low in comparison to the other conditions. The 
prominence of this feature of easy win-win lies in the fact that the four categories 
constitute implicit arguments based on which the decision about the implementation 
order is justi ficd. 
5.3.4 Multi Criteria Decision Analysis 
Multi Criteria Decision Analysis is a process that allows making decisions between 
candidate alternatives in an environment with multiple competing objectives. One such 
model is the Analytic Hicrarchy Process (AIIP). 
5.3.4.1 The Analytic Hierarchy Process 
Ile Analytical Ilicrarchy Process (AIIP) is a systematic method for making decisions, 
between a number of possible options with respect to multiple objectives [94]. Fig. 5.3 
illustrates an ATIP the main elements in the AIIP hierarchy. 
Overall goal 
Criterion III Criterion 211 Criterion 311 Criterion 4 
Candidate A andid cA Candidate A 
te 13 
11 II Candidate A 
Candida and 
ze 
B Candidate B Candidate B 
Candidate C Candidate C Candidate C Candidate C 
Fig. 53-AIIP Hierarchy 
Initially the participants state the overall goal of the decision making process, which 
usually would be the selection of the optimum candidate decision. In a process 
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resembling the creation of utility trees in ATAM, the overall goal is decomposed into a 
number of criteria (also called the objectives that the alternative needs to achieve) that 
need to be satisfied, and against which the candidate decisions will be evaluated. After 
the critcria have been defined the participants make pair-wise comparisons between 
goals populating a matrix with values indicating the relative importance of the x, y 
objectives (i. e. I= believe that they are of equal importance, 9= very strongly believe 
that X is more important than Y). Calculating the eigenvector of the matrix of the 
critcria, results in a vector that indicates the overall importance of each goal. 
Following the calculation of weights for each of the objectives the participants make use 
of the same process to compare the 'goodness' of the options. For each objective a 
table is created with pair-wisc comparison between the options answering the generic 
question "which option from the two you think has achieved the objective better". 
Alternatively scale values can be used. The process will result in a set of tables, the 
eigcnvector of which shows the relative 'goodness' of each alternative with respect to 
each objective. Combining the table using matrix algebra results in aI xN (where N the 
number of alternatives) matrix, showing the overall score of each alternative. Among 
AIIP's strengths is the fact that the participants can made subjective judgements 
regarding the importance of the objectives, as well as the achievements of the objectives 
from the options. 
5.4 Using AHP for Trading-off goals in the Context of 
Dependability Cases 
This is an exercise showing potential use of AIIP as part of the construction of a 
dependability case. The exercise was created during meetings between the mcmbcrsý 
of the partnership, as part of which this research took place. The purpose of the exercise 
was to examine the suitability of AIIP to be used in order make justified trade-offs 
between system goals in the context of dependability case development. In the exercise 
AIIP was used to select the most optimum design for a hypothetical Future Transport 
Aircraft (FTA). The new transport requirements as described in [95] served as 
inspiration for the definition of the requirements and the general context for the FTA 
exercise. This is a hypothetical example with the sole purpose the evaluation of the 
*'QinctiQ, BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce pfc. 
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concepts (such as application of a utility vector to represent dependability) of the AHP 
methodology. In accordance to the description of AIIP the process involves three main 
phases: 
- ldcntification of ovcrall goal and critcria 
- Prioritisation of criteria and calculation of weights 
- Asscssment of the candidatc dccisions 
Although it was cndcavourcd to provide realistic requirements, their accuracy is not of 
primary importance to the exercise. The data relating to the aircraft were inspired by 
real examples, but in certain occasions (i. e. minimum stall speed and flight endurance) 
conjectures were made. However this does not affect how AIIP is used but merely the 
dctails of the final rcsult, which is not a conccm. 
5.4.1 Identification of Criteria & Alternatives 
The first step in the AIIP process is the identification of the criteria, which will be part 
of the final hierarchy. Criteria represent the requirements that need to be achieved by 
the candidate design, and constitute the context in which the candidate (design) 
alternatives will be assessed. In a (GSN based) dependability case the criteria would be 
the equivalent to goals, representing the system requirements that will have to be 
achieved by the system (i. e. the aircraft). 
Deviation Dependability Analysis (described in chapter 4) was applied to derive the 
goals and dependability requirements for the FTA. DDA was not used for a full system 
analysis but to clicit the high level system goals and requirements by identifying the 
system concerns. A prerequisite for DDA was the existence of the high level of concept 
of operations. The Future Transport Aircraft (FTA) is a military cargo aircraft. 
According to its concept of operation, the FTA can undertake multiple roles according 
to the purposes of the mission, including strategic, tactical and theatre of operations. 
The strategic role involves transport of big volumes of cargo and personnel between 
(possibly distant) bases or command ccntrcs. During a tactical mission the aircraft is 
required to deploy equipment and personnel using temporary airstrips, prepared at the 
beginning and maintained until the end of the mission. Finally in the theatre of 
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operations role, the FTA provides support such as surveillance and medical evacuation. 
Fig. 5.4 presents the issues with which the tasks of each FTA role were prompted. The 
issues cover a range of attributes including perforniance safety, usability. 
Cargo capacity 
Range 
Speed 
Fake off landing runway length 
Autonomous ground handling 
Oround manoeuvrabilit-v 
Minimurn stall speed 
Flight Durability 
Ease of payload comersion 
I lull loss (Safety) 
Fig. 5.4 -F FA Issues 
Using the identified issues the high level tasks of the FTA for each role were examined 
and concenis were identified. 
Payload Inadequate transport capability. 60 t 
Range Inadequate range, requires refuelling for distances greater 3500 iini 
than the achieved range. 
%V1111111111111 Difficulty in deploying paratroopers, and airborne 110 kts 
Stall Flight delivered equipment. This also impacts the length of the 
Speed landing strip. 
Flight The aircraft will have to break mission to refuel 10 hrs 
Endurance 
Reliabilltv Probability of fault that will result in aborting the 10-5 
Mission. 
s'roi, Nfininium length ofthe required runway for short take of 2300 ft 
and landing (STOIA Very difficult to create long 
runways in theatre of operations. 
By applying the steps of the DDA process, Table. 5.1 was created. The table 
surnmarises the task issues, the ackTIONVIedged concerns, and their respect'Ve 
requirements elicited from the DDA process. 
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5.4.2 Calculation of Weights 
The next step of AHP involves calculation of weights for each of the identified criteria. 
The weights show the relative importance among the identified criteria. Calculation of 
weights entails the creation of a matrix, which includes pair wise comparisons of the 
criteria (Fig. 5.5 a). The values represent the relative importance of the criteria (i. e. I= 
believe that they are of equal importance, 9- very strongly believe that X is more 
important than Y). A tool implemented by the author in Java, prompted the exercise 
participants for pair-wise evaluations between the identified criteria, and calculated the 
eigenvector of the table. The resultant vector is shown in Fig. 5.5 (b), and represents 
the importance of each criterion according to how the participants evaluated each pair- 
wise comparison. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 WEIGHTS: 
---- 
1 
21 
31 
41 
--------------- 
1 
0.126 
0.2 
0.33 
- ----------- 
8 
1 
3 
4 
------------------ 
5 
0.1ý33 
1 
2 
------------ 
3 
0.25 
0.5 
1 
------------ 
3 
0.33 
3 
1 
---------- 
4 
2 
3 
2 
-------------- 
3 
025 
0.25 
0.5 
Safety: 0.35453835 
STOL: 0.17924733 
MinSpeed: OA2529664 
Range: 0.12261105 
Endurance: 0.10109467 
51 0.33 3 0.33 1 1 2 0.5 Reliability: 0.0673232 
61 0.25 0.5 0.33 0,5 0ý5 1 1 Payload: 0.049888786 
71 0.33 4 4 2 2 1 1 1 1 TO-TAUJAMOO 
(a) (b) 
Fig. 5.5 - AllP Criteria Comparison Table & Weights 
As expected, when making the pair-wise comparisons, safety received the highest rating 
followed by the remaining criteria. It is worth noticing that two of the criteria, namely 
minimum stall speed and range have little difference in their weights, only becorning 
evident at the 3 rd decimal digit of the weight value (the significance of this observation 
is discussed in §5.5) 
5.4.3 Evaluation of Alternatives 
Evaluation of the possible design options followed the calculation of weights. In the 
FTA exercise the focus was on one design aspect, namely the number and configuration 
of the aircraft engines. Identification of how the characteristics of each option affect the 
goals (similar to sensitivity analysis as performed in ATAM) was not in the scope of the 
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exercise, which focused on the effectiveness of AHP in architectural trade-offs; a more 
detailed discussion about design rationale can be found tin chapter 6. However during 
the exercise such activity took place in order to understand how each alternative would 
affect each criterion. Three options were proposed: 
Option A: Two high thrust engines under the wings. 
Option B: Four engines under the wings. 
9 Option C: Two engines above the wings. 
The characteristics of the three options have different impacts on the operation of the 
aircraft. At this stage assumptions were made about how the three configurations affect 
each of the criteria. Again, although the participants had rudimentary knowledge of the 
principles that govern the behaviour of the aircraft, there were assumptions made; the 
factual accuracy of which was not of primary importance to the exercise. 
By using two engines over the wing, option C achieves more lift and therefore the 
aircraft has lower minimum stall speed. This allows for shorter a runway as the aircraft 
can take off sooner and needs less space to brake during landing. Moreover when using 
temporary strips as runways, the engines are protected from debris suction that may 
damage the engine; especially during short take-offs when the engine is set to the 
highest thrust, this can be a very serious risk. In contrast to option C, option A has two 
engines mounted under the wing, providing less lift. Hence higher thrust engines are 
required, something that would increase the possibility of debris suction. Moreover 
higher thrust engines would comparatively contribute to higher overall weight, 
increasing in the same time fuel consumption, which would compromise flight 
endurance. Finally, option B is a more conventional configuration; the aircraft has 
lower (compared to the two other options) thrust four engines mounted under the wing. 
Although more exposed to debris than option C, the low thrust reduces the risk of debris 
ingestion in comparison to option A. Option B provides the aircraft with the capability 
to fly with one or two engines shut down or at idle power (i. e. gliding with a small 
descent rate) preserving fuel and therefore extending flight endurance. 
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Next in the AHP process, the alternatives are evaluated against the identified criteria. In 
order to simplify the example and increase accuracy of the exercise, only three criteria 
were used. Selection of the three criteria was based on the confidence of the 
participants, in being able to predict how the characteristics of each alternative would 
affect the criteria during evaluation. Calculation of weights was repeated for the three 
selected criteria, the results of which are presented in Table. 5.2. 
Table. 5.2 - Weil! hts for the Criteria Subset 
I Safety ý 0.7018 
1 STOL 10.1972 
I Endurance 1 0.1009 1 
Table. 5.3 shows an overview of the normalised results of the evaluation of the three 
options. Within brackets is the original score in a scale from I to 10 that assigned to 
each altemativc with respect to each criterion. 
In the case of this exercise, evaluation was based on the participants assigning the 
'goodness' of each alternative, by interpreting the degree of satisfaction of each 
criterion. For example, the evaluation results show that both options 13 and C would 
have the same degree of achievement of endurance and therefore were assigned the 
same grade. Moreover the table implies that option C performance in STOL is nearly 
fully satisfied the criterion and therefore was assigned a9 out ot' 10. 
Table. 5.3 - E,, aluation and Normalisation of A lternafiNes 
Option B FOption C 
0.2857 (6/10) 0.3809 (8/10) 0.333 (7/10) 
0.2727 (6/10) 0.3181 (7/10) 0.409 (9/10) 
0.25(4/10) 0.375 (6/10) 0.375 (6/10) 
The final result of the process is a 10 matrix presenting the overall utility of each of the 
alternatives. This is produced by combining, using matrix algebra, the matrix that 
results from Table. 5.3 and the matrix containing the weights of each criterion Table. 5.2. 
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The resultant matrix contains the overall (normalised) utility of each alternative with 
respect to all criteria. 
UtifityMatrix(U) = AlternativesEvaluationMatrix x WeightsMatrix => 
0.2857 0.2727 0.25 w, 0.2857 0.2727 0.25 0.7018 0.27936"option4' 
U=0.3809 0.3181 0.375xw, =: ý0.3809 0.3181 0.375xO. l972=>0.36787 optionB 
0.333 0.409 0.375 w3 0.333 0.409 0.375 0.1009 0.35219, optionC, 
Fig. 5.6 - Calculation of Utility Vector 
Fig. 5.6 shows the calculations taking place when producing the utility matrix. Option B 
(0.36787) is the most optimum option followed closely by option C (0.35219); option A 
(0.27936) scored the lowest. 
5.5 Drawbacks in the Numerical Representation of 
Dependability 
As described in chapter 3, dependability is a generic term which encompasses many 
heterogeneous attributes. This characteristic of dependability causes problems when 
attempting to represent or even understand dependability as a single concept. In fact, 
when referring to dependability, it is often done in the context of a particular viewpoint 
such as reliability and safety. This section investigates the problems when modelling 
dependability using a numerical representation, and discusses its application (i. e. AHP 
exercise) in making justified decisions in the context of a dependability case. After 
presentation of the problem and completion of the AHP exercise, discussions followed 
regarding the suitability of the characteristics of AHP as decision making tool in 
dependability cases. Observations by the participants of the exercise as well as 
subsequent analysis and evaluation from the author, identified several challenges to be 
overcome, in order for a trade-off resolution method to be used in dependability case 
framework. 
Use of a trade-off resolution method in the context of a dependability case requires 
clarity in rationale of justifications, and traceability. As explained in chapter 3, a 
dependability case presents an argument and communicates assurance regarding the 
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operation of the system. Arguments in the dependability case evolve and are 
constructed in the context of the system, and consequently design decisions. In order 
for the final argument to be compelling all decisions made during system development 
should be justified. Moreover the rationale on which the decisions were based should 
be clearly communicated in the case. Clarity of rationale and documentation of 
justification on which decisions are based are important prerequisites for traceability of 
the argument. Traceability is an important aspect of a strong and compelling argument 
contributing to the overall system assurance. Reviews of the argument should be easily 
performed and reviewers should be able to identify the assumptions and justifications 
accompanying the inferences from the statement of a goal to the provision of evidence 
supporting that goal. Moreover, developers need to be able to trace the reasons on 
which their decisions were based, to identify improvements and to control changes by 
analysing their impact on the overall dependability of the system. 
At the early stages of the exercise, participants expressed a certain degree of confusion 
when challenged with pair-wise evaluation of the objectives. Specifically, in some 
instances participants were unable to express a clear preference between the 
alternatives. The main cause for that was the lack of context in which the relative 
importance of the criteria was evaluated. Participants were asked to distinguish 
preference based on the abstract notion of each attribute (e. g. safety versus endurance). 
However there was no analysis supporting this judgement as to how each attribute 
contributes to the overall operation of the system. Criteria that were considered far 
more important than others may be subject to exceptions, something that is not captured 
by pair wise assessment of the criteria. For example, during a surveillance mission 
endurance may be more important than safety. Arguing about preference between two 
objectives requires an assessment on behalf of the stakeholders of the consequences of 
trading off each objective. However, even when relating the objectives to the intended 
operation of the system, stakeholders often cannot precisely specify a preference. The 
reason for this is that the involved stakeholders cannot substantially understand what 
failing to meet the ob ective will signify for the envisioned operation of the system, j 
unless the degree of satisfaction of that objective is stated. 
Making trade-offs involves comparing the achievement of each of the goals 
(descending from the attributes) with respect to the design alternatives. Being 
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heterogeneous and representing fundamentally different concepts, dependability 
attributes cannot be compared directly with each other by a mere numerical comparison. 
For instance consider two goals representing requirements elicited from the viewpoint 
of two different dependability attributes. The goals are described using numerical 
representation of utility, with measures (assuming a percentage scale) of 65% and 70%. 
This may not necessarily mean that there is an overall difference of 5% in utility. The 
consequences of not achieving the goals are fundamentally different and cannot be 
directly compared. Even factoring weights in the utility of each goal cannot represent 
with accuracy how the two goals can be valued in terms of their impact on the system's 
operation. Prasad [10] in her thesis concludes that we can only quantify attributes of 
dependability individually. Even then, Prasad mentions that some attributes such as 
safety are not easily quantifiable. Furthermore, she continues by claiming that is 
infeasible to represent dependability as a single metric with methods such as the Multi 
Attribute Utility Theory. This is a view also put forward by [96] in which it is stated 
that "The main problems perceived in use of multi-attribute utility methods are: 
difficulty of trading-off very different kinds of attributes; subjectivity of the problem 
structure and weightings used,, and consistencyfrom one decision to another". Prasad 
mentions that a representation of utility as a vector could be potentially used. However 
a numerical approach also showed difficulties in justifying the meta-decisions made 
during the assessment such as pair-wise judgements, and evaluation of alternatives. 
Application of the trade-off method takes place within an argument based framework 
such as dependability cases. Hence any decision made needs to be justified. Another 
part of the exercise was the construction of an argument justifying the alternative that 
was selected that would incorporate steps of the AHP. This eventually resulted in 
arguing about the assignment of values to the comparisons. Although the overall 
direction of the comparison (e. g. A is better than B) was captured, the specific value 
assigned during a pair-wise comparison is something that is assigned subjectively and 
cannot be justified that it reflects the stakeholders' interests, resulting in weak 
arguments. Fench et al suggest, with regard to decision making in general, that 
"disagreements among groups are addressed via sensitivity analysis and debate not via 
some mathematical formula which combines judgements in some democratic way and 
prescribes a consensus decision " [96]. 
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Traceability of decisions (irrespective of whether they involve trading off of objectives) 
is an important aspect of a dependability case supporting evolutionary development. 
The justification and rationale behind a decision and in particular decisions 
necessitating trades, constitute vital information for the success of further design 
reviews, system (and case) maintenance, and integration with other systems in a System 
of Systems. During these activities system developers need to review how a decision 
was taken and re-examine whether the contextual information used (such as the design 
of the system) have changed since the decision. Developers are often interested in how 
individual elements of the system contribute to the overall 'fitness' of the system for its 
use. Basing a design decision or trade-off on numerical criteria such as the creation of a 
utility function (using for example AHP) makes it considerably more difficult to trace 
the decision to individual elements of the system, something that was also pointed out 
by Prasad [10]. 
5.6 The Trade-Off Method (TOM) 
The Trade-Off Method (TOM), developed by the author, is inspired from the ALARP 
principle, aiming to facilitate dynamic reasoning about candidate design options (with 
respect to the system goals). TOM consists of a number of steps, which allow system 
stakeholders to evaluate design alternatives and systematically make trade-offs 
balancing all required system properties. 
5.6.1 Objectives 
The purpose of the method is to produce an argument module, which reasons about 
optimum and acceptable selection of an alternative. The resultant argument provides 
context in which the dependability case evolves. TOM aims to: 
e Enable stakeholders to understand and share their perspectives and rationale 
for acceptability. Each stakeholder has a unique perspective on the system's 
operation with system goals that reflect their interests. This means that when 
eliciting goals related to them, stakeholders cannot necessarily understand the 
implications the achievement of the goals will have on other stakeholders. 
Moreover, it is essential that during trade-off discussions, all the stakeholders 
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share their rationale and understanding of the consequences of compromising all 
goals on the overall acceptability of the system. There is little useftilness in 
developing a system that may satisfy the goals of a particular stakeholder but is 
not fit for purpose with regard to another. It is not the purpose of TOM to 
provide a 'recipe' for solving disagreements between stakeholders. The final 
decision of the process must be justified. 
Systematically examine and understand the trade-offs involved with each 
alternative and provide feedback to the evolution of the design. Selection of 
each alternative involves relative bcnefits and compromises with respect to other 
alternatives. Stakeholders identify the motivation for selecting each alternative 
and reason whether the benefits of an alternative can balance the compromises. 
Moreover, the strengths and weaknesses of each alternative can be fed back to 
the design process, which under a particular focus (provided by TOM) may 
improve the proposed alternatives. 
Document reasoning, contributing to the traceability of the dependability case. 
Evolution of the system entails design decisions, in the context of which the 
dependability case evolves. The trade-off argument constitutes context to the 
'main' dependability argument capturing the justification and rationale, on the 
basis of which the alternative was selected. Documentation of the reasoning 
leading to the selection of the alternative provides an explicit reference to 
contextual information which can be easily reviewed and modified. 
5.6.2 Overview of the Method 
Fig. 5.7 presents the stages of the trade-off method. Initially, the system goals are 
identified from the dependability case along with their targets. Following the links in 
the dependability case provided by the metamodel (DCM), participants identify from 
the products of the DDA process, the rationale for the goals and their target. The aim of 
this step is to define and justify 'how much' compromise of the goals can be tolerated, 
still resulting in an overall acceptable system. 
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Start Identify goals & ý-ýdetermlne bounds 
Identify candidate 
alternatives 
Create trade-off End 
argumer 
Fig. 5.7 - Overall Processes of TOM 
Next, participants identify the candidate alternatives that were created during the design 
process and evaluate the alternatives with respect to the goals. Finally examining the 
'goodness' of the candidate alternatives participants identify the involved trade-offs and 
reason about the selection of the most suitable alternative. 
5.6.3 Fundamental Concepts of TOM 
The trade-off method introduces a number of concepts used in order to establish the 
trade-off argument: 
e Acceptability of requirements 
* Flexibility of requirements 
e Willingness to trade-off 
These concepts are discussed in the following sub-sections. 
5.6.3.1 Acceptability of Requirements 
Acceptability of the degree of satisfaction of requirements depends on the context in 
which the system will operate, as well as on how the stakeholders envision the operation 
of the system. Achieving stated requirements is often not a 'black or white' situation, 
but they can also be partially met. The degree of satisfaction indicates the extent to 
which the requirement has been met; however, it is meaningless if stated out of the 
context of operation of the system. For example stating a degree of achievement of 
90% for a performance requirement of IMbit bandwidth is not helpful; unless the 
stakeholders assess the implications of the 'partial' achievement of the original 
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requirement to the (envisioned) operation of the system. Implications may mean that 
the interests of the stakeholder(s) that defined the requirement are compromised, or they 
can be negligible. Acceptability of requirements helps providing a meaningful 
interpretation of the degree of achievement of a dependability requirement. Trade-offs 
especially in large systems are inevitable. In order to be able to make trades 
stakeholders should avoid looking at the requirements as single targets, and instead be 
prepared to discuss the acceptability of a broader range of (degrees of) satisfaction. 
This will result in a space in which a not fully met requirement may still be admissible 
from the stakeholders. 
One of the most compelling examples in which partially met requirements may be 
admissible is safety. It is common consensus that a safety critical system can never be 
completely safe. For example the stereotype that the safest airplane is the one that will 
not fly reflects that belief. Hence the assurance for a safety critical system is based on 
reasoning that a system is acceptably safe for its particular use in its operational context. 
A well-established approach for defining the acceptability of risks is the As Low As 
Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) principle [44]. The risk associated with the operation 
of a system is defined in terms of the frequency and severity of the consequences of the 
identified system hazards. Fig. 5.8 shows an adapted example of the categories for 
classification of risk used in safety standards such as [46]. 
, *e 
re Improbable I I 1 1 
Unlikely 2 2 1 1 
Possible 3 3 2 1 
Frequent 3 3 3 2 
KEY 
3: Intolerable Risk 
2: ALARP 
1: Negligible Risk 
Intolerable Risk 
Limit 
ALARP M 
.G 
w 
egligibi 
Target 
Risk 
Fig-5.8 - Example of Risk Classification and ALARP 
According to the ALARP framework, risk can be classified in three major categories: 
Negligible, Intolerable, and within the ALARP region. The safety 'target' is to achieve 
risks that are considered negligible. Additionally, a limit on acceptable risk is defined. 
Risks exceeding the defined limit are considered intolerable (i. e. unacceptable). The 
region between these two values (the target and limit) defines the risks that can be 
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considered to be tolerable if they can be argued to be As Low As Reasonably 
Practicable (ALARP). A risk is considered to be ALARP if costs associated with 
further risk reduction can be shown to be disproportionate to the risk reduction that 
would be achieved. 
Defining acceptability criteria for safety is common practice. The requirement for 
acceptable safety can be flexible depending on the cost required to achieve it. The UK's 
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) gives examples for targets and limits with regard to 
acceptable tolerable and intolerable risks to the general public and individuals in various 
work environments. According to the UK HSE [44], a risk of I death in 1,000,000 per 
year broadly defines the boundary between negligible and tolerable risk. HSE suggest 
that the boundary between tolerable and intolerable risk should be I in 10,000 per year 
for the public, and I in 1000 per year for workers. When considering the limit for the 
risk limits we take into account the residual risks of every day life, as well as the benefit 
of the activity to the society. 
Security is another example of dependability attribute for which flexibility in 
requirements is practiced. Security has a unique characteristic that possible threats to 
the system are caused by malice. The Common Criteria for Information Technology 
Security Evaluation [61] provides a framework that defines the security evaluation 
process for a system, with respect to a target of evaluation. The Common Criteria 
framework defines six security assurance levels, each of which describes a set of criteria 
to be satisfied and the processes to be followed during the development of the system. 
There are other examples of attributes in which the definition of acceptability is 
important in understanding the benefit of a design decision. For example, the 
performance of a system (i. e. delivery of functionality in a timely manner) is important 
for real time systems, where temporal deadlines must be met. In practice, occasional 
losses can often be tolerated, either because the consequences of the loss are negligible, 
or because the system is able to react before the next deadline without serious 
consequences. It has been suggested that the tolerability of missing the deadlines can be 
specified by 'constraint values' that define the limit for missed deadlines [97]. For 
example, consider a hypothetical telemedicine system providing real time digital video. 
The system should decode the video stream at a desired 23 frames per second (fps). A 
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missed deadline is a frame that has not been decoded before the next one in sequence 
arrives for decoding. If few deadlines are missed the video stream would not degrade 
significantly, but if too many are missed this can endanger the procedure. In this case 
the target is 0 missed deadlines and the limit is no more than 3 missed deadlines in a 
row, at which the video will still be acceptably clear although with degraded quality. 
Overall, stakeholders' acceptance may vary according to operational context of the 
system. In this thesis the term acceptability is defined as follows: 
Acceptability is the attribute of a goal that captures the interpretation of the degree of 
satisfaction ofa goal, with respect to the impact it will have on the envisioned operation 
of the system compared withfull achievement ofthe goal. 
5.6.3.2 Flexibility in Goal Based Requirements 
In the aforementioned examples, defining the acceptability of a system requires 
description of the required 'target' and 'limit' values, defining the region in which 
divergence from the target value is tolerable. When the limit of the acceptability criteria 
has not been met, the system is considered unacceptable and action must be taken to 
correct this. However, in cases where a target value for an attribute is not met the 
system can still be considered acceptable ifjustified. This requires arguing that the 
consequences of 'increasing' the attribute towards the target are disproportionate to the 
benefit achieved. Defining the acceptability region also needs to be justified. The 
acceptability region is only meaningful when considered in the operational context of 
the system. 
Targets and limits define the bounds of a goal that represent a space (of acceptable 
solutions) in which degree ofsatisfaction ofa goal can be traded. 
Definition of bounds achieves separation of concerns when reasoning about 
requirements. Goals describe the core intent of the requirement (e. g. system is 
acceptably safe), whereas bounds represent the acceptability criteria of the requirement. 
As an extension to GSN, this thesis introduces the concept of bounds of acceptability of 
a goal, comprising of a target and limit values. These two criteria define the bounds 
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within which a requirement may be considered acceptable provided that the levels 
achieved for the goal in question are as high as reasonably practicable. 
With respect to GSN, bounds constitute contextual information and they are related to a 
goal with in context of associations. Hence a goal can be stated in context of a target 
and limit (i. e. bounds). In terms of representation in GSN, bounds are denoted by GSN 
context elements, with a solid bar along the top or bottom edge of the context, 
indicating the target and limit respectively. 
Fig. 5.9 presents the security requirement goals associated with part of an example 
dependability case for GIS (Geographical Information System) software. The extract 
focuses on security. The top-level goal for security (SecTop ), refers to the architecture 
ensuring adequate security and it is stated in the context of the definition of security 
('SecDefn ). In order to ftirther decompose the top-level goal, we follow strategy 
'ArgScen' to argue over the identified system scenarios that refer to security. Among 
the identified scenarios are scenarios describing the response of the system in the event 
of someone trying to login to the system (authorisation), and the scenario of the system 
detecting intrusion to the system. 
Eliciting the requirements based on the scenarios, results in identifying as goals for 
security 'AccSec Auth' and 'AccSec-Detect'. These goals state that the system should 
provide acceptable means for authorisation and that the system adopts acceptable means 
for detecting system intrusions. The security goal 'AccSec Auth'is stated in the context 
of acceptability criteria 'TargSec Auth'and 'LimSec Auth'which define the target and 
limit values of acceptability, and in the context of justification (Auth 
- 
BoundsJ), 
enabling references to the supporting rationale for the acceptability criteria as defined. 
Since the security goal is stated in the context of a target and limit, changing the 
acceptability criteria or the justification for them will not necessarily affect the 'core' 
security goal. Definition of bounds can isolate reasoning about requirements from 
reasoning about acceptability of requirements and explicitly define a space in which 
design alternatives can constitute an acceptable solution. 
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Fig. 5.9 - Example of Flexible Security Requirements In GSN 
5.6.3.3 Willingness to Trade-Off 
Trading-off design goals requires information about how the degree of achievement of 
the goal is affected by each alternative, the acceptability of the achievement, and 
evaluation of the importance of each goal. 
In ALARP, after the stakeholders have defined the target and limit values of risk, trades 
between safety and cost need to demonstrate that the cost required to reduce the risk 
levels of the system is disproportionate to the actual risk reduction achieved. In 
practice, the tolerable (ALARP) region is often split in two equal sub-regions. Hence 
when a design is within the ALARP region, it can be identified as being closer to the 
limit or being closer to the target. This distinction is made in order to help stakeholders 
to argue about disproportional benefit. For example, it is easier to justify that a risk 
reduction would be beneficial when closer to the limit value rather than when closer to 
the target. Extending the ALARP principle for multiple attributes, when two 
dependability objectives A and B are in conflict, not fully achieving A, may be tolerated 
if the benefit from not compromising B, is greater than the benefit gained from fully 
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achieving the original requirement of A. In order to implement this principle, 
willingness to trade-off a goal was introduced in TOM to facilitate trades. 
Willingness of the stakeholders to trade a (dependability) goal represents the ease with 
which the stakeholders are prepared to trade the degree of satisfaction of the goal. 
Willingness is a means of expressing acceptability of a decision alternative with respect 
to a goal. 
The rationale behind willingness to trade-off is that stakeholders, similar to ALARP, 
will be more willing to trade a goal if that goal is closer to the target or if that goal is not 
very important. Accordingly, the minimum required benefit in order to trade-off a goal 
will vary based on the degree of achievement and the importance of a goal. As 
discussed, acceptability interprets the degree of satisfaction of a goal. Willingness is 
specified in relation to the degree of achievement of the required goals by a particular 
option. Willingness of a goal should not be defined a priori (as in the case of the a 
priori comparison of importance between goals in AHP), but needs to take place as part 
of the assessment of an alternative with respect to a goal. 
a. b. 
Target 
Limit 
Bounds 
Degree of 
satisfaction 
C. 
Willingness 
Fig. 5.10 - Relating Degree of Satisfaction, Acceptability and Willingness 
Fig. 5.10 shows the relation between degree of satisfaction, goal acceptability and 
willingness to trade-off a goal. The left bar represents the range of values for the degree 
of satisfaction of a goal. However, the values alone are not meaningful; the middle bar 
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(b) captures the acceptability to the stakeholders, interpreting the various degrees of 
satisfaction. Finally the right bar (c) illustrates the categories of willingness, expressing 
the levels of acceptability of a goal. There are five categories of willingness defined to 
represent the acceptability of the degree of satisfaction of a goal: 
1. Unconstrained (Categoly D: 
This category represents a degree of satisfaction that exceeds the defined target. 
These goals would be the first to consider trading, given that the requirement of 
the stakeholders represented by the goal has not been compromised in any way. 
Stakeholders would not need significant gains (in terms of the benefit to the 
satisfaction of other goals) in order to be willing to trade the goal. 
2. Probable (Catego1y 11): 
This category represents a degree of satisfaction falling short of the target value. 
These goals would be probable candidates for trade-offs, if some benefit (to the 
satisfaction of other goals) can be gained. 
3. Potential (Category 111): 
The third category represents a degree of satisfaction falling in the region of 
'medium' tolerability, being neither close to the target nor limit values. 
Stakeholders would be willing to trade the satisfaction of these goals given a 
considerable alternative benefit to the satisfaction of other goals. 
4. Hesitant (Categoly IW 
This category represents a degree of satisfaction closer to the limit value. These 
goals would be the least likely to be traded-off given their marginal 
acceptability. 
5. Ineligible (Categoly W 
This category represents a degree of satisfaction that is considered unacceptable 
(i. e. falling short of the limit value). An alternative that results in a degree of 
satisfaction in this category will be rejected and cannot be traded-off. 
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The degree of satisfaction of the goal is not the single consideration when assigning 
willingness to goals with respect to an alternative; another consideration is the relative 
importance between the goals. For example, ALARP assumes that importance between 
safety and cost should be biased in favour of safety. This is the reason that the system 
stakeholders are required to demonstrate that the benefit from compromising safety (and 
therefore cost saving) is disproportional to the compromise itself. Willingness to trade- 
off incorporates importance of the goal. Importance of the goal is not stated explicitly 
using a metric, but is implicitly included in the assignment of willingness. 
Stakeholders will be more willing to trade a goal in favour of a more goal. By 
describing willingness to trade-off stakeholders implicitly include assessment of how 
important the goal is to them. For example, if a performance and safety goal were 
described with the* same level of willingness (with respect to an alternative), this would 
mean that stakeholders after considering the acceptability of the degree of satisfaction of 
the goals (step of the TOM process), they are equally willing to make a trade-off A 
major difference with the example using the AHP method is that stakeholders only 
evaluate the specific instance of the goal in relation to the candidate alternative. 
Altering the distribution of the willingness categories within the acceptable space of the 
goal, stakeholders can compensate for the goal's importance. An example of an 
occasion in which this could happen is when the operational context of the system 
changes making the goal more important to the system stakeholders. Fig. 5.11 includes 
instances of goals (bars d and e), which show two additional examples of assignment of 
willingness. In the examples, the spaces, which represent lower willingness to trade the 
goal, cover most of the range with the bounds of acceptability of the goal. 
This is illustrated best in the goal captured in bar e. The importance of the goal makes 
the stakeholders hesitant to trade it, leaving only a small window in which the goal can 
be traded without some significant benefit (yellow and aqua spaces), and an even 
smaller window in which the goal can be traded with some benefit (aqua space only). 
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Fig. 5.11 - Compensating Willingness 
5.7 Method Walkthrough 
This section presents in detail the stages of the methodology, illustrating its application 
on the FTA example. 
5.7.1 Determination of Bounds 
The first stage of the trade-off method is responsible for eliciting and capturing the 
degree of satisfaction of the goals as well as the acceptability, described in terms of 
willingness, which corresponds to the different levels of the degree of satisfaction. 
Fig. 5.12 illustrates in detail the process of this stage. Initially, the stakeholders identify 
the goals that the system needs to satisfy, which are defined during application of the 
Dependability Deviation Analysis (DDA). At this stage the goals elicited during DDA 
are stated in the context of the target (one of the two elements of bounds; the other is 
limit). The target represents the actual requirement accompanying the intent 
represented by the goal, as described in chapter §5.6.3.2. During application of TOM 
the tolerability of the stakeholders with regard to the requirements is examined, 
resulting in definition of the limit (complementing the already defined targets). 
Following identification of the goal, it is important for the participants in the method to 
165 
Acceptability 
Chapter 5- Facilitating Trade-offs Between Dependability Requirements 
identify and understand the type of criteria associated with the goal. The purpose of this 
is to comprehend how the target can be reduced defining the range for the degree of 
achievement of the goal, until the lowest limit of acceptability is identified. 
For example, consider the target of the FTA payload; in this case the type of the 
acceptance criteria is mass (measured in tons), hence the range of values in which the 
degree of satisfaction of the goal is the different mass values. Identifying the type of 
criterion is necessary in order for the participants to be able to comprehend the range of 
values the degree of satisfaction can have. It may be the case that the type of the 
requirement is not clear, especially for qualitative requirements the description of which 
may contain ambiguities. In such occasion TOM participants will not be able to 
understand the range of the satisfaction of the goal. To remedy this situation, 
participants should refer to the 'specification of dependability profile' DDA stage, in 
order to understand the rationale based on which the goal and the target were elicited. 
Payload constitutes a quantitative criterion; however requirements can also be described 
using qualitative criteria. In the case of the GIS software example the security goal was 
stated in the context of qualitative criteria. The intent of the goal was the provision of 
'adequate means of authentication'. The type of the criterion is the functionality 
required for authentication. Reducing the degree of achievement to identify the 
acceptable limit, the degree of satisfaction involved 'less' authentication functionality, 
thus making the system less secure. In this example target and limit were not 
quantitative but they were qualitative. Forcing the criteria to be expressed 
quantitatively is not always the best approach. A possible quantitative representation of 
this goal could be a statistical metric showing the probability of malicious actors being 
authenticated successfully. However such a metric may not always be accurate or even 
possible to define. Specifically for security there are practical problems introducing a 
metric; one of them is that the statistical sample may not be suitably large to make 
conclusions since the actual security attack is unknown until detected. 
Bounds can be described in qualitative terms by the stakeholders, provided that they 
understand and explain how the target can be reduced, defining in this way a region of 
the degree of satisfaction of the goal. In this example the combination of functionality 
that allows hardware key authentication and password authentication is considered to be 
more effective than password authentication, which is also the limit of the goal. 
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Table. 5.4 shows the FTA concerns after the completion of this step of the trade-off 
methodology. Column c documents the type of the criterion that was identified during 
requirement elicitation shown in column b. Subsequent to identification of the type of 
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the criteria this stage of the method involves elicitation of the goal's limit. To achieve 
this, participants reduce the criterion hypothesising a new degree of satisfaction. 
According to the rationale based on which the target value was elicited the acceptability 
of the hypothesised degree of satisfaction is described. This iterative process takes 
place until a hypothesised degree of satisfaction is described not acceptable. An 
important outcome of this process is the justification of the limit (target has already 
been justified during the requirement elicitation). Justification of the limit is elicited by 
combining reduction of the criterion and allocation of the new degree of satisfaction to a 
willingness category. 
Table. 5.4 Bounds & Limils ol'the Itivitlifivil 1-1 % Concei nN 
oil 
Tyýe of 
Criterion 
Ilull loss 10-1 Probability 10-1 Maximum probability of' losses of 
previous systems. 
Payload 60 t Mass 50 t Weight of armoured vehicle and 
equipment required for start ofoperations. 
Range 3500 Distance 2800 Minimum distance between refuelling 
nm nrn points. 
Min. Stall 110 kts Speed 140 kts Maximum speed for deploying equipment 
Speed without being damaged. 
Flight 10 hrs Time 8 hrs Average time of' most operations which 
Endurance the FTA will have to support. 
Reliability 10-1 Probability 10-4 Minimum probability to abort mission 
STOL 2300 ft Distance 3000 ft This is the maximurn length of runway the 
engineering unit can construct on time for 
the mission 
Allocation of a willingness category involves identification of the impact that a reduced 
degree of satisfaction will have on the intended operation and utility of the system. 
Participants are asked to evaluate the compensation that would make the compromise of 
the degree of satisfaction tolerable. This question is put forward in a step-by-step 
approach, in which the participants evaluate whether the acceptability of a degree of 
satisfaction belongs to one of the prescribed willingness categories. 
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Taking a step-by-step approach is more preferable as, in this way, the participants 
consider the entire range of the degree of satisfaction of a goal. 
Consider the payload requirement for the FTA. The target was defined to be 60 tons, 
with the rationale for choosing this value being that this was the maximum weight of a 
typical armoured transport vehicle with related equipment. The impact of gradually 
reducing the payload capacity is a reduction in the FTA's capability to transfer the 
vehicle and all of its equipment. Hence, only the necessary equipment for the vehicle's 
immediate operation could be transferred. This may be a reduced capability that is still 
considered tolerable. Further reduction would result in the FTA being able to transport 
only the vehicle without any equipment. Continuing to reduce the payload capacity will 
ultimately result in a FTA that cannot transport an armoured vehicle. The payload 
capacity at which this occurs was considered to be the the limit for the payload goal. 
Tablc. 5.4 shows the limits and justifications for all requirements in the FTA example, 
elicited by applying the process. 
5.7.2 Identification of Alternatives 
This is a relatively straightforward stage of the trade-off method. The purpose of this 
stage is for the stakeholders to identify the alternatives and record the acceptability of 
each alternative with respect to the goals. 
Initially the stakeholders identify the candidate alternatives. Construction of the 
alternatives is not within the scope of the trade-off method, but the product of design 
evolution methods discussed in chapter 6. After identifying the degree of satisfaction of 
each goal with each alternative, a willingness category is assigned to each goal- 
alternative pair. Categories of willingness are assigned based on the correspondence 
between degree of satisfaction and willingness identified during the previous stage. 
Evaluation of the alternatives is captures in a tabular form, the trade-off table, illustrated 
in Table. 5.5. Each of the shaded cells constitutes a result of evaluating an alternative 
with respect to a goal. By browsing through the cells, stakeholders can review the 
acceptability of each goal, identifying whether an improvement can be made. 
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Table. 5.5 -Trade-off Table Format 
Attributes Coal I Coal 2 Goal 3 
Alternatives 
Option A 
Option B 
Option C 
Moving vertically in the table the participants of the method can identify the 
compromise or benefit from switching between candidate options. Moving horizontally 
the participants identify how an option affects the goals that need to be achieved. 
Combining these two actions it is possible to identify which goal was the motivation to 
select another alternative and what is the impact of this improvement. If the 
improvement involves reducing the acceptability of another goal, then a potential trade- 
off occurs. 
5.7.3 Construction of the Trade-off Argument 
Examining an option can lead to opportunities of improving a goal that has not met the 
target criterion (given that some other option improves the acceptability of that goal). 
This can lead to arguments in favour of adopting the option that improves that goal. 
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This stage of TOM facilitates decision making after the consequent trade-offs are 
evaluated. Fig. 5.14 presents the process followed in this stage of TOM. 
The process begins with the participants examining the populated trade-off table to 
identify what they perceive to be the best alternative. Characterisation of an alternative 
as best can be thought of as a token that indicates at any time the alternative considered 
as the most preferred with respect to satisfying the dependability goals. The better the 
alternative is overall, the less likely the participants will prefer another. Selection of 
what is perceived to be the best alternative at the beginning of the stage, reduces the 
number of potential trade-offs that the participants will evaluate. Instead of randomly 
selecting an alternative for evaluation, this step provides a starting point to this stage of 
TOM. 
There are no specific rules for the selection of the best alternative. As a 'rule of thumb' 
at the beginning of this stage the alternative that has the fewest goals in the lower 
willingness categories will initially be considered the best alternative. A constraint that 
applies to the selection of the best alternative is that the acceptability of all goals must 
be within the tolerance region (i. e. above the limit), thus selecting an alternative that is 
overall acceptable. This means that an alternative with a goal categorised as 'ineligible' 
cannot be selected as best alternative, neither at the beginning of the stage nor during 
later parts of the stage. 
Following identification of the best alternative, the participants examine the 
acceptability (described as willingness) of the alternative with respect to the 
dependability goals. The objective is to identify goals, the acceptability of which is in 
need of improvement. Improving such a goal motivates the stakeholders to choose a 
different alternative, which achieves higher acceptability with respect to that goal (these 
goals are referred to as motivating goals). Stakeholders should not seek to improve a 
(motivating) goal if it is in a higher willingness category than another goal. This would 
imply that the goal characterised with 'higher' willingness is more important. This is in 
conflict with the definition of willingness, making the resultant trade-off argument 
weak. 
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If participants continue to feel a stronger motive to improve a goal with higher 
willingness level than another, the willingness levels of the goals must be re-examined 
as shown in Fig. 5.1 1. Improving the degree of satisfaction of a motivating goal can be 
achieved in two ways. Firstly, participants may improve the design of the alternative. 
Altering the design is outside the scope of the trade-off method and the Factors, 
Analysis and Decision Alternatives (FANDA) method should be used (as presented in 
chapter 6). Alternatively, a goal can be improved by selecting another alternative 
(termed the candidate alternative) that best improves the willingness of the motivating 
goal. Improvement of a goal can entail compromising other goals. 
Following identification of a candidate best alternative, participants evaluate whether 
they are prepared to accept the consequent trade-offs. Initially participants identify the 
goals of the same willingness which will be compromised by the selection of the target 
alternative. Selection of the target alternative is based on the participants' acceptance of 
the involved compromises. If a compromise is identified that cancels out the benefit 
from selecting the target alternative, feedback is provided to the design rationale process 
(by invoking FANDA) in order to improve the target alternative. If goals in the same 
willingness category as the motivating goal are not present, participants examine 
whether they can afford the rest of the goals being compromised. TOM provides a 
systematic analysis of the trade-offs involved in selecting each alternative. It facilitates 
stakeholders to argue about the selection of an alternative, by allowing them to reason 
about the motivations for selecting an alternative as well as objections for not selecting 
others. 
However TOM does not provide a definite answer about which alternative should be 
selected. The final decision lies with the stakeholders who need to justify their 
selection. The argument about the selected alternative records the information on which 
the decision was based. Table. 5.6 shows the resulting trade-off table after the first 
stages of TOM. In the first the acceptability (expressed in willingness) of the goals with 
respect to the degree of achievement of the goals was identified and in the second stage 
the alternatives for the FTA were evaluated against the goals. 
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Following the process of the third stage of TOM a best alternative needs to be selected 
in order to start studying the involved trade-offs. Using the rule of thumb, alternative C 
was described as the best alternative as it had fewer goals in the lower willingness 
categories. Moreover, by examining the table it is immediately noticeable that 
alternative A is an unacceptable alternative, since the endurance this configuration will 
result in is below the lowest acceptable limit of the degree of satisfaction for tile 
endurance goal. Identifying that a particular goal is unacceptable can lead participants 
to examine the design rationale of the alternative. The FANDA method was invoked, 
identifying how the characteristics of alternative A contributed in 'unacceptably' 
satisfying the endurance goal. 
As a result alternative A was modified with the new design accommodating engines 
with slightly lower thrust that also weigh less. Changing these two I'actors was 
considered to improve the endurance of the FTA. During this step improving all 
alternative with respect to a goal may compromise it (the alternative) with respect to 
other goals. However in the example it was considered that other goals were not 
affected to a degree in which the willingness was changed. Table. 5.7 shows the trade- 
off table after modifying alternative A and identifying alternative C as the best 
alternative. Examining the best alternative, safety was identified as a motivating goal 
for selecting another alternative (Table. 5.8). Although endurance has lower willingness 
level cannot be improved as all other alternatives achieve the sarne level of' willingness. 
Safety is improved only in alternative B (Table. 5.8), which was decided that it would be 
the target best alternative. 
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In order to select the target alternative as best, participants need to examine the 
compromise involved (Table. 5.9 & Table. 5.10). As a consequence of improving the 
safety levels of the FTA, the acceptability of the STOL capability is compromised firorn 
category I to category 111. 
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As already discussed, TOM does not provide a definite answer; final selection lies with 
the stakeholders. According to whether they approve or not the compromises involved 
with a goal improvement the final alternative selection is made. However justification 
of the final selection is required, as this is essential information to be recorded for the 
overall dependability case. In this case compromising STOL was not considered 
acceptable as the reduced take-off/landing theatre capability during operations was 
considered to outbalance the safety improvement. 
5.8 The Trade-Off Argument 
Upon completion of TOM, participants will have created arguments that ultimately 
guide them to selection of the best alternative. The arguments contain inforination 
about a number of issues addressed during the TOM processes, including the following: 
* Identification and rationale of bounds 
0 Acceptability of the altematives 
0 Preference between competing alternatives 
The arguments resulting from TOM provide important contextual information to the 
dependability case. In order to use the arguments within a dependability case, modular 
GSN is used to capture them. Fig. 5.15 shows the structure of the Trade-off argument 
module. The top level goal of the argument (TradeOft) claims selection of the most 
suitable decision among the candidate alternatives. The goal is stated in context of the 
dependability goals that the alternative needs to satisfy (TradeOffCl), and the candidate 
alternatives created during design evolution (TradeOfJC2). In this thesis FANDA - 
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described in Chapter 6, is a design rationale method used to create the alternatives used 
in TOM. 
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The Trat1eq1j'goal is substantiated by two away goals (DecAcc and DecDom), which 
correspond to separate argument modules (Bounds Argument and Selection Argulnent). 
The Bouncls Argument is further decomposed to argument modules arguing about tile 
apportionment of acceptability of a goal with respect to its degree of satist'action. Tile 
left half of Fig. 5.15 shows the overall structure of the trade-off' argument. 
Decomposing the Bountis Ai-gument to smaller modules about the acceptability of' each 
goal, was adopted after considering the overall dependability case architecture 
(presented in Chapter 6). When a goal in the dependability case is stated in the context 
of a Target and Limit, it is also associated with an away (argument) context justifying 
the derived Bounds. 
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By partitioning the trade-off module as shown in Fig. 5.15, the Goal Bouncls argurnents 
can easily be referenced from other goals. Fig. 5.16 shows the details of the Boun(Is 
Argument (left half), and the Goal Bounds Argument (right half). 
The top level goal of the Bounds Argument claims that the decision selected during 
TOM is acceptable. This is substantiated by the goals DecMetGoal and 
BoundsAst-GocdGbountZv - the latter being an away goal. The first goal states that tile 
decision meets the limit, which is the minimum criterion for a goal to be acceptable. 
The second goals corresponds is instantiated for each dependability goal arguing tile 
justification of the apportionment of willingness to the degree of satisfaction ofthe goal. 
The right half of Fig. 5.16 shows the argument module. 
The argument is decomposed based on identification of the acceptability for tile various 
levels of degree of satisfaction of the goal. The top level claim is Supported by the 
goals TypCrit, GoalTa? - and GoalRetl. 7: vpCi-it documents the type of' the criterion 
describing the target, and GoalTcir the rationale for setting the target -- elicited during 
the last stage of DDA. The goal GoalRed is instantiated for each willingness level 
capturing the impact a reduction of the degree of satisfaction of' the goal has on the 
operation of the system. 
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Achievement of the limit is not alone a sufficient argument for choosing an alternative. 
Participants also argue about the preference of the selected alternative with respect to 
the others. Fig. 5.16 illustrates the Selection Argument of the trade-off argument 
module. The overall goal (DecDom) claims that participants identified the selected 
alternative as best among the candidates. The top level claim is supporting an argument 
stating that despite the presence of goal motivating the participants to select another 
alternative, the selected alternative was preferred. The final decision is stated in the 
context of a justification element stating why one alternative was preferred over the 
others. 
5.9 Summary 
This chapter has defined TOM, - a qualitative method, for systematically identifying and 
arguing about trade-offs. TOM introduces the concept of bounds capturing an 
admissible space in which goals can be traded-off. In order to relate the degree of 
satisfaction of a goal to system operation, the concept of acceptability is introduced. 
Selection of a goal involves identification of benefit and compromise using the trade-off 
table. Finally, the chapter defines GSN arguments arguing about the selected decision, 
in the context of which the development of the dependability case takes place. 
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Chapter 6 
Evolution and Architecture of 
Dependability Cases 
6.1 Introduction 
Accepted practice in safety cases suggests that a case should be constructed 
incrementally in parallel with the system. In particular, safety standards such as the 
Ship Safety Management Handbook JSP430 [12] and the Defence Standard 00-56 [8] 
explicitly require development of the safety case to start at the beginning of the system 
lifecycle. 
Evolution of the system and the argument involves making decisions about the 
architecture and the design of the system that need to be justified and documented. 
Interaction between the argument and the design process exists during the evolution of 
the system. The evolving argument should serve to evaluate the design's fitness to 
satisfy the stated dependability goals. A design that directly addresses the stated goals 
will result in a strong argument. If the stakeholders involved in the development of the 
argument deem that the argument is not satisfactory, changes to the design will have to 
be made. The top levels goals of the argument correspond to what needs to be claimed 
for the final system and accordingly appropriate goals are elicited according to the stage 
of the system development. Goals in GSN are specific claims that a system has 
achieved a particular requirement. Being able to explicitly represent and interrelate all 
the elements of an argument, GSN helps to articulate post-conditions for the initially 
identified requirements of the system in question. 
As part of this decomposition, GSN captures the strategies based on which the goals 
were decomposed, the rationale for the argument approach adopted and the context in 
which the goals are stated. The argument of a dependability case can constitute the 
interface between evolution of requirements and design, providing a systematic way of 
documenting, tracing and reasoning about decisions. This chapter presents how GSN 
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arguments can be used as a design and assurance driver to evolve requirements and 
design in parallel. Additionally the chapter describes how we can establish a modular 
compositional dependability case relating to the structure of System of Systems. 
6.2 Processes Participating in the Evolution of the 
Dependability Case. 
Overall, the dependability case framework incorporates the three different 
methodologies which are proposed in the earlier chapters of this thesis. The participant 
methodologies collaborate during the evolution of the dependability argument, which 
itself is based on the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) methodology and notation. 
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Fig. 6.1 -Methods Supporting Argument Based System Evolution. 
Fig. 6.1 presents the collaboration between the methodologies to support argument based 
co-evolution of design and requirements, by showing the flow of information between 
them during system evolution. The methodologies participating in the evolution are the 
following: 
Dependability Deviation Analysis (DDA): DDA (described in chapter 3) 
provides a method for the systematic analysis of the system identifying the 
effect of system deviations on the normal operation of the system. In the context 
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of dependability cases, the purpose of DDA is to elicit the required and 
acceptable behaviour of the system with respect to dependability and to clearly 
identify associations between failures from the viewpoint of each dependability 
attribute. 
e Goal Structuring Notation (GSM): GSN (reviewed in chapter 2) consists of a 
notation and method pertaining to the development of structured arguments. 
GSN is used to construct the core of the dependability case - the dependability 
argument. The dependability case framework has been built using GSN 
exploiting its ability to explicitly reference contextual infonnation. 
9 FactorANalysis and Decision A Iternatives (FANDA): FANDA (described in this 
chapter) complements GSN in supporting the development of arguments. The 
method can be thought of as a catalyst between the argument and the design. It 
assists analysts in examining the system goals, recording and managing 
rationale, and eliciting candidate options for the design decisions taking place 
during the system lifecycle. 
41 Trade-Off Method (TOM): TOM describes a systematic way of establishing and 
using a space of admissible requirements, to trade-off achievement of 
dependability goals, hence overcoming a potential impasse that resulted from 
conflicts between the goals. TOM ultimately creates arguments of preference 
between candidate decisions, in the context of which the dependability argument 
evolves. 
The starting point of the evolution is considered to be the definition of the overall 
concept system operation - e. g. the definition of the concept of operations (CONOPS) 
and operational scenarios and roles of a system. This information constitutes the high 
level model of the system (e. g. OV-1 in DODAF). The models are used in DDA, 
during which analysts identify the attributes of interest and elicit dependability 
requirements for the system elements identified in the models. The GSN method is 
used to identify and create an argument about the dependability of the system. The 
requirements elicited during DDA constitute the required dependability behaviour of the 
system. The goals are used by the FANDA method to elicit design rationale and 
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identify the candidate design alternatives that satisfy the goals. The identified design 
alternatives are fed (along with the GSN goals) to the trade-off method, which will 
facilitate selection of the most suitable alternative. The first stage of TOM can also be 
called from the GSN in order to define the bounds. Moreover TOM can also provide 
feedback to FANDA in order to improve the identified alternatives. Following the 
selection of the most suitable alternative, the design space is updated with the models 
that reflect the design decisions. The new models or system elements can be analysed 
using DDA, thus starting a new evolution cycle for the argument and the system. 
6.3 Influence of GSN on System Development 
Creating a compelling dependability argument requires references to the product and the 
(system) development process. Showing that a system is safe may require references to 
decisions concerning, for example, the elimination or mitigation of identified hazards. 
Other goals may need to be supported by arguments regarding the operation of the 
system or elements of the system with respect to other dependability attributes. For 
example, claiming that a system is reliable may be argued from the design decision to 
adopt redundant units. An argument is closely related to the context within which it is 
stated. In this case the context would be the design decision to use redundant units. 
Had the argument construction been left for the end of the lifecycle, developers may 
have not decided to adopt a redundant design. This would eventually lead to 
construction of a weak argument concerning the system's reliability, or may even result 
in an unreliable system as the 'inefficiencies' of the design would be apparent. 
6.3.1 Argument Strategies 
A GSN goal structure evolves through a process in which goals are decomposed into 
sub-goals, until the sub-goals can be supported by evidence. Goals can be decomposed 
in a manner that analysts perceive is suitable in order to support the parent goal. 
Strategies are used in GSN to describe how the argument has been decomposed. 
Identification and elaboration of strategy takes place during steps 3,4 and 5 of the six- 
step GSN method, as described in chapter 2. During these steps the developers of the 
argument need to identify the strategy based on which the argument should evolve, the 
contextual information necessary to make this decision, and the children goals that need 
184 
Chapter 6- Evolution andArchilecture ofDependability Cases 
to be defined to support the parent goal, given the selected strategy. Fig. 6.2 presents an 
example of strategy describing how goal G3 is achieved by its sub-goals. 
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Fig. 6.2 - Example of Strategy In Goal Decomposition 1471 
The strategy argues over the effectiveness of a decision related to the design of the 
system. Strategy should communicate the approach which is used to decompose the 
argument. However decisions regarding the development of the argument are often 
closely related to decisions regarding the system. In the case of the example of Fig. 6.2 
the strategy is to argue by appeal to the effectiveness of the interlocks - stated in context 
of the interlock design decision. Kelly [47] remarks that although a strategy can refer to 
design decisions (as in the case of Fig. 6.2), it should not be a mere reference to the 
design decision. Instead, this should be done using the design decision as context. 
GSN strategies are not only limited to describing design approaches. For example, a 
system argument may be developed to argue about the quality of procedures and 
processes of the development lifecycle. 
Definition of argument strategy is a pivotal point during the evolution of the argument. 
Regardless of the particular focus of an argument the process of evolving the argument 
cannot be perfon-ned in isolation of the system. 'The process includes evaluation of the 
goals that need to be achieved and contextual information such as the evolution of 
design of the system up to that point, previous experience and architectural tactics. 
Deciding upon a strategy to develop an argument can influence many facets of the 
system lifecycle and ultimately affect the system itself. The decision for the adoption of 
a strategy (and its subsequent influence on development of the system) can originate out 
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of a set of possible alternative decisions. Whilst GSN documents all the necessary 
information required to review and understand an argument, the process resulting in the 
identification of the appropriate argument strategy and the information related to this 
decision are not recorded. 
A situation in which the documentation of decisions becomes important is the activity 
of changing part of the argument. Changing an aspect of the system such as design, test 
data, goals will have a ripple effect to the argument [47]. Hence decisions that at the 
time that were taken were thought to be the best option may need to be reviewed. This 
requires reviewing the rationale as well as the argument, based on which they were 
preferred over other possible decisions in the first place. 
In this chapter, FANDA is presented as a method to help developers understand and 
record the evolving dependability goals, the means of achieving the goals, and the 
resultant decision alternatives during the processes of parallel evolution of argument 
and system architecture and design. 
6.4 Factor Analysis and Decision Alternatives (FANDA) 
FANDA facilitates the interaction between the argument and the design. Eliciting 
design alternatives is an inductive process that uses inferences to associate goals with 
recognised factors that affect them. The combination of these design factors will form 
the proposed alternative. The process can use information collected from activities such 
as brainstorming, reuse of previous and general domain experience, application of 
patterns and experiments. The purpose of this step is to give developers the necessary 
impetus to produce candidate alternatives optimised for the satisfaction of the 
dependability case goals. FANDA provides the following functions: 
e Brainstorming and elicitation of alternatives affecting the design of the system & 
the satisfaction of the dependability case goal. 
* Documentation of decision rationale concerning the achievement of the goals 
41 Identification of competing decisions 
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" Relative impact of and identification of degree of satisfaction of decisions on 
goals 
" Collation (and digest) of information regarding argument construction 
FANDA consists of a number of elements that have been introduced in the DCM, as 
well as of a process that helps to instantiate and use FANDA. 
6.4.1 Overview and Structure of FANDA Elements 
Fig. 6.3 depicts in UML the principal elements of FANDA as well as their structured, as 
defined in the dependability case metamodel. 
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Fig. 63 - FANDA Metamodel Description 
6.4.1.1 Goal 
The class 'goal' represents the GSN goals that exist in the dependability case (described 
in chapter 3). Goals participate in FANDA, as they are the epicentre (and starting point) 
of the process around which the alternatives are proposed. 
6.4.1.2 Factor 
Factors are a concept analogous to sensitivity points [37]. Their sole purpose is to 
identify possible characteristics that may affect a goal. In the context of this thesis, 
factors relate to design characteristics that are considered to influence the goal. For 
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example redundancy in a design is a factor that can affect a goal regarding the 
availability of the system, or the strength ofencryption of data affects the security levels 
of a system. According to the goals that refer to, factors can be generic statements. For 
example identification of redundancy as a factor, refers to the architectural layer of the 
system, and would take place during the initial stages of the system development. 
6.4.1.3 Factor Instance 
Although a factor identifies an association of a feature with a goal, it does not provide 
an indication of how the observation is used in the system under development. A factor 
instance essentially is a concrete proposal for using a factor in a particular way, in order 
to achieve the goal. For example with respect to strength of encryption a factor instance 
could be. 128-bits encryption, or with redundancy the factor instance could be use of 
triple modular redundancy. 
6.4.1.4 Decision 
Decisions represent the actual alternatives created from the FANDA process that 
constitute the proposed solutions regarding with respect to the dependability goals. It is 
these decisions that are evaluated during the trade-off method. A decision consists of a 
number of factor instances. Hence it is related to all goals that the designers need to 
achieve. For example, a decision would be triple modular redundancy architecture 
using 128 bit encryption. This thesis focuses on design decisions; however other types 
of decisions can exist. For example there can be decisions regarding the process 
followed to develop a system and not the product (design) itself. Such decisions could 
be modelled in the DCM by extending the decision class. 
6.4.1.5 Impact on Goal 
Factors acknowledge an association between the design characteristic that they 
represent, and a goal. However they do capture how the factor will affect the goal. 
Impact on goal is an association class between the factor instance and the goal. Given a 
concrete use of a particular factor, the impact captures how the proposed factor instance 
affects the goal. Impact of goal has two types of attributes: type of impact and 
magnitude of impact. The type of impact captures whether the factor instance affects a 
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goal positively, negatively or it may be neutral. The magnitude captures the extent to 
which the factor instance affects the goal. Magnitude of impact is described in a 
qualitative scale including low, medium and high. 
6.4.1.6 Decision Impact on goal 
Having identified factor instances and their impact on the goals (decision) alternatives 
are proposed. Decision impact on goal captures the impact of the proposed alternatives 
on the goals. Contrary to impact of goal which is mainly used to trigger brainstorming, 
decision impact should be accurate. In essence, decision impact mirrors the degree of 
satisfaction of an alternative with respect to the goal, used during TOM. 
6.4.2 FANDA Process 
The FANDA process provides a systematic way of examining the required 
dependability goals and eliciting the decision alternatives. The FANDA process is 
structured using the six hats method [98], which helps stakeholders reach consensus. 
6.4.2.1 Six Hats Method 
The strength of the method lies in the fact that decisions arc not achieved through a 
process of debate. Instead, participants identify a number of perspectives from which a 
problem is viewed, focusing on each in isolation. This increases the productivity and 
effectiveness by structuring brainstorming, which often is an ad-hoc activity. Each of 
the perspectives represents a thinking hat switching the participant's mindset to 
particular thinking philosophy, forming an attitude that the stakeholders can follow. 
The six thinking hats are labelled as colours, for ease of remembering their function, 
namely: 
- White hat: The white hat is concemed with facts and figures. The purpose of 
this perspective is to identify the available data that can be used to support 
positions. The white hat aims to be neutral and objective and therefore personal 
opinion is dismissed in white hat thinking. However, facts that cannot be 
verified are permissible and arc denoted as beliefs. Further investigation and 
collection of data about a belief needs to take place. Apart from the availability 
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of information that supports a fact, the likelihood of a fact being true is also an 
important attribute. The concept of likelihood separates the concepts of a 
generally acceptable truth and a fact. For example, it can be said that that it is 
generally true that avoiding loops will decrease complexity of a program; 
however this may not necessarily be a universal rule and there may not be 
adequate evidence to support this claim. The two concepts (acceptable truth and 
fact) have been incorporated in the DCM. 
- Red hat: This hat provides an emotional view and allows feelings on an issue 
without having to justify the position. It is suggested by De Bono that there 
should not be any attempts to justify an opinion. Intuition in expressing an 
opinion is represented in this perspective. 
- Black hat: Black represents caution and its purpose is to focus on the negative 
and weaknesses of an idea. Under black hat thinking participants are asked to 
answer questions such as "what can go wrong". Black hat thinking can also 
identify a suggestion that is not supported by facts. Dc Bono further advocates 
that black hat thinking should not degenerate into an adversarial argument. 
- Yellow hat: Optimism and thinking about the positive aspects of an issue arc 
covered under the yellow hat. Yellow hat thinking explores possible value and 
benefit. 
- Green hat: Creativity and proposal of new ideas is the focus of the green hat. 
This perspective is involved with what can be done and what alternatives can be 
produced regarding an issue. 
- Blue hat: The blue hat is responsible for organising the overall process and use 
ofthcotherhats. It can be said that the author of this research defined the use of 
the hats in FANDA from the perspective of the blue hat. 
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The six hats methodology influences the FANDA by constraining the attitude of the 
participants during each of the FANDA processes, focusing only on the necessary 
perspective at each stage. 
6.4.3 Overview of the Process 
FANDA consists of three stages, elicitation of factors and factor instances (I"' stage) 
and goal wide examination of factor instances (2 nd stage) and elicitation and 
examination of decisions (3"d stage), illustrated in Fig. 6.4. Each stage is further 
analysed using dedicated process diagrams in subsequent sections of this report. 
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Fig. 6.4 - Overall FANDA Stages 
The objectives of the first stage are: 
To identify the goals that the alternative is required to satisfy 
Identify the factors affecting the goals 
Suggest ways forward using the factor 
Explore possible factor instances and identify their impact on the goal 
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9 Examine the availability and plan collection of evidence supporting the factor 
instance's impact on goal 
The focus of the first stage is limited on a single goal. Not taking into account the 
impact a factor may have on other goals, the participants of this stage aim to maximise 
creativity. Critical thinking is part of the second stage, which examines the factor 
instances with respect to the entire set of the dependability goals. The objectives of the 
second stage are: 
e Identify the impact of factor instances across all goals create a rationale map 
0 Identification of evidence suggesting negative impact 
Following identification of the impact of factor instances across all goals, participants 
have created a (as mentioned by De Bono) 'rationale map'. The map captures possible 
ways forward identified by the participants and both the positive and negative impact 
that they will have on the goals. The last stage of FANDA involves: 
9 Creation of decisions 
9 Specification of their impact on all goals, according to the factor instances that 
they contain 
9 Identification of insufficient evidence and planning of evidence collection 
6.4.3.1 Elicitation of Factors and Factor Instances Stage 
Fig. 6.5 presents in a flowchart diagram the process for instantiating factors and factor 
instances. The process starts by importing, from the argument, the dependability goals 
that participate in FANDA, and selecting a goal that will be examined. By examining 
the goals individually the scope of the process is reduced and the appropriate focus is 
given on an individual problem at a time. 
Identification of the goals includes examining the context of a goal, as well as any 
inherited context (when a goal is decomposed using the GSN method, the children of 
that goal are also stated in the context associated with the parent goal). Hence any 
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information from the context associated with a parent goal needs to be acknowledged as 
it may provide useful information. 
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Fig. 6.5 - Process for Instantiating Factors 
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Following the selection of a goal, participants suggest factors that possibly affect the 
goal. At this stage, a factor can be anything that it is thought to affect the ability to 
address the goal. Using a 'green hat' attitude the participants need to assert factors that 
they think can influence the goal without necessarily analysing at this stage the validity 
of the claim. Inspection of the validity and usefulness of a factor takes place gradually 
throughout the process. Initially an assessment of available facts regarding the factor 
needs to be performed. Participants need to look for sources of facts regarding the 
yes 
Do you think that 
as 
0, 
goal has been 
tly? 
k that 
so 
ad 
Ig 
No S. Mcien 
-4 addressed 
ufflciently? 
(Red) (Red) 
Document 
Factor 
I n. t C@ Our 
yes 
Can you suggest 
magnitude of 
Impact? 
(White) 
193 
Chapter 6- Evolution andArchitecture ofDependability Cases 
factor and its associated goal such as experimental results, and data from previous 
experience and proofs. Where a factor is suggested but there is insufficient evidence to 
support it, the association between the fact and the goal should be characterised as belief 
and not as claim. This means that there is uncertainty whether the association is true. 
Hence the association between the factor and the goal is expressed using likelihood. 
Participants need to plan how sources of evidence can be further verified to support the 
association with more certainty. At this point of the process, as suggested by the white 
hat, interpretation of the facts in order to conclude as to whether a factor will affect the 
goal positively or negatively should be avoided. The task is solely limited to identifying 
the availability of evidence regarding the association between the goal and the identified 
factor. 
Instantiation of factors should first take place using'a positive and optimistic attitude. In 
other words the participants seek factors that will contribute to the satisfaction of a goal. 
This is reflected in the next step of the process, in which a hypothesis on how the factor 
can be used to support the satisfaction of a goal is suggested. Although this step needs 
to take place with a positive attitude, a suggestion needs to be supported by rationale, 
explaining the available evidence supporting the hypothesis. Caution should be given 
not to criticise the hypothesis but to maintain a focus on whether the suggested factor 
can contribute positively to the goal given the available evidence. Identification of 
positive contribution and definition of the rationale is a stepping stone for proposing a 
factor instance. Proposing a factor instance entails a concrete specification of how the 
factor (which was identified as having a positive contribution to the goal) could be used 
to achieve the goal. The definition of the factor instance is accompanied by definition 
of the magnitude of impact. This captures the degree that the factor instance is believed 
to contribute in achieving the goal (low, medium, high), which is an attribute of the 
ImpactOnGoal class in the FANDA metamodel (Fig. 6.3). Identified sources of 
information can provide evidence supporting the decision. Eventually the factor 
instances that have high impact on goal will be given extra consideration when an 
alternative an alternative will be specified. It is these factors that will influence the 
dependability attributes of the proposed alternative. 
The process ends with the participants determining whether the identified factors, along 
with the factor instances, can sufficiently help support the goal. A thorough analysis 
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and justification for having addressed the goal adequately is not required. Completion 
of the stage (for each goal) is a subjective decision of the participants, based on whether 
the brainstorming activity suggesting factors as well as elaborating on their use, has 
been effective enough. 
6.4.3.2 Goal-wide Examination of Factor Instances Stage 
During the first stage of FANDA factor instances are proposed driven by identification 
of a factor that can (positively) contribute in achieving the goal. Factor instances will 
not have a positive impact on all goals and may affect certain goals in a negative 
manner (black hat mentality). This part of FANDA involves examining a factor 
instance with respect to the rest of the goals, also identifying negative impact. The main 
reason for which examination of possible negative does not take place during the 
instantiation of the factors (first stage of FANDA) is to avoid rejecting a factor instance 
on the grounds of negative contribution. A factor instance and the corresponding factor 
and approaches should not be rejected before examining how it can contribute to the 
overall decision. 
Identifying potential negative contribution of a factor instance and collecting the 
appropriate evidence, which takes place during this stage is an important activity. The 
concept is similar to the requirement of Defence Standard 00-56 [6], which asks for the 
identification of possible counter evidence that could have a negative impact on the 
creation of a safety case. Fig. 6.6 presents the process for examining the factor instances 
with respect to all required goals. 
The process begins by selecting a proposed factor instance. Using the appropriate 
mindset as described in the six hats methods, participants need to identify whether the 
factor instance will have, in their opinion, a negative or positive impact on a goal. 
Impact in this case can also be described as neutral. The possibility of neutral impact is 
considered during the use of the positive thinking (yellow) hat. This is in accordance to 
maintaining an overall positive attitude for the benefit of creativity. Failure to identify 
impact on a goal implies insufficient information about the relationship between the 
factor instance and the goal. In case the impact is considered to be neutral this should 
still be supported by evidence. Lack of evidence does not imply a neutral impact. 
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Fig. 6.6 - Goal - wide Examination of Factor Instances 
Identifying available sources of evidence that can support a suggestion regarding the 
impact of a factor instance is necessary for evaluating of the overall decision. 
6.4.3.3 Specification of Decisions Stage 
Following completion of the second stage, participants have created an overview of the 
factors that affect the required goals, and have created factor instances using the 
identified factors. The last stage of FANDA involves composition of factor instances 
and proposition of candidate (design) decisions. 
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Fig. 6.7 shows the process of the last stage of FANDA. There are no specific guidelines 
as to how the decisions should be made. De Bono suggests that by identifying, 
understanding and discussing the impact of each factor instance on each goal, a 
grationale map' is built that contributes in enhancing the perception of the problem. 
Following proposal of a decision participants investigate whether there are associated 
factor instances belonging to the decision with the goals. By examining the associations 
between factor instances and goals already dcfined during the previous steps of FANDA 
can identify the impact of the decision on the goals. There is the possibility that the 
proposed decision does not have any factor instances associated with one of the goals. 
In this occasion participants should identify sources of evidence that can help establish 
the association. In order to do this, the impact of the decision's factor instances should 
be assessed using the steps of stage 2. Failure to identify impact of decision on a goal 
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implies inconclusive sources of evidence that will later support the argument and hence 
are discarded. 
6.4.4 Availability of Evidence during the System Lifecycle 
With FANDA participants specify factor instances and decisions, and dcfinc their 
association with the system goals. During FANDA, participants enter an incremental 
process of establishing a collection of 'micro-argumcnts' (although not captured in GSN 
as with the main dependability argument) about the association of factors, factor 
instances and decisions with the goals. Evidence supporting these micro-arguments arc 
an essential aspect of the FANDA process. However, availability of evidence varies 
according to stage of the system lifecyclc. At the early stages of the lifecycle, 
availability of evidence is more limited compared to later stages. Booch [99] suggests 
that defining an architecture requires "... suboptimal decisions madepartly in the dark". 
Initially the claims in FANDA may be supported by beliefs (e. g. based on previous 
experience or common practice), which need to be verified by evidence as the 
development of the system progresses. Apart from identifying available information, it 
is essential during FANDA to think about evidence collection required to support 
decisions made at an earlier stage of the lifecycle based on beliefs or limited evidence. 
6.5 Architecting the Dependability Case 
At the end of its development, dependability case will combine claims regarding a 
number of perspectives of the system development such as the trade-offs, the product 
and the process. Consequently there will be differences in the arguments supporting 
these claims. Techniques such as modularising arguments in GSN, allow the overall 
dependability case to be represented as a series of interrelated modularised arguments. 
According to how the links between the arguments are defined the overall case can 
result in different layouts (architecture). This section defines a possible dependability 
case architecture. There are three main concepts are which have been used by the 
author to structure the dependability case: 
* Use of a high level dependability argument 
* Use of the dependability profile to structure the supporting arguments 
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e Use of GSN contracts to compose the overall dependability case 
The following sections describe how these concepts contribute to the proposed 
dependability case architecture. 
6.5.1 High Level Dependability Argument 
A dependability case communicates assurance that the system will provide acceptable 
operation with respect to the stakeholders' envisioned dependability requirements. The 
overall dependability argument constitutes a description of the stakeholder's 
dependability goals. By constructing the high level dependability argurnent, 
stakeholders determine the dependability attributes of interest For the system, their 
respective requirements and associated acceptability criteria (i. e. the bounds of tile 
goal), which are elicited during DDA. The high level argument predominantly captures 
the requirements of the system in context of its envisioned operation. 
One of the advantages of using modular GSN is the achievement of separation of' 
concems between the argument modules. Fig. 6.9 shows application of modular GSN to 
separate high level dependability argument from other supporting modules. 
High level depenthibilitil argument clainis 
ichieventent ofelepen(kibilitV characteristics with 
t-(,, v)ect to the stakeholders'inferests 
Partitioning is nol arbilrarilYspec4lied. Rationale 
for the creation ofthe supporting wgument mo(hi/es. 
JIrguments 
supporting 
the high level 
dependabilitv claim 
Fig. 6.8 - High Level Dependability Argument and Support Modules 
The focus of the high level dependability argument is on the high level dependability 
requirements of interest to the system stakeholders, which also define the system's high 
level envisioned operation. 
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Supporting modules provide the arguments for achievement of the requirements 
identified in the high level dependability argument. Partitioning of the dependability 
case cannot be arbitrarily specified. The rationale for a particular way of partitioning 
the dependability case needs to identified, examining the (logical) relationship between 
the high level argument and the arguments supporting it. A possible way to architecting 
the dependability case is to use the high level dependability argument as a means for 
separating individual arguments regarding the dependability attributes. Fig. 6.9 shows 
the basic structure of the resulting dependability case using a high level dependability 
argument. The high level dependability argument (called dependability specification 
argument in this example) is used to identify the required system dependable operation. 
Following identification of the goals of dependable operation, each of the attributes is 
supported by separate arguments focusing on arguments pertinent to that attribute 
(Table. 3.1). 
Dependability 
Specification Argument 
saftty Securiti 
P-; Argument Argument 
Ij 
Trade-off 
Argument 
Fig. 6.9 - Case Partitioning Based on Attributes 
The argument modules concerning the dependability attributes are stated in the context 
of a module arguing about the conflicts and trade-offs between the attributes. Although 
this architecture for a dependability case is appealing there are certain problems that 
make its use difficult for communicating a clear argument about the achievement of the 
required dependability properties. 
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As demonstrated in chapter 4, there are associations between dependability attributes 
which during DDA are captured as 'can cause' relationships between failures. This 
dependency is carried through to the respective goals that were elicited during DDA. 
For example, consider a safety goal for the AGO scenario, claiming achievement of 
satisfactory safety (loss of life) where this has been identified as being a system concern 
during application of DDA. During DDA the consequences of failure condition 
'Artillery will receive the wrong location' (FC6) were associated with the safety 
concern. Correspondingly, the claim about achievement of safety will depend on 
achievement of reliability in those system elements that participate in transmitting 
target data. Hence, a requirement stated from the perspective of one attribute may be 
supported by claims stated from the perspectives of other dependability attributes. 
Making many cross-references between the argument modules as shown in Fig. 6.9 will 
result in a case that is difficult to comprehend and review. An alternative, more viable, 
approach to structuring the architecture of a dependability case is presented in section 
6.5.3. 
Establishing any high level dependability argument will entail the following aspects: 
9 Top level claim: The overall claim that the dependability case communicates. 
* Attributes of Interest: Goals defining the required (high level) operation of the 
system regarding the dependability attributes of interest to the system 
stakeholders. 
Relation to DDA analysis: identification of how DDA can be used to identify the 
stakeholders' concerns and how these can be supported using the products of 
DDA. 
The individual aspects of the high level argument (i. e. the arguments contained within 
the high level dependability argument module) are described in the following sections. 
6.5.1.1 Top Claim 
Dependability Deviation Analysis, as described in chapter 2, provides a framework for 
thinking about how each attribute can affect the operation of the system. Establishing 
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the dependability claims that the system will need to satisfy are determined during the 
first stages of the DDA. 
TopClalm TopCIaImC1 
(System X) (System )0 Is appropriately 
dependable for its operational 
operation. objectives. 
Fig. 6.10 - Top Claim In Context of the System's Operation 
The top claim (Fig. 6.10) of the dependability case represents the overall claim regarding 
the envisioned operation of the system. Correspondingly, the goal is stated in the 
context of the objectives of the operation of the system. The top level claim is the 
starting point of the argument. In the initial stages of dependability case development 
references to dependability attributes cannot be meaningfully established. Hence at this 
stage, identifying the operational objectives of the system can provide the necessary 
background for decomposition of the top level claim, in which dependability attributes 
can meaningfully relate to the stakeholders' interests. 
6.5.1.2 Argument from the Perspective of Dependability Attributes 
Identifying the attributes of interest entails stakeholders examining the operational 
objectives (captured in context TopCIaimC]) from the perspective of each dependability 
attribute. Definition of the system objectives is one of the initial stages of the DDA 
process. 
During DDA typical issues pertinent to the dependability attribute under which the 
system objectives are examined can reveal the primary concerns for the system 
stakeholders. A concern is an issue that can credibly affect the system objectives and 
hence the overall acceptable operation of the system. 
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Fig. 6.11 -Attributes of Interest In the High Level Module 
Fig. 6.11 illustrates how the top level goal can be decomposed to capture the attributes 
of interest to the stakeholders. TopClaimS is the strategy based on which the top goal is 
substantiated, requiring identification of the attributes of interest to the stakeholders that 
will contribute to achieving dependable operation. The strategy is solved by goal 
DepAttr which is instantiated for each identified dependability attribute of interest and 
claims acceptable achievement of that attribute. The strategy (DepAttrS) for solving 
goal DepAttr is to argue over the concerns (identified during DDA) that may 
compromise the attribute of interest. Use of concerns and DDA to support goal DepAttr 
is discussed in the following section. 
6.5.1.3 Arguing Acceptable Operation Regarding Dependability 
Concerns 
Development of the goals referring to the attributes of interest is achieved in 
substantiating goals addressing the stakeholders' concerns. Analysis of the system 
during the Dependability Deviation Analysis identifies how deviating from normal 
operation with respect to an attribute can compromise the operation of the system. Goal 
DepAttr is substantiated by arguing over the concerns identified by the stakeholders 
during DDA. Fig. 6.12 presents the resulting argument. 
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Goal ConcAttr supports strategy DepAttrS by claiming that the concerns that may 
compromise the attributes of interest have been addressed. DDA provides the necessary 
information for claims ConcEffect and DepConc0p, supporting the ConcAttr goal 
which was identified earlier. ConcEffect claims identification and understanding of the 
concern's effect on the system operation. This takes place during the initial stages of 
DDA, in which the top level objectives are examined. DepConcOp argues that the 
operation of the system with respect to the concern is acceptable. DepConcOp is 
defined in context of the elicited target and limit, which define the bounds of 
acceptability. Also, DepConcOp is stated in the context of the claim that the bounds of 
acceptability have been justified. This claim is associated with the argument produced 
by TOM stage one, which captures the rationale behind the determination of limits. 
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Fig. 6.12 - Arguing About the Concerns 
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Further development of the argument requires identifying how a single failure 
condition or combination of failure conditions, can result in concerns that will 
compromise the dependable operation of the system (strategy ConcSDDA 
- 
B). This is 
stated in the context of the failure conditions map identified during DDA 
(ConcSDDACI), which provides a 'causal picture' of which failure conditions can 
result in a concern. Understanding the failure conditions that can cause the concern 
being argued allows further decomposition of the argument under strategy 
ConcSDDA_B. As explained there are interrelations between failure conditions which 
were depicted using the failure maps. Use of case studies by the author indicated that it 
is difficult to decompose ConcSDDA 
-B 
with goals relating to each of the failure 
conditions that may cause the concern; this would result in circular references and a 
great number of associations between goals, which would make the dependability case 
difficult to manage. The use of the dependability profile is used in this research as a 
means of structuring the dependability case. 
6.5.2 Dependability Profiles Supporting the High Level 
Dependability Argument 
The high level dependability argument's objective is to capture and argue about the 
overall required operation of the system. Hence, the high level dependability argument 
primarily focuses on the overall system requirements stated in context of the envisioned 
operation. However arguments claiming satisfaction of the high level requirements 
needs to be developed in context of a particular system design. The dependability 
profile is a concept introduced to facilitate traceability between the high level 
dependability argument module and argument modules developed in the context of the 
system. The dependability profile is created during Dependability Deviation Analysis 
(DDA) and describes acceptable behaviour of system elements that are modelled (in the 
modelling framework that has been selected) with respect to various dependability 
attributes. Each profile is a collation of requirements elicited from the perspective of 
each attribute of interest, regarding a particular system element. 
As described the strategy to argue over contributing factors ConcSDDA 
-B 
(Fig. 6.12) 
introduces certain problems in the design, resulting in a complicated and difficult to 
manage dependability case. However, information such as the effects and consequences 
of the various failure conditions does not need to be part of the argument, but 
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constitutes the context in which the argument is created. An alternative (to 
ConcSDDA B) strategy (recommended by this thesis) would be to argue over 
achievement of requirements that were elicited in the context of the identified failure 
conditions. This way instead of supporting a goal about a concern (goal DepConc-0p) 
by arguing over the failure conditions, the argument will be made by claiming 
achievement of the requirements that were elicited given the identified failures. For 
example, in the case of the AGO (discussed in §6.5.1) claiming achievement of a safety 
concern would need an argument over the reliability levels of the target data provision 
function. 
Fig. 6.13 illustrates a refactored high level dependability argurnent, substituting strategy 
ConcSDDA_B with a strategy (DepConc-OpS) supported by an argument based upon 
satisfaction of the dependability profiles of the system elements. This is the approach 
favoured by this thesis. 
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Fig. 6.13 - Strategy by Appeal to the Dependability Profile 
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In order to create a clear and manageable case, the dependability profiles associated 
with the concern are not directly associated with DepConcOpS since this would result in 
separate arguments for each concern of each attribute of interest. Instead, the arguments 
referring to the dependability profiles are contained in separate modules, which support 
the high level argument. Linking argument modules requires recording the interfaces 
between the arguments in an understandable manner, maintaining traceability and 
clarity of the argument. GSN contracts are employed to compose the dependability case 
out the identified individual arguments. 
6.5.3 Use of GSN Contracts to Structure the Dependability Case 
Using GSN, a case can be partitioned into modules, each of which constitutes an 
individual argument. The overall case is defined by aggregating and documenting the 
relationships between the participating modules [100]. Fig. 6.14 shows how contracts 
can be used to structure a case. The top level module contains the overall claims about 
the system. 
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other modules. Ae goals are 
solved by contract 
GSN contrat ts are a type 
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to more than one line oj'argument 
I! - 
Fig. 6.14 - Use of GSN Contracts in Structuring a Case 
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For example, overall claims about the achieved safety levels of the system (safety), or 
the dependability behaviour of the system (dependability case). Development of the 
argument contained in the top level module can result into goals that are supported by 
arguments in other modules (orange and blue goals). 
The two goals are 'developed by contract', which captures the association of the parent 
goal with the modules supporting it. Contrary to 'away goals', a goal developed by 
contract does not necessarily have to be associated with the top goal of an argument 
module, but it can be supported by any public goal in the module (a public goal in GSN 
is a goal visible outside its container module). Moreover goals within an argument 
module can provide support to more than one contract; in Fig. 6.14 the bottom module 
provides support to two contracts. Use of GSN contracts provides the following 
benefits: 
High Cohesion: Modules focus on particular aspects of the system-case 
development. 
Low Coupling: Relations between the modules are captured at the module level. 
* Documented Interfaces: The interfaces of the modules are captured and 
explained. 
Information hiding: Only public goals are visible to other modules. Particularly 
useful for security policies between development teams, constraining free access 
to all modules. 
Use of contracts provides flexibility in structuring a case that cannot be achieved with 
the use of 'hard-wired' away goals and contexts. A contract is not merely a collation of 
the interfaces between the modules; instead they are arguments themselves, providing 
an argument about the way in which the parent module is decomposed. In the context 
of the dependability case, contracts are employed to structure the dependability case 
capturing the interfaces between the modules, and arguing about how the arguments 
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regarding the achievement of the dependability profiles can support the dependability 
goals of the high level dependability argument. Fig. 6.15 presents the resulting 
architecture of the dependability case, proposed in this thesis, using contracts in 
modular GSN. 
In this thesis, we structure the dependability case of a system based on the models that 
represent it (the system). In particular we align the dependability case with MODAF 
products. In general, defence architectural frameworks are optimised to Systems of 
Systems (SoS). As discussed in chapters 2 and 4, the MoD and DoD specification do 
not provide a definite way for developing the products. However, the DoD deskbook 
provides guidelines for a data-centric approach, called the activity Based Methodology 
(ABM) [23] presents the sequence in which the products are constructed following the 
ABM. 
ABM is used to maintain consistency between the DAF products, creating integrated 
architectures by adding detail to existing models, the elements of which can be mapped 
onto the new models. An important aspect of the ABM methodology is that during the 
evolution of the system, the developers follow a set of well specified steps incorporating 
traceability during development of the models. Addition of detail in each step, results 
to the evolution of the overall system by defining new models. DAF models using the 
ABM, define a hierarchy that can be used to trace dependability considerations from the 
high level concept of operations (CONOPS), to individual systems and functions that 
constitute the operation of the system. 
The dependability case architecture proposed in thesis is organised around the hierarchy 
presented in Fig. B. 2. Fig. 6.15 illustrates the resulting architecture of the dependability 
case employing GSN contracts for its composition. The case consists of four different 
types of argument modules: 
* High level dependability argument: High level dependability argument: 
Argument about the satisfaction of the high level dependability requirements, of 
primary interest to the system stakeholder. 
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* Operational view product arguments: Arguments about the satisfaction of 
dependability requirements of each operational level product. These 
requirements are derived according to how the operation of the SoS may affect 
the dependability attributes of interest to the stakeholders. 
System view product arguments: Arguments about the satisfaction of W- 
dependability requirements of each system level product. These requirements are 
derived according to how the systems may affect the operation of the SoS. 
Trade-off arguments: The trade-off arguments, product of TOM, constitute 
context to the dependability case, providing an argument that the selected 
altemative is the most suitable. 
Dependability goals stated in the 
context of hounds (elicited in 
TOAV. The goals are analysed in 
FANDA identifyingfactors. 
Proposed decisions are provided 
to TOM 
The contract mL. Ies are 
defined in the contert of the 
decision based on which the 
respective MODAF views were 
created. Analysing the resulting 
modelsfrom the decision in 
DDA the systems that can 
contribute in manifesting a 
concerns are identified and 
theirprofile is created. The 
contract captures these 
associations between the goals 
of the parent module and the 
goals that support it. 
Fig. 6.15 - MODAF Centric Dependability Case Architecture 
Arguments 
about 
operational 
view OV 
productproftles 
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The high level dependability focuses on the dependability requirements of the system 
stakeholders. The leaf goals of the module are stated in the context of bounds and their 
justification argument. Justification of the bounds is a part of the trade-off method 
argument. Using GSN contracts the leaf goals of the high level argument are supported 
by arguments regarding the dependability profiles of each of the (MODAF) operational 
view products, which in their turn are supported by arguments about the dependability 
profiles of each of the systems view products. 
6.5.3.1 Refactoring the High Level Argument to Use Contracts 
As illustrated in Fig. 6.13 the strategy followed in the high level dependability argument 
was to argue over addressing the concerns that were identified (during DDA) to be able 
to compromise the envisioned operation of the system. Fig. 6.16 shows the leaf goals of 
the high level argument refactored to reflect the use of contracts. 
ConcAttrS 
I 
Argument over Identifying DepConcOPT 
ams Targ tT 
the effects and addressing/ 
DOPC oncopt. 
causes of the concerns 
ConcEffect 
DepConcOp 11.1mit L) 
fConcern Q can 
compromise (system X) (Concern Q has been B-- undeClalm-BoundeAr 
envisioned operation acceptably addressed 
I 
Fo 
Bounds have been justified 
ConcEffect 
DDA High 
Level 
Objectives' 
Analysis 
Fig. 6.16 - High Level Argument Using GSN Contracts 
Using the GSN contracts the high level argument focuses purely on addressing the 
overall dependability goals of the stakeholders, as identified by the DDA. Details of 
how the case is structured are now not a part of the high level argument. In Fig. 6.13 the 
DepConcOp was substantiated using a strategy to argue over adherence to the 
appropriate dependability profiles (DepConcOpS). The strategy was stated in the 
context ConcsDDACI which references the product of the DDA that shows the 
dependability profiles related to a particular concern (i. e. failures map). 
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Information regarding how the dependability case modules support the instances of goal 
DepConcOp is now part of the contract module. Fig. 6.17 illustrates how the developed 
by contract goals (DepConc0p) are associated with their respective contract 
(DepConcOpContract). 
( ConcAttrS 
Argument over Identifying 
the effects and addressing 
causes of the concerns 
ConcEffect 
(Concern C) can 
compromise (system X) 
envisioned operation 
DepConcOp 
(Concern C1 has been 
acceptably addressed 
ConcEffect 
DDA High 
Level 
Objectives' 
Analysis 
(Concern Q support 
contract 
DepConcOpT 
(Target T) 
( Im 
DapConcOpL 
Umit L) 
BoundsCialm-BoundsAr 
9 
Bounds have been justified 
Fig. 6.17 - High Level Argument Linking to GSN Contract 
6.5.3.2 Contract Module Supporting the High Level Argument 
Using modular GSN and in particular GSN contracts, information regarding the 
partitioning of the dependability case is not part of the high level dependability 
argument. As described a contract is an argument module itself, which can capture the 
rationale and justification for the particular dependability case layout. 
Fig. 6.18 illustrates a pattern for contract modules representing the approach adopted in 
this thesis. DepConcOp_. HighLevelArgument is the goal in the contract module that 
corresponds to the (leaf) 'developed by contract' goal DepConcOp in the high level 
dependability argument. 
The goal is substantiated by strategy DepConcContrS. The strategy states that the 
argument will be developed, by arguing over meeting the requirements dcfined in the 
profile of the system elements, which have been identified as contributing to concern C. 
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Depeclable operation of 
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conclusions from the DDA 
<: J-- - -- 
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profiles of the elements 
relating to (concern C) 
DepConcOp-High Level 
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t DepConcContrS 
Argument by adherence to 
dependability profile of 
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fconcern C) 
1.. n 
ConcSupport-Module m 
i 
(Dependability Requirement DR) in 
(Dependability Profile DP) for (System 
Element SE) has been acceptably met 
Module m 
Fig. 6.18 - Dependability Case Contract 
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The strategy DepConcContrS is stated in the context of the following items: 
* DepConcDDA: Refers to the DDA I'ailure map that shows the lailure condi'lliolis 
of which system elements can contribute to concern C. 
ArchContext: Specifies the design decision which resulted in tile definitioll of 
the model elements that were analysed in DDA, rcSLIltIIIg III tile I'alkire Mill) 
referenced from DepConcDDA. 
TradeOfj'- This is a reference to the argument resulted from TOM Justifying Illat 
the architectural (or design) decision stated in ArchContext is the most stiltabic 
among the candidate alternatives. 
0 Conc-DecompJust: Explains how concerns are related with the system clenicnts 
based on the results of the DDA. 
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9 DecompJust: Explains how the leaf goals of the contract module will be 
associated with goals in other modules. 
A characteristic of GSN contracts is that the goals that are referenced in other argument 
modules (i. e. the top and leaf goals of the contract module), inherit the context of the 
parent goals in the module in which they belong. 
6.5.3.3 Supporting Modules 
With regard to MODAF, as presented in Fig. 6.15 each of the supporting arguments 
serves as 'wrapper' argument about the profile of a MODAF product. The modules 
support the higher level goals based on the results of the DDA analysis, justified in the 
contract module. 
Fig. 6.19 shows the pattern of a supporting module. The top level goal of the argument 
MODAFProdProf claims that the profiles of the system elements related to the product 
have been met. The goal is decomposed to goals regarding each dependability 
requirement of each system element associated with the MODAF product. The goals 
resulting from this decomposition (RQSEMet) are the public goals referenced from the 
contract. 
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Fig. 6.19 - MODAF Product Arguments 
The argument is further developed in the context of the DDA analysis, according to 
which the failure conditions of other system elements can compromise the requirement 
claimed by RQSEMet. Addressing the identified failure conditions (goal FC. 4thh-s) 
requires references to other modules, which are implemented using contracts. 
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6.6 Summary 
This chapter has defined FANDA, a method for capturing design rationale and 
brainstorming design alternatives. In addition the chapter describes how the proposed 
methods collaborate to create a dependability case. A dependability case architecture is 
proposed defining how the overall dependability argument can be structured using 
modular GSN and contracts. Use of dependability profiles allows structuring the case 
around MODAF products. Finally, the chapter presents how the information collected 
using DDA and TOM are related to the dependability argument. 
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Intentionally Blank 
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Chapter 7 
Evaluation 
This chapter describes the means by which the work presented in thesis was evaluated 
against the thesis proposition, throughout the duration of the research. The thesis 
proposition was stated in the following terms: 
"This thesis demonstrates that it is feasible to establish a structured approach to 
evolving and presenting a dependability case for Systems of Systems through a 
unified approach to eliciting flexible dependability requirements, facilitating 
resolution of trade-offs between competing objectives, and combining and managing 
these activities using structured argumentation. " 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the proposition implies the following challenges: 
" Understanding relationships between dependability requirements 
" Analysis of the design from the viewpoints of the dependability attributes 
" Elicitation of acceptable dependability requirements 
" Design rationale and identification of resultant trade-offs 
" Management and facilitation of trade-offs 
" Evolution of case in parallel to the design 
" Composition and architecture of the dependability case 
" Traceability between all the levels of the dependability case 
The challenges are addressed by three distinct strands within the research, namely: 
" Dependability requirements elicitation using deviation analysis, described in 
Chapter 3 
" Argument-based resolution and management of trade-offs, described in Chapter 
4 
" Dependability case evolution and architecture, described in Chapter 5 
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The evaluation of the proposition was focused on examining the application of the 
framework with respect to the following concerns: 
1. Feasibility of the proposition - examining the resulting dependability case 
structure after application of the methodologies 
2. Benefit in applying the methodologies in order to address the challenges 
inherent in the proposition 
7.1 Means of Evaluation 
Various means of evaluation were employed during the different stages of the research. 
These included the following: 
" Use of simple examples and anti-examples 
" Peer review 
" Formalisation and tool support 
" Case studies 
7.1.1 Examples 
Examples were the simplest means of evaluating the concepts of the thesis. They were 
a means of quickly testing newly introduced concepts within the framework. Initial 
acceptance or rejection of concept was based on proof of concept (using an example) or 
identification of an 'anti-example' demonstrating inefficiency of the concept. Larger 
scale evaluation was also required for evaluation of the overall resultant framework. 
7.1.2 Peer Review 
Design and proposal of a framework is an inherently difficult subject to evaluate, since 
it is typically infeasible to obtain a statistically significant sample of case studies. 
Furthermore, the domain of application of the research is characteristically conservative 
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in adopting and evaluating new methodologies. For these reasons, the need for 
evaluation by means of peer review was highlighted at an early stage of the research. 
The author used all available opportunities for peer review from highly experienced 
persons who were professionals in domains related to high integrity systems and 
requirements engineering. Having been based extensively on the concept of safety 
cases, the input of experiences and practices from reviewers related to the domain had a 
significant impact on the evolution of the work. Reviews included comments on the 
feasibility of the methodologies, as well as the potential bcncflt gained through 
application of the framework. Description of the dependability case framework was 
communicated using examples and worked through case studies. 
7.1.2.1 Peer Review through Publications 
Most of the material in this thesis has been presented in international conferences and 
workshops. Safety and requirements engineering conferences were targeted with the 
aim to subject the research to opinions from professionals in as closely related domains 
as possible. In general there was positive feedback relating to the work. Although this 
is the weakest form of peer review, positive feedback was consistently received during 
different conferences, giving an indication of acceptance of the work. An exception in 
which the work was subjected to more scrutiny was the presentation of a paper in the 
24th International System Safety Conference. The paper, describing FANDA and TOM 
and their use in the dependability case framework, received the best paper award after 
being evaluated by a panel of professionals and academics affiliated to the System 
Safety Society. Although the methodologies were not investigated by the panel in depth 
it was considered a vote of confidence regarding the benefit from potential application 
of the methodologies. Furthermore, the overall framework was presented at the I't 
Object Management Group (OMG) Workshop on Software Assurance Cases -a 
workshop with the declared aim of standardising the structure and presentation of 
assurance cases. The metamodel presented in this thesis addresses some of the issues 
identified by the workshop panel. Finally, some of the work has been cited in a number 
of papers [101], [102], [103]; most notably, is the reference of all the methodologies 
that constitute the dependability case framework, in a report issued by the US homeland 
security regarding good practice in software assurance [ 104]. 
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7.1.2.2 Peer Review within the HIRTS Defence and Aerospace 
Research Partnership 
This research is carried out under the High Integrity Real Time Systems Defence and 
Aerospace Research Partnership (HIRTS DARP), funded by the MoD, DTI and 
EPSRC. The members of the HIRTS DARP are BAE SYSTEMS, Rolls-Royce p1c, 
QinetiQ and the University of York. 
As part of the partnership the results of the research was frequently presented to the 
industrial partners during two types of events; quarterly working group meetings and 
yearly DARP workshops. The former type of event consisted of persons with particular 
interest and experience to the strand of research regarding dependability cases and SoS. 
The latter involved a broader audience interested in the work, not limited to the DARP 
industrial partners. 
Quarterly working group meetings constituted a very effective means of evaluation and 
provision of feedback. The meetings included review of examples and case studies, and 
presentation of the methodologies and their underlying theories. Discussions triggered 
by the presentations were held throughout the meetings, examining the qualities of the 
methodologies as well as their feasibility and potential benefit. Experience and close 
relationship of participants to the subject, as well as in depth discussions made the 
DARP working group meetings a strong means of evaluation. Feedback collected in the 
meetings significantly influenced the work. 
DARP workshops provided an opportunity to present the work to a broader audience 
interested in the topic. Compared to the working group meetings, DARP workshops did 
not provide as much substantial feedback. The dependability case framework and its 
associated methodologies were not examined in the same detail. In general the work 
received positive feedback and some comments were further discussed during the 
working group meetings. 
7.1.2.3 Peer Review during Case Studies 
This type of peer review encompasses discussions taking place prior and during 
application of case studies, in order to familiarise persons related to the case studies 
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with the framework. This form of evaluation was useful in gaining the experience of 
those other than the thesis author in their first-hand application of the methods. In brief, 
the majority of the received comments reflected recognition of benefit from the 
application of the methods. 
7.1.3 Formalisation of the Framework and Tool Support 
Formalisation of the dependability case framework involved creating a metamodel that 
captured concepts and interrelationships required to support the proposed methods. 
Further support was provided to the metamodel with scripts that performed a range of 
functions: These included functions to perform validation of instances of the 
metamodel, production of graphs, as well as automatic labelling and creation of objects 
where applicable. Although there is not a properly developed tool encompassing the 
dependability case framework, the eclipse model editor and the scripts written provide 
some fundamental computer aided support for someone wishing to create a 
dependability case based on the proposed framework. 
The metamodel classes and their related attributes define the essential concepts of 
dependability cases. Associations between the metamodel classes help understand the 
relationships betweep the methods described in the thesis. Definition of a metamodel 
requires a high degree of rigour. Existence of a rigorous metamodel that captures the 
concepts of the assurance cases domain can deliver a number of benefits. Most 
importantly, it offers a common vocabulary and consensus on the concepts. 
Furthermore, satisfactory use of the scripts offers some evidence of the correctness, 
coherence, sufficiency and detail in the implementation of the metamodel. 
7.1.4 Case Studies 
Evaluation by means of application on case studies was necessary in order to evaluate 
the research framework. The methodologies were applied to three case studies: 
1. The Anti-Guerrilla Operations (, AGO scenario (presented in appendix B). This 
is a fictional fully developed case study created by the author for the purposes of 
the research. Although fictitious, the case study was considered to be realistic 
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enough for its use. This claim was also supported by the DARP partners as well 
as by feedback received during DARP workshops. It was substantially based on 
input from industry, as well as examples widely available from sources such as 
the US Department of Defence. The AGO case study was the main case study 
used to communicate the results of the research for peer review during working 
group meetings and workshops. 
2. Network Centric War are WCM case study. The second case study was L 
provided by BAE Systems, one of the DARP partners. Due to the sensitive 
nature of the case study, details of the underlying scenario, models and results 
cannot be revealed. The NCW case study was defined in the spirit of a typical 
NCW example, and has very similar qualities with the AGO scenario. 
Application of the methodologies on the NCW case study was particularly 
useful. Compared to the AGO example, this was a 'real' example which 
demonstrated the readiness of the research to be applied in industry. 
Furthermore, the particular case study evaluated the framework in terms of 
scalability. Being a real scenario, the case study included numerous platforms 
collaborating and exchanging information. Through the course of the case study 
revisions of the methods took place. 
3. Hig-h Altitude Platfonns Wfs). This is the third case study, developed in 
collaboration with the Department of Electronics of the University of York. 
Typically, a HAP is an airship or an endurance aircraft capable of flying at an 
altitude of around 20km. This is above any current normal aircraft but 
significantly below stratospheric satellites. The case study was initiated during 
the latter stages of the research. The main motivation was to establish an overall 
dependability case about the use of the HAP and the accompanying systems 
required for the required scenarios. The methodologies presented in the thesis 
have been presented and explained to the HAP stakeholders. The HAP case 
study has been a very effective means of supporting the evaluation, because it is 
developed in collaboration with individuals with no safety engineering 
background. This allowed the author to examine how easily the concepts can be 
understood and applied by someone unfamiliar to safety cases -a founding 
concept underlying the approach presented in this thesis. The case study offered 
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evidence for the clarity of the concepts as well as the sufficiency of detail of the 
methods. Moreover, the case study offered a platform of evaluation which 
demonstrated all the characteristics of a typical System of Systems, whilst being 
considerably different to the Network Centric Warfare examples. 
7.2 Evaluation of the Contributions 
In this section the contributions are examined individually. The discussion that follows 
is based on feedback received from the application of the means of evaluation as 
described in section 2. 
7.2.1 Evaluation of Dependability Deviation Analysis (Chapter 
4) 
Dependability Deviation Analysis advocates a philosophy of examining potential 
deviations from the perspective of each dependability attribute. Furthermore it 
introduces the concept of the dependability profile, which is used as a 'stepping stone' 
for the specification of acceptable dependability contracts used in the assurance process 
(construction of the case). Application of the methodology results in identification of 
credible deviations and their resultant failure conditions that can compromise the 
stakeholders' objectives, as well as a dependability profile for each of the system model 
elements that were analysed. DDA can also be graphically represented in a failures 
map which is automatically generated from the metamodel instance. 
An important aspect of DDA is the definition of concepts common to all dependability 
attributes, namely issues, concerns, failure conditions and system element. The purpose 
of these concepts was to provide gencralisations for concepts specific to individual 
attributes. Furthermore their associations were defined as part of the mctamodcl. The 
representation of the concepts of failure conditions and system elements were swiftly 
understood when presented to other individuals as part of working group meetings or 
during case studies. Comparatively, the concepts of issues and concerns proved to be 
more challenging to explain. These two concepts are more abstract than their equivalent 
attribute specific concepts such as security vulnerabilities and security breaches. 
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However, upon finiher elaboration, the differences as well as the purpose of each of the 
two concepts was recognised. Separation of concerns and issues makes a distinction 
between the ultimate interests of the stakeholders regarding overall system operation 
(i. e. concerns), and the properties of the system design that could lead to these concerns. 
Comments received also suggested the specification of templates of typical issues that 
could be defined and reused during the analysis of similar systems. The usefulness of 
this was explicitly highlighted during the HAP case study, in which the set of concerns 
incorporated communication specific issues. 
All three case studies have extensively exercised the DDA method. DDA has proved to 
be very efficient in identifying the relationships between failure conditions. Application 
of deviations that were optimised to reveal issues particular to one dependability 
attribute, - resulted in the wider identification of failure conditions that compromised 
other attributes. Identified failure conditions can directly compromise the stakeholders' 
concerns, or they can be the cause of another failure condition already been identified. 
Comments received through peer review were positive, mostly concentrating on the 
usefulness of the failures map to capture and clearly record failures from multiple 
dependability viewpoints. Often the failures map revealed associations between 
dependability failures that otherwise would have been difficult to conceive. 
Dependability profiles capture the specification of behaviour required from a system 
element in order for the system as a whole to operate dependably. Dependability 
profiles were introduced in the framework as a means of facilitating partitioning of the 
argument modules of the dependability case, using GSN contracts. Dependability 
profiles can also potentially be used to aggregate specifications that were elicited with 
methodologies other than DDA. Finally, the dependability profile helped specifying the 
bounds of the goal. 
An important characteristic of the DDA method is that it is model independent. DDA 
has not been defined for use with a particular modelling framework. Instead, DDA is 
applied on, what is described in the metamodel as, system elements. This represents an 
entity of the system iffespectively of how it is modelled. In a few cases independence 
of the modelling framework was practically shown when transforming some system 
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models used in the case studies from one notation to another (e. g. from a MODAF 
specific notation to UML), without having to reapply the method. 
In conclusion, it is considered that evaluation of the DDA has been successful. The 
means of evaluation were applied extensively throughout the research and provided 
sufficient evidence. The methodology can offer a valuable perspective on typical issues 
regarding the dependability attributes, the concerns of the stakeholders, and how deviant 
behaviour of the system can affect the overall dependability of a system in its 
operational context. 
7.2.2 Evaluation of the Trade-off Methodology (Chapter 5) 
The Trade-Off Method (TOM) provides a qualitative approach for managing conflicting 
goals and arguing about trade-offs between goals. 
One of the significant contributions of TOM is the introduction of the bounds in GSN. 
The bounds consist of a target and limit, which constitute the acceptability criteria of 
the goal and signify the region in which the goal could be tradcd-off against another. 
During the initial stages of the research there was some scepticism about having to 
explicitly think about the bounds during the definition of a goal, i. e. before encountering 
an actual conflict. However, during the research the benefits of thinking about the 
bounds became clear. The worked examples and case studies showed that dcfining the 
bounds enables reasoning about the overall acceptable levels of dependability in system 
operation. Definition of bounds involves capturing and sharing the rationale of the 
requirements between the stakeholders. Moreover, their introduction provided a useful 
means for unambiguously separating the core intent of the goals from their acceptability 
criteria. 
During the definition of TOM, the use of numerical approaches for resolving trade-offs 
and in particular AHP was examined for its suitability to handling the trade-offs within 
a dependability case. TOM addresses the problems identified in numerical approaches 
by means of qualitative reasoning. Participants do not need to a priori prioritise the 
goals without considering the operational context of the system. Instead, the goals are 
traded according to the impact that a possible compromise will have on the operation of 
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the system. Willingness to trade-off helps in sharing of vieMMoints and reaching 
consensus between the stakeholders of the system. Willingness to trade-off was 
recognised in peer review as being both easy to understand and apply. Another quality 
of the method that received positive comments is the fact that it does not provide a 
definite solution but it deliberately seeks debate and argumentation when selecting an 
option. Creation of the GSN arguments provides a clear way of expressing the 
motivation for selection of one between two or more competing decisions. Furthermore 
it adds traceabilily to the dependability case, as the resultant GSN argument reflects all 
the steps of the method. 
One concern is scalability. Although TOM has worked acceptably well in the examples 
and case studies there is a concern with a major increase of competing objectives and 
alternatives. In such situations there may be occasions in which similarities between the 
alternatives make conclusion of an optimal decision difficult. Although such a problem 
was not encountered there are several suggestions for solving the problem such as 
further refinement of the willingness to trade-off categories. Although scalability may 
pose a challenge to TOM this is a shared concern for all of the reviewed trade-off 
methods. In numerical methods, scores close to each other make it difficult to 
appreciate the qualitative differences with respect to the system operation. Having 
scalability in mind the author, has written scripts for TOM which process decision 
alternatives and their related goals. The script generates a report in which the best 
option is identified and a list is produced showing the potential compromise and benefit 
from choosing an option other than the one identified as the best alternative. 
Overall, TOM provided an alternative means of managing and arguing about trade-offs, 
in the context of a dependability case. 
7.2.3 Evaluation of the Dependability Case Evolution and 
Architecture (Chapter 6) 
Chapter 6 presents contributions at three different levels. Firstly, it shows the links 
between the methods (DDA, FANDA, TOM and GSN) and how they collaborate in 
order to evolve a dependability case in parallel with system design. Secondly, it 
presents FANDA, a design rationale method developed to work with TOM. Finally, the 
chapter proposes a dependability case architecture. 
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FANDA has a dual purpose during the evolution of the dependability case. Firstly it is 
used to identify the features (factors) of the design that affect the required dependability 
goals. Thereby FANDA highlights the elements of the design on which the developers 
should focus. The second use of FANDA is to assist brainstorming, the creation of 
design alternatives, and recording design rationale. Identification of design factors and 
how they affect the required goals proved to be a useful tool during application of 
TOM. Conflicts between design alternatives can be traced to the underlying design 
factors that cause them. Furthermore, it provides an early assessment of the impact of 
design factors on the goals before committing to an actual decision. FANDA employs 
the six hats method which helps participants to manage information related to the 
identified factors and to brainstorm, identifying new design alternatives. Furthermore 
FANDA can also be used to manage the collection of evidence regarding the evaluation 
of the alternative with respect to the dependability goals. FANDA was applied on a 
number of examples and it was also applied during case studies. It helped to clearly 
reveal the design factors responsible for a goal conflict. This was rccognised during all 
forms of peer review and during application of the AGO case study. FANDA helped 
the participants in brainstorming alternatives. However, in the other case studies the 
system details were already finalised making application of FANDA less effective. 
Although the benefit from identifying sensitivity points in the design was clearly 
expressed, there was not adequate evidence to suggesting that use of FANDA resulted 
in proposing designs alternatives which otherwise would not have been conceived. 
The Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) was chosen to capture the core arguments of the 
dependability case. GSN proved to be a correct decision in terms of: 
9 Previous experience from use in safety cases 
* Appeal to peers and ease of use 
o Extensibility 
From an early stage in the research it was clear that creating a dependability case 
combining individual argument modules (using the features of modular GSN) was the 
most appropriate route. GSN modules provide a useful means of separating the 
dependability case into arguments corresponding to elements within the system 
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structure. GSN contracts help record how individual modules can be be composed to 
satisfy the overall objectives of the dependability case. Furthermore, modules make it 
possible to organise the dependability case in terms of the MODAF products. At the 
highest levels an argument was stated in context of the envisioned operation of the 
system, abstracting contextual information about system design. The proposed 
architecture for dependability cases was received positively both during case studies and 
peer review; especially the suggestion of a high level dependability argument focusing 
on the dependability qualities of interest to the stakeholders. This has been adopted as 
the starting point in other projects such as [ 10 1 ]. 
Additionally, the chapter provided a useful insight to the synergies between the 
proposed methodologies. Failures identified during dependability deviation analysis 
helped eliciting goals arguing about the acceptable behaviour of the system. The 
dependability profile was introduced as a means of capturing the requirements elicited 
during DDA without explicitly referring to DDA as this would result in weaker and 
more complicated arguments. The use of GSN contracts in conjunction with the 
dependability profile was accepted as being a viable solution constructing a 
dependability case. The argument modules that support the contracts as well as the 
profile of a SoS element, can potentially make clearer the decomposition of the 
dependability argument. 
The suggestions of this chapter have been subject to lengthy discussions during the 
research. Feasibility of the suggestions was demonstrated with examples and creation 
of arguments during case studies. Regarding the benefit from the contributions, some of 
the suggestions have been used by peers, however the ultimate evaluation in terms of 
benefit will only come with wider industrial application. 
7.2.4 Evaluation of the Metamodel 
The metamodel is an important contribution of the research. The metamodel provides 
formalisation as well as a concrete representation of the dependability case concepts and 
their associations. In terms of feasibility the metamodel was created using tools widely 
established in the modelling research community. The correctness of the mctamodel 
was achieved through numerous examples and application of case studies. For any 
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problems, ambiguities, or inefficiencies that were discovered the metamodel was 
changed appropriately. 
The benefit from the implementation of the metamodel was immediately apparent and 
significant. The metamodel introduces traceability in the dependability case by 
unambiguously defining the associations between the concepts. Furthermore, 
traceability at the instance of the metamodel, can clearly show the related elements that 
were produced during application of the methods. This allows the use of automated 
verification, processing and transformation of the model. For example, scripts were 
written the functions of which included verification that there are no errors in the model, 
and automatically producing a list of applicable deviations from a template including 
the dependability attributes of interest and a basic traceability model between the system 
elements on which the* deviation analysis was applied. Scripts accompanying the 
metamodel are a feature particularly useful regarding scalability. The industrial case 
study provided by BAE Systems produced a dependability case with approximately 
1,500 elements. Scripts provided an invaluable means of managing the elements of the 
case within reasonable time limits. Moreover the metamodel makes a solid starting 
point for creation of a tool that will incorporate the methods. A proof of concept 
exercise was attempted by the author to create a tool using the eclipse GMF framework. 
The results of the exercise were very encouraging and a very simple application was 
created, able to create and graphically represent simple GSN arguments. 
The metamodel proved a very successful means of communicating the proposed 
concepts, and positive comments as well as further interest regarding dependability 
cases echoed among all research peers. 
7.3 Evaluation of the Thesis Proposition 
The contributions were also assessed in ternis of the distinct characteristics of the thesis 
proposal, as highlighted in Chapter 1. 
Structured: The Dependability Case Metamodel extends GSN to incorporate all 
of the concepts and associations necessary to structure a dependability case. In 
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addition, step-by-step guidance has been established for each of the methods 
proposed. 
Evolving: Iterative collaboration between the methods allows the evolutionary, 
analysis, design rationale and development of the design and the dependability 
case. 
Systems of Systems: This is the type of systems predominantly used in the 
examples and case studies throughout the research. DDA and FANDA in 
particular have been shown to work with Systems of Systems descriptions 
provided using the MODAF framework. The research has also shown how it is 
possible to use the modelling structure provided by MODAF products to 
organise and present a modular Systems of Systems dependability case. 
Unifiled: Definition of the metamodel was particularly successful in bringing 
together the concepts and associations underlying the proposed methods. As a 
result, when working on any element of the dependability case (e. g. a goal or a 
dependability concern) it is possible to clearly identify its association with other 
elements. 
e Flexible: Flexibility was introduced by stating the dependability goals in the 
context of bounds of acceptability. Encouraging developers to think about 
flexibility from the early stages of the design is a necessary activity effective in 
supporting trade-offs between goals. 
Facilitating resolution of trade-offs: TOM systematically identifies potential 
trade-offs between dependability goals, enabling their resolution through a 
process of debate and argumentation. 
Argumentation: Using GSN as the underlying argumentation approach, the 
framework presented encourages the development of 'primary' dependability 
arguments, together with arguments concerning the rationale behind the 
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dependability goals as stated (e. g. concerning the bounds of acceptability) and 
justifying the optimality of the trade-offs made. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions and Future Work 
8.1 Overall Conclusions 
This thesis has presented an integrated approach for managing and evolving 
dependability cases. The contributions of this thesis can be surnmarised as follows: 
Definition of a dependability requirements elicitation technique. Dependability 
Deviation Analysis (DDA) is the proposed method, documented in Chapter 4. 
Systematic management, analysis and justification of trade-offs resulting from 
competing dependability objectives. The Trade-Off Methodology (TOM) is the 
proposed method presented in Chapter 5. 
Support for the evolutionary development and architecting of dependability 
cases in parallel with system design processes and structures. The Factors 
Analysis and Decision Alternatives (FANDA) method, together with a proposed 
architecture for the dependability case, are documented in Chapter 6. 
Definition of the Dependability Case Metamodel (DCM) that rigorously 
captures the associations between the concepts inherent in dependability cases. 
The technical approach taken to define the metamodcl is presented in Chapter 3. 
The complete mctamodel can be found in Appendix C. 
This chapter discusses how the contributions presented in this thesis support the 
proposition stated in Chapter 1, and discusses areas of future work. 
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8.1.1 Conclusions on Dependability Deviation Analysis 
Chapter 4 discusses how safety analyses are used to analyse the system and elicit 
requirements during each stage of the system lifecycle. Dependability Deviation 
Analysis (DDA) is a method for the analysis and elicitation of dependability 
requirements, optimised for the SoS paradigm. DDA extends existing well established 
deviation-based safety analysis techniques. It includes a number of novel concepts. 
DDA allows participants to explore how deviations - established from the perspective 
of one dependability attribute - can impact the achievement of other attributes. DDA 
introduces the concept of failure maps to explicitly document and visualise these 
associations. Creation of failure maps relies upon the underlying traceability between 
system models. Although this can be found in some safety analysis techniques (e. g. 
Hip-Hops [105]), DDA has been optimiscd for models representing SoS behaviour 
(specifically MODAF). Finally, DDA includes checks for distinguishing the 'end' 
requirements - requirements of primary interest to the stakeholders - from the 'means' 
requirements - requirements that are contributing factors in achieving the former. 
8.1.2 Conclusions on the Trade-Off Method 
The Trade-Off Method (TOM), documented in Chapter 5 is a methodology for 
systematic identification of trade-offs, facilitating the production of arguments 
justifying the associated decisions. The arguments produced provide essential context 
for the development of the dependability case. A distinct characteristic of TOM is the 
adoption of qualitative, rather than quantitative, reasoning. Moreover, TOM introduces 
the concept of flexible requirements, considered necessary to enable trade-offs to be 
made. Whilst inspired by elements of the ALARP principle, TOM allows examination 
of trade-offs between multiple dependability attributes (in contrast to the safety - cost 
trade-offs made in the ALARP framework). 
8.1.3 Conclusions on the Dependability Case Evolution 
Chapter 6 describes how a GSN based dependability case can be developed in parallel 
to the system design. In the six-step method for constructing arguments using GSN 
developers are encouraged to identify and document the strategies they have used in 
argument decomposition. However, it provides little guidance on how strategies are 
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identified. FANDA focuses on brainstorming and gradual elicitation of design rationale 
in order to identify possible decision alternatives. Although FANDA is presented in the 
context of SoS configuration decisions, experience from its application shows potential 
for its use in other domains. Moreover, the chapter discussed the collaboration of the 
proposed methods in order to establish a dependability case. Finally, a dependability 
case architecture is presented that integrates the outputs of the proposed methods. 
8.1.4 Conclusions on the Dependability Case Metamodel 
At present there is no established metamodel for assurance cases. Existence of a 
rigorous metamodel that captures the concepts of the assurance cases domain can 
deliver a number of benefits. Most importantly, it offers a common vocabulary and 
consensus on the concepts involved in the task of assurance case development and their 
semantics. Recently, there has been increasing interest in this subject. In particular, the 
Object Management Group will shortly be issuing a Request for Proposals for an 
assurance case metarnodel. 
8.2 Revisiting the Dependability Case Roadmap 
Chapter I described a number of the challenges that exist in establishing a dependability 
case for Systems of Systems. The following challenges were introduced: 
1. Multiple dependability attributes 
2. Allocation and apportionment of requirements 
3. Conflicting requirements 
4. Changing requirements 
5. Traceability 
6. Interaction of case and design 
7. Ownership of the dependability case 
As stated in Chapter 1, this research specifically targeted a number of these challenges, 
namely 1,2,3,5 and 6. The work presented in this thesis has made the following 
contributions with respect to the targeted challenges: 
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8.2.1 Multiple Dependability Attributes 
Interaction of dependability attributes is identified during DDA, in which failure 
conditions are associated, thereby identifying how the operation of the SoS from the 
perspective of one attribute can affect the operation of the SoS from the perspective of 
other dependability attributes. Requirements regarding all of the attributes of interest 
for a specific SoS element are collated using the dependability profile. Dependability 
profiles are used to structure the architecture of the dependability case. The proposed 
dependability case architecture does not simply merge heterogeneous attributes (an 
approach identified to be problematic). Using the traceability mechanism introduced by 
the rigorous definition of all associations between the dependability case concepts, 
reviewers of the case can. trace an overall dependability case (GSN) goal to the 
requirement within the dependability profile for a given SoS element, and the attribute 
of interest with which the goal is associated. 
8.2.2 Allocation and Apportionment of Requirements 
Allocation and apportionment of requirements is an activity that takes place during 
DDA. Initially the system stakeholders identify their overall concerns with regard to 
the system's operation. Following that, using guidcwords, the design of the system is 
prompted to identify how deviating from the intended operation (with respect to a 
dependability attribute) can affect the overall operation of the system. Accordingly, 
appropriate requirements are derived for each system clement. However, the methods 
proposed in this thesis do not explicitly handle negative emergent behaviour of SoS. 
DDA allows engineers to hypothesise deviations and map the causal relationships 
between failure conditions. However, negative emergent behaviour can arise even 
when no deviations have occurred (e. g. through the composition of individual systems' 
normal behaviour). 
8.2.3 Conflicting Requirements 
The Trade-Off Method allows stakeholders to examine their requirements - identifying 
and justifying the extent to which compromise of their requirements can be tolcratcd. 
TOM allows stakeholders to exchange views concerning the preference of one design 
alternative over another, as well as helping establish the rationale for the chosen option. 
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After applying the method stakeholders will have established a justification for the 
trade-off made (communicated through a structured argument) which can then be used 
to support the dependability case. 
8.2.4 Traceability 
The Dependability Case Metamodel was defined as a means of documenting the 
associations between the contributions of this thesis. It provides traceability between 
the concepts used in this thesis that contribute to establishing a dependability case. In 
particular, methods that support the trade-offs and evolution of the dependability case. 
By instantiating the metamodel (instances of) fully traceable dependability cases arc 
created. Having an underlying metamodel allows the (instantiated) models to be fully 
navigable. Moreover, with the help of modelling management tools, certain aspects of 
dependability case evolution can be automated. 
8.2.5 Interaction between System and Case Development 
This thesis has defined how the proposed methods can be used in combination to 
support the evolution of a dependability case, alongside the decision-making processes 
of system development. FANDA facilitates the evolution of the case and system, by 
capturing how features of proposed decision alternatives will affect the goals of the 
system. Documenting these observations FANDA facilitates further clicitation of 
design alternatives and identification potential improvements to existing alternatives. 
Moreover, the various interfaces between the stages of the (proposed) methods are 
captured describing and documenting their collaboration during evolution of the 
dependability case. Finally the products of the proposed methods are related with the 
dependability case product (describing how they are used in the final dependability 
case), resulting in an architecture for a dependability case. 
8.3 Areas of Further Work 
During the course of the research reported in this thesis, some possible directions for 
future work, improving the proposed concepts have been identified: 
e Extending the library of issues and deviations 
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o Determining assurance levels in dependability cases 
* Dependability cases in the presence of change 
e Socio-technical issues concerning flexible requirements and trade-offs 
These areas are discussed ftuther in the following sub-sections. 
8.3.1 Extending the Library of Issues and Deviations 
During the development of DDA, a number of typical issues were identified for 'key' 
dependability attributes that were applicable across a wide range of domains. However 
case studies, in particular the HAP case study, identified a number of domain specific 
dependability issues that needed to be considered. Moreover, deviations have been 
optimised alongside models that feature particular characteristics capable of exploring 
dependability concerns. Further study of domains and cataloguing of related issues, as 
well as incorporation of other model frameworks such as SysML, could expand the 
applicability of DDA. 
8.3.2 Determining Assurance Levels in Dependability Cases 
Dependability case arguments are, and will be, inherently subjective - relying upon 
inductive reasoning. This thesis has demonstrated how we can capture claims regarding 
the acceptability of a system. An important facet of argumentation is the degree of 
assurance with which these claims are made. Work done by Weaver ct al. [106] 
demonstrates how assurance levels can be incorporated in argumentation. Applying this 
to the dependability case is a potentially useful way forward enhancing the framework 
proposed in this thesis. In particular, it would be interesting to explore the relationship 
between the newly introduced concepts of GSN 'bounds' and the determination and 
achievement of assurance levels. As defined currently, bounds identify the limits of an 
acceptable solution in terms of achievement claims, without considering the degree of 
assurance of those claims. There will be a relationship between these two concerns. 
For example, a stronger claim, closer to the parent goal's target, may be more weakly 
assured that a claim closer to the parent goal's limit. 
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8.3.3 Dependability Cases in the Presence of Change 
One of the characteristics identified for System of Systems is that they often include re- 
configuration. This means that the assumptions and context regarding the SoS may 
change. A dependability case based on these assumptions and context will be called 
into question following re-configuration. It will be unrealistic to expect complete rc- 
evaluation of a dependability case following every change to a SoS configuration. In 
this thesis a modular dependability case architecture has been proposed that will 
potentially allow changes to the dependability case to be bounded and limited to only 
affected parts. In addition, the concept in this thesis of establishing dependability 
profiles that capture the required characteristics of system elements could help support 
change by enabling substitutions of system elements with matching characteristics. 
However, ftirther work is required to explore how a dependability case architectcd in 
accordance with the principles in this thesis will cope with realistic change scenarios 
(and potentially timescales). 
8.3.4 Socio-technical Issues Concerning Flexible Requirements 
and Trade-offs 
Whilst it is accepted that conflicts and trade-offs are inevitable, it is not current 
subcontracting practice to contract elements of the system using flexible requirements. 
There is a general belief that adopting such an approach would require a framework for 
ensuring that suppliers have made 'genuine' trade-offs, not simply aiming for the 
minimum acceptable system. Moreover, the significant of trade-off decisions needs to 
be related to authority to make such decisions. An example where this is demonstrated 
is shown in the U. S. MIL-STD-882C [107]. In this standard the higher the residual 
safety risk the higher authority is required for ultimate sign-off and approval. 
8.4 Final Remarks 
The concept of a dependability case may initially be perceived as a straightforward 
extension of the well established concept of a safety case. However, this thesis has 
shown that the concept brings with it a number of new challenges, primarily concerned 
with the management of the interrelationships that exist between dependability 
attributes. These challenges are particularly apparent in the operation of Systems of 
Systems, where the problem becomes one of configuring a network of interoperating 
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systems in such a way as to address the dependability objectives associated with the 
overall concept of operation. Through the methods presented in this thesis we have 
begun to address these challenges. The methods defined support the systematic 
development of a dependability case - from the initial identification of dependability 
objectives, the management of trade-offs, and the evolution of the case in step with the 
configuration of Systems of Systems. However, a number of challenges remain in 
establishing the dependability case concept for System of Systems. Questions still exist, 
for example, concerning the overall ownership of the Systems of Systems dependability 
case, and the sustainability of the concept in the presence of rapidly changing 
requirements and system configurations. The work presented in this thesis provides a 
framework within which these, and other, issues can continue to be explored. 
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Appendix A 
Overview of the ARP 4761 
Safety is a system property, the achievement of which has a crucial contribution to the 
system's final acceptance. Due to its importance, safety should be methodically 
analysed along the system lifecycle. A number of standards and recommended 
practices define the processes and the objectives of the safety lifecycle. 
The civil aerospace guidance document ARP 4761 provides a comprehensive guide of 
safety analysis for airborne systems [70]. ARP 4761 suggests the following activities 
during a system's lifecycle: Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHI), Functional Hazard 
Assessment (FHA), Preliminary System Safety Analysis (PSSA) and System Safety 
Analysis (SSA). The safety lifecycle takes place in parallel with the system lifecycle 
providing appropriate feedback, according to the design information available, during 
the evolution of the system. The FHA is a process that takes place at the beginning of 
the system development cycle. The purpose of the FHA is to identify and classify the 
failure conditions that are associated with the system functions or with combinations of 
system functions. The rationale for the classification of the failure conditions is 
specified by taking into account the risk of each condition, justifying the classification 
based on the severity of the failure. Furthermore FHA examines failure conditions 
involving multiple functions as well as multiple systems, which is conducted fault tree 
analysis (FTA) at function and system level respectively. 
PSSA is conducted interactively with the design of a system and it is used to complete 
the failure conditions list and elicit detailed safety requirements for each of the 
participating systems and subsystems. PSSA extends FHA and uses the conclusions of 
the FHA to further explore how the individual systems can contribute to the identified 
failure conditions. PSSA uses fault trees to identify how possible single or combination 
of system of function failures can affect the assessed failure conditions during the FIIA. 
The PSSA results to detailed safety requirements for the system which are examined 
and design strategies are proposed for their achievement. 
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Fig. A. 1 - ARP 4761 Steps within the V-Lifecycle 
Fig. A. 1 presents Pumfi-ey's adaptation of the V-1ifecycle model [761 including tile main 
safety activities during the development of a system, such PSSA and SSA which are 
also described in ARP 4761. A prominent feature of the diagram is the clear association 
of the safety activities and the system design activities. The proposed safety lifecycic 
model is nearly identical to what is described in ARP 4761. Fig. A. 2 shows in cxcerpt 
from ARP 4761 that has been abstracted to highlight the relation between function 
analysis and system specification with extraction of general and systcin specific 
requirements during the development of a system. Initially identification ofthe overall 
safety objectives of the system with respect to its overall functionality and the 
ftinctionality of the identified systems (FIIA & System FIIA) takes place. 
Understanding of how the individual systems contribute to the overall functionality of' 
the platforril (i. e. aircraft) is essential in order to apportion specific requirements to each 
of the systems. FHA and system level FFIA are followed by PSSA, which involves 
identification of the proposed detailed design of the system. 
During PSSA the identified failure conditions in FIIA and system FIJA are evaluated 
against the proposed design, which may result in altering the design in order to improve 
the overall safety levels. SSA takes place during the evaluation ofthe system and (lie 
main purpose to complete the safety assessment with verification that the requirements 
set during FIIA and PSSA have been achieved. 
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Fig. A. 2 - The ARP 4761 Processes 
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The civil aerospace guidance document ARP 4761 provides a compreliensivc guide ot 
safety assessment analysis for airborne systems [70]. ARP 4761 stiggcsts thc f(fliowing 
activities during a system's lifecycle: Functional Hazard Asscssinclit (FIIA), 
Preliminary System Safety Analysis (PSSA) and System Safety Malysis (SSA). 
Fig. A. 3 presents a schematic of how the safety analysis stages arc associated with tile 
system lifecycle. 
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Fig. A. 3 - Safety Analyses During System Lifecycle 1701 
FUJA considers the aircraft functions and idcntifics I'ailurc conditions i-clatcd to dicin. 
The participants during FIIA are required to evaluate the consequences of'cach I'aililre 
condition and assign probability target according to the severity of' cach Cadure 
condition. Taking into account the contribution of' the aircraft systcnis to thc overall 
aircraft functions, analysts specify safety objectives l'or the constituent systems ol'each 
function. Table. A. 1 shows an excerpt from ARP 4761 FIIA, in which thc breaking 
function (whilst on ground) of a passenger aircraft is evaluated with 1-espect to a set of' 
possible failure conditions. 
FIIA is followed by PSSA which is described by ARP 4761 as "a sYstematic 
examination qf the proposed system architecture to determine how. /ai/jjj-cýv c-in, lea(l to 
thejýnctional hazards identýfied b. v the Functional HazardAssessinent (h'11, A), and how 
the FHA requirements can be met". Finally the SSA is a confirmatory analysis, which 
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takes place at the end of the system lifecycle, verifying that the safety targets that were 
finalised during PSSA have been met. 
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Description) / Crew 
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a. Unannunciated Landing Crew is unable to Catastrophic SIX Aircraft 
loss of Deceleration /RTO decelerate the aircraft, I'aultTree 
Capability resulting in a high 
speed overrun 
b. Annunciated loss Landing Crew selects a more I la/ardous S18 Aircial"I 
of Deceleration suitable airport, notifies kitilt free 
Capability emergency ground 
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occupants for landing 
overrun 
C. Unannunciated Taxi Crew is unable to stop Major 
loss of Deceleration the aircraft on the taxi 
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in low speed contact 
with terminal, aircraft 
or vehicles. 
d. Annunciated loss Taxi Crew steers the aircraft No safely 
of Deceleration clear of' any obstacles eftect 
Capability and calls for a tog or 
portable stairs 
Purnfrcy [76] classifies the analysis techniques according to the arnount ofinforniation 
available during the system's fifecycle, about the ldcritified 1111lure with respect to 
causes and effects. Hence the causes and effects ofa failure can be unknown, pro jectcd 
and known. Fig. A. 4 shows how each of the analysis stages described in ARP 4761 can 
contribute into increasing the information about tile design. At the beginning of' the 
system's lifecycle exploratory analyses are employed to identify system failures that 
constitute possible hazards. During this stage of' the systern's 111ecycle, the causes as 
well as the effects are unknown. At this stage analysts extrapolate possible effects 
based on the preliminary studies of the design and early identification ofhazards. As 
the analysis methods are applied on the gradually evolving design, the confidence about 
the causes and effects increases. 
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Fig. A. 4 - Failure Information During System Lifecycle 
Exploratory analyses assist in considering possible IallUres and eliciting requirements 
about the system. In specific, after the completion of PSSA the requirements should be 
clear and complete and the involved stakeholders should be able to understand tile 
rationale for their elicitation. For example in ARP 4761 the IISSA identifies how cach 
individual system contributes in achieving the functions analysed in F1 IA (Table. 3.1 ). 
The achievement of the design to satisfy the requirements is shown by employing 
confinnatory analysis. SSA is the phase ofthe lifecycle, during which tile design has 
reached a mature and enough detailed stage, can be used to identify with certainly 
weather the safety requirements have been met. Starting from known causes and effects 
confirmatory analysis takes place verifics the requirements and the proJectcd salety 
levels specified in during the earlier stages of tile safety analysis. Ideally, both tile 
causes and effects of a deviation in the intended system operation should be known at 
the end of the safety lifecycle. 
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Appendix B 
Overview of MODAF and the AGO 
Scenario 
Thc emergence of concepts such as the Network Centric Warfare (DoD) and the 
Network Enabled Capability (Mol)) has resulted in highlighting many aspects, 
necessary for their intended operation of a system. Analysis and design evolution of 
such systems required a concrete framework which could be used to communicate 
architectures as well as their intended operation. The US Department of Defence 
proposed an architecture framework (DODAF) to be used by all the different 
stakeholders to represent their concerns, during the system's entire lifecycle. In this 
document we present how the methodologies and descriptions provided by the DoD and 
MoD can be used to model a system, by illustrating the Anti Guerrilla Operations 
(AGO) scenario, as presented in the strand 2 examples. 
1. Overview 
DODAF is used to "define a common approach for DoD architecture description 
development, presentation, and integration for both war fighting operations and 
business operations and processes". DODAF has evolved over the years from 
fmmc-A, orks that were used by individual bureaus within the US Dol), initially resulting 
in the C41SR Architecture Framework [21]. The framework consists of several 
products organiscd in views, which when used will ultimately describe the complete 
operation of the system. DODAF products arc organiscd in three main views: 
Operational, Systems and Technical, accompanied by a fourth view used as reference 
and to maintain consistency between the other views, called the All-Vicws (Table. B. 1 
surnmariscs the DODAF products). 
NIODAF is the equivalent architecture framework dcfincd by the UK ministry of 
dcfcncc. NIoD has tailored DODAF to its needs with the addition of the stratcgic and 
the acquisition vic%%-s. Tablc. BI presents the products of the additional MODAF vicws. 
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Overviewof the DODAF Products and VjeýNrS 
NI OV I 
(Operational) 
SV 
(Systems) 
II igh-Leý el Systems Interface I ksci iption I echnicai (A CI ý lcký alld 
Operational Concept Standards Profile Summary 
Graphic Information 
Operational Node Systems Communications Technical Integrated 
Connectivity Description Standards Dictionary 
Description Forecast 
Operational Systems-Systems Matrix - 
hif'ormation Exchange 
Matrix 
Organisational Systems Functionality - 
Relationships Chart Description 
Operational Activity Operational Activity to - 
Model Systems Function Traceability 
Matrix 
a) Operational Rules Systems Data Exchange - 
Model Matrix 
b) Operational State - - 
Transition Description 
c) Operational Event- - - 
Trace description 
Logical Data Model Systems Performance - 
Parameters Matrix 
- Systems volution Description - 
- Systems Technology Forecast - 
- a) Systems Rules Model - 
- b) Systems State Transition - 
Description 
- 0 Systems Event-Trace - 
Description 
Physical Schema 
Table. 13.2 - NIODAF Addition 
Stv 
(Strategic View) 
Strategic Capability Vision - 
al Views 
AcV 
(Acquisition VI 
SoS Acquisition ( hitci,, 
Capability Functions SoS Acquisition Prograninics 
Capability Phasing 
SoS lustcrs 
Capability to Systems D cployment M 
2. DODAF Modelling notations and Frameworks 
DODAF is intended to provide the common grounds flor description of' architectures. 
DODAF does not include any specific modelling methodologies/notations. Instead, it 
provides descriptions of what inforination the products at each stage of the systern's 
lifecycle should capture. 
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This provides DODAF with the flexibility to use any model that can satisfactorily 
address all the issues that are required for each of the products. UML is tile modelling 
language most commonly used to model DODAF products, even though there arc 
problems to overcome, mainly due to the fact that there is no definite way to model the 
DODAF products in UML. 
The DODAF and MODAF as well as other studies (e. g. [90]), Suggest UML models that 
can be employed to represent the DODAF/MODAI, ' products. Table. 13.3 presents the 
products and the UML models that can be employed to construct them. 
Table. B. 3 - Representation of DODAF/iNIODAF Products in UNIL 
[DI: DODAFTechnical Specification, I MI MODAFTechnical Spec i fical i on, 
[T]: Telelogic's white paper on modelling N('W and NIC 
"Ipability Vision n/a (ftee l'orniat) 
Capability <(Capability>> Stereotyped Class 
hinctions 
Capability Phasing n/a 
, ýoS Clusters <<CapabilitV>) Stereotyped Class with Depcildencies 
Capability to Stereotyped classes representing <<Systems>> can be overlaid on a 2- 
'--;, ys, tenis 1) (X, Y) table representing capabilities (X) and organis. ations (Y). 
Deployment 
Mapping 
Capability n/a (tabular form) 
hinction to 
Operational 
iI ig li Level n/a (free forni) [ 1) M 
( )perational 
Concept Class or use case diagram & graphics [T] 
Operational Need Collaboration diagrams ID] 
Connectivity 
I )escription Composite (Stereotyped) Structured Diagram [M], [T] 
Operational n/a [D], [M] 
Information 
Exchange Matrix UML report queries [T] 
Organisational Class diagram using actor icon I D] 
Relationships Chart 
Class diagram [M], [T] 
Operational Operational activity diagram with object flows & actors 
Activity Model representing nodes [D], [M], [T] 
Operational Rules n/a (free text), post and pre conditions and OUL can be applied on 
Model use cases [D], [M], J] 
Operational State Statecharts [D], [M], [T] 
Transition 
Description 
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ON'6c Operational Event Sequence diagram [D], [M], [T] 
Trace Description 
ON'7 Logical Data Class diagram [D], [M], Fri 
- 
Model 
7 
Svi Systems Interface Deployment diagrams [D] 
Description 
Class diagram using stereotypes [M] 
Composite structure diagram [T] 
Systems n/a however could be modelled using deployment & component 
Communications diagrams denoting the cornmunications links 11) 1 
Dcscription 
SysML (UML 2) [M] 
Composite Structure Diagram [T] 
'ý; Ystenls-systenls n/a, tabular form [ 1) M 
\Iatrix 
DOORS traceability view [T] 
Systems Use cases, classes and class operations 11) M 
I'LIFICtionality 
Description Activity diagram with object flows ['rj 
Operational n/a however can be gathered from OV-5 and SV-4. <<Include>) 
Activity to Systems relationships. [1)], [M] 
I unctionality 
I raceability Matrix DOORS traceability view [T] 
'ýYstems Data n/a [M], however the matrix product expands on the int'orniation 
I xchange Matrix associated with SV-I systems, SV-4 use cases, and system data 
flows [131. 
tJML model queri es [ I'] 
Systems 11/a 11)], [M] 
11crformance 
Parameters Matrix UML model queries [T] 
'ýystems Evolution n/a [all] 
Description 
1ýystems n/a [all] 
echnology 
orecasts 
'-, 'ystems Rules Pre, post conditions on classes of'SV-4 JDJ, OCL I MI 
Model 
Text ['F] 
Systerns State Statechart [D], [M I, ["F] 
1'raiisition 
Description 
I Systems Event Sequence diagram [D], IMI, [T] 
['race Description 
WMA Iý Physical Sc ema Class diagram [D], [M], [T] 
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3. Evolution and Model Dependencies 
The MODAF and DODAF technical specification do not provide defitute gm(felliles 
regarding the stage of the lifecycle that each of the products should be constructed. 
Each of the products can be used at any stage of the system liflecycle ifit's useful for tile 
concerned stakeholders. However there are examples of suggested use of' the models. 
The department of navy use the Architecture Definition Process Management which 
defines 432 tasks and their interdependencies. MODAF acquisition community of' 
interest handbook suggests a set of products for requirements management during the 
CADMID [109] lifecycle, shown in Fig. B. I. Furthermore the DODAF deskbook gives 
a data-centric perspective in which the data is developed and orgamscd to continually 
add layers of complexity to the description of the enterprise, creating intcgrated 
architectures (shown in Fig. 13.2). 
User Reouirenients Document 
" StV6, Capability Functions to Operational Mapping (Concept) 
" OVI, High Level Operational Concept (Concept) 
" OV2, Operational Node Connectivity Description (Assessment) 
" OV3, Operational Information Exchange Nlatrix (Assessment) 
" OV5, Operational Activity Model (Assessment) 
" TVI, Technical Standards Profile (Assessment) 
Svstcm Requirements Document 
" OV7, Logical Data Model (Assessment) 
" SVI, Systems Interface Description (Assessment) 
" SV3, Systems - Systems Matrix (Assessment) 
" SV4, Systems Functionality Description (Assessment) 
" SV2, Systems Communication Description (Assessmeno 
" SV6, Systems Data Exchange Matrix (Assessment 
" SV7, Systems Performance Parameters Matrix (Assessment) 
" TV1, Technical Standards Profile (Assessment) 
Fig. B. 1 - MODAF Requirements Documents 
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\\ Operatimul/ 
OV-3 Iýiov Prothicts 
(:::; 
D 
------\----------- --------------------------------iI 
'Ww'"Is 
SV4 svio Vlcýi Produas 
svi 
SV5 
According to Fig. 13.2 the development ofthe products is oriented around tile definition 
of the operational activity diagram (OV5) and the mapping of' those activities onto 
individual systems (SV5). The two views have three main 'design areas' with which 
they are linked. The first represents the functions of the system and their activities and 
how these are mapped onto individual systems. The second refers to tile data and 
entities that need to be used and how the systerns represents the defined entities and use 
the identified data. Finally the third area involves conirmin icati oils and in general links 
that need to be established in order for the system to perform the specified functions. 
Using the MODAF metamodel Fig. 13.3 presents the common classes between the 
products according to how their relations as indicated in Fig. B. 2. Identit, ying the 
common classes between two products can help the analysts understand the system 
element shared by the two products. 
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As it can be seen in Fig. B. 2, the identification of the products is not representative of 
the order in which they are defined (always from a data centric perspective). The main 
activities for specifying the system in DODAF are shown in the following table along 
with their respective products. 
Table. B. 4 - DODAF Development Process 
Development of0pera tional View 
Obtain/ build an operational concept OV I 
Document the business process OV5 
Document business rules associated with the OV5 must be updated OV6 
business process accordingly 
Aggregate activities into operational nodes OV2 
Develop logical data model OV7 
Determine information exchange requirements OV3 
Identify organisation types that will perform OV4 
the activity associated with the nodes 
Assign organisations and physical locations to Using OV4 and OV2, update OV3 
o erational nodes and activities 
ýý I 
OV3 
0 ýý 
Identify physical node locations Useftil to determine 
communications asset 
availability 
Identify and characterise available systems in 
terms of owners, system functions and 
perfon-nance 
Based on the operational activities deten-nine Requires OV5 SV5 
tile requires system functions 
Define the relationship among systems and Requires SV5 SV4 
functions 
Develop the physical data model Should be done before SV6 SVI I 
Determine systems' behaviour SVIO 
Assign systems and other interfaces to the Requires OV2 SVI 
Operational Facilities (OPFACS) 
Map information exchange requirements into Requires OV3 SV6 
candidate systems 
Develop systems communications description SV2 
Identify hardware and software performance SV7 
parameters 
Describe system to system relationships Requires SV6 and SV I SV3 
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4. The Anti Guerrilla Operations (AGO) Scenario 
The Anti Guerrilla Operations (AGO) is a hypothetical scenario, in which the army 
forces (in this case air force, artillery and Special Forces) collaborate, based on 
paradigms described by the concepts of NCW and NEC, to suppress guerrilla operations 
in a hostile territory. The case study includes example products for the operational view 
and two of the system view products (SV4 & SV5). The systems view was not 
developed in full due to the detailed technical knowledge that it requires. The 
operational view and products 4 and 5 from the systems view are adequate to 
demonstrate the logical links and traceability between the DODAF products when 
developing an integrated architecture. 
OV I High Level Operational Concept 
The following figure shows a schematic of the overall concept of operations during the 
AGO scenario as described in [I 101. 
UAV Scout 
Theatre Command 
Long-range 
Artillery 
Troop-carrying 
Helicopter,,, 
Fig. B. 4 - AGO OV I 
Guerrilla 
Enemy 
According to the scenario guerrilla activity is identified by unmanned vehicles 
patrolling the hostile area. Artillery is used to weaken the enemy defences allowing 
transport and attack helicopters to transport and support Special Forces in order to 
neutralise the guerrilla teams. 
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OV5 Operational Activity Diagram 
The suggested way to model OV5 is by using activity diagrams. Activity diagrams 
model the flow of events. This way the system behaviour captured in OV-1 can be 
further analysed, without showing any detail about the implementation and structure of 
the system. 
0 
Initiate Mission 
upon initiation of mission, 
a 
1. UAVstake off 3. 
ýSet-up 
Stand-by forces it not kno*n W)ether 
enem y forces vWl be 
detected. 
2. U AVs m owe to the enemy area 4. P atro I Area 14e-- 
6. Suppress [Enemy Ater mwAng troops 
to the theatre of 
operations, the helicopters 
5. Transport Special Forces ------------ join am my suppression 
N 
7. Deplane SF 
N Lim ber s =i 'Aties 
are for traceability 
not specizic: on of 9. E ngage E nem y 
sequence 
Fig. B. 5 - AGO OV5 
OV6 Operational Rules Model 
Having defined the activities that take place to complete the mission, OV6 is defined 
which provides a detailed view of mission, including events and messages between the 
mission entities. As part of OV6 the collaboration diagram for the AGO scenario is 
provided. 
Ater rnwAng troops 
to the theatre of 
operations, the helicopters 
join enemy suppression 
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UAVFlod: Iie I Iin I I'I 
Order Take Off 
send patrol area 
Yat rol Area 
loop(ever y5 sed) 0C, P(aV, sec) .1 1 
E 
nd ay position ý. se I; ,, 
Order mobillsation 6 
Dispatch to erýam y 
suppress enemy 
deplam 
,oS ecs) 
upd. 
ý 
map 
n 
- I 
I 
00p(i 0 secs) 
updat a map 
l0 sec*) 1 r ý 
, 1 
ý 
, 
. ........ . 
Fig. B. 6 - AGO OV6 
OV2 Operational Node Connectivity 
The suggested representation of this product is made with collaboration diagrams, 
identifying the entities within the system and the needlines, which show the information 
exchanges that exist between the participating entities. In the example presented 
instead of using a collaboration diagram strictly using UML, we have employed a use 
case to show the information dependencies between the different actors. Merely 
identifying the "needline links" between the system actors is not adequate to specify 
this product. We also need to specify what information will be 'carried' by the needline 
as well as the consumer and provider of the information. 
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-------------> Needline 1 
Needline 4 UAV Flock 
<------------------> 
Mission Control ý, -' 
Needline3 
Needline 7 
<-------- -- I 
Infantry 
Needline 2 
Arti He ry Needline 6 
Needline 5 
Helicopters 
Fig. B. 7 - AC .0 OV2 
I k(; () M .1 iNct-Alim 
D( ý( 1 11014,11) 
Information Exchange 
(Fuse)sensordata ' c 
I , 
UAV Hock "WISS1011contiol 
amet Area Tr ý Mission Control Helicopters 
is e nsor data ( I I le I icopters Mission control 
arget area Mission control Artillcry 
irget area Mission Control Infantry 
\1ap Mission Control Infantry 
luse) feedback Infantry Mission Control 
\Iap Mission Control I lelicopters 
1 irget area Mission Control I lelicopters 
(Fuse) feedback I lei icopters Mission Control 
Theatre Support i lelicopters lilf-Intry ' 
Target location I [ Art illcry 
OV2 is a view of particular interest as it specifies at the highest level the 
interconnections and sharing of information that is required by each of the SoS 
elements. This product can be very useful when conducting analysis associated with the 
safety or dependability of the system. Each of the needlines serves a purpose regarding 
the successful completion of the scenario. Identification of the criticality ofthe services 
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provided by each needline can help in understanding the required integrity tor system 
features such as data, communication links, and interfaces. 
OV7 Logical Data Modelling 
The Logical Data Modelling product describes the structure of the data types that are 
used by the system. Class diagrams identify the data types as well as the relationships 
between the entities. 
ý<0FOOF966400>> 
commands MSSION CONTROL 
-TheatreMap object 
-TargetArea obled 
-attribute-9. int 
-commandUnitMoyemerd 0. void 
+commandAttack(TargdAiea: TwgetArý). Yod 
. operati on_l 0 0, void 
T 
ISR 
<<"Cffp> 
UAV Flock 
-Localion. object 
. WaWoird objed 
-T argetArea oo ect 
-UAYSIstutobjed 
-updateSensomo void 
+updateMapo void 
+moveo vood 
+pagrol()Yotd 
+scanGroundo void 
+scwf nmronmerto. yoid 
commards ISR 
< <Urkit> > 
kwor*y 
, boardPlaneo. void 
+deboarcIC rat o Yoid 
+moyeo. void 
+attackArea (T argetAr ea: T argetAtea) void 
+updedeMap(y. yoid 
commands 
commands 
uniV- 
HE LICOPIERS 
o"rvsAon, > 
ARTILLIE RY 
-T&rgeIP4aa oblact 
-affackAteao void 
ISR 
-ovell v ands 
suppo" 
-attackAres(TorgetAtee. TorgetArea)yoid 
Comm 
Fig. B. 8 - ACO OV7 
SV5 Operational Activity to Systems Function Traceability Matrix 
SV5 is one of the products that provide a link between the opcratloilal and systems 
view. This is achieved by analysing the defined activity t1or the scenario (as described 
by OV5), identifying which system (or organisation) participate during each of' the 
activities. This allows determining how the individual entities contribute in achieving 
the overall functionality (or capability). SV5 cannot be specified only from the activity 
diagram, but it also requires knowledge of what functions each of the system call 
provide. Hence, based on the functions that a system provides the developers examine 
which systems contribute to an activity and how. An example Activity to Systems 
Function Matrix for the AGO scenario is presented below. The table also show a 
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possible decomposition of the Mission Control entity into two subsystems, one For 
decision making and the other responsible for communications and Fusing the received 
data. As more detail is added the class diagrams should be updated accordingly. 
I able. 11.6 X(A) S\"% 
C4 
g 
u 
l e m n-, 
UAV'I'ake-off x x X 
Guidance of UAVs x x x 
Set up of forces x x x x 
Patrol Enemy Area x 
Transport Special Forces x x 
Deplane Special Forces x x 
Suppress Enemy x x x 
Fuse infonnation 
I 
x x x x 
Engage Enemy x x 
SV4 Systems Functionality Description 
This product documents the functionality of the systems participating in the scenario. A 
use case provides a hierarchy of functionality showing the relationship between 
functionality using the <<include>> association. 
--on objectfus.. 
Noutrahme Eýy 
include 
rndude- 
include 
obled- 
DeOoynerd of Speml Forces 
Include dude Include 
Include 
mclude inducler 
--mislion obledrrre. - M= 
Transport Dp.. W F-: " 
... 3son cbled-. Maon obid--- 
Su Spe. 
ýa: 
lFw: 
D.. 
include include 
isswobledKe-- 
Patrol Hoitile Area 
Fig. B. 9 - AGO SV4 
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Furthermore a class diagram can be employed identifying the functions (methods) of 
each class, as well as the data flows in between them. Fig. B. 9 shows the use case 
diagram for this product. As class diagram the OV7 product can be used to depict the 
methods of each of the entities and their data interconnections. The class diagram 
abstracts detail of the exact data flow between the systems. 
5. Summary 
This section presents a brief exercise, the objective of which was to develop the AGO 
example according to DODAF, using UML as modelling basis. The main focus was on 
the operational view since it is the one in which the overall dependability operation of 
the system can be analysed, showing all the characteristics distinct to SoS such as 
geographic distribution, collaboration and data sharing. The operational view is the 
main view for requirements elicitation as it can be used to associate and analyse the 
system behaviour with the overall scenario objectives. Furthermore of particular 
interest is the decomposition of the SoS level to the individual systems (elements) level, 
which is achieved using the products SW and SV5 maintaining the traceability of 
requirements (functional and non-functional) to systems level. 
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Appendix C 
DCM & EOL Code 
The appendix presents the Dependability Case Metamodel as defined using KM3. 
Moreover some of the scripts are presented whish were used for the creation and 
analysis of the dependability case. Due to the fact that EOL is still an experimental 
language there cannot be an integrated way in which the scripts are applied on the 
model. Instead the user needs to know which script needs to be run at each stage of the 
dependability case. At the time this thesis is written the author is migrating the code to a 
newer version of EOL which supports these features. The scripts in this appendix are 
presented as code samples. 
1. The Dependability Case Metamodel 
I package DC 
2 
class Case extends Package ( 
4 
5 
6 class ArgumentModule extends PackageableElement, Package 
7 reference goat: Goal; 
8 
9 
10 class SolvedBy 
II reference parent: SpinalElement oppositeOf solvedBy; 
12 reference child container : SpinalElement; 
13 attribute cardinality : String; 
14 attribute optional : Boolean; 
15 
16 
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17 class InContextof ( 
18 reference parent: SpinalElement oppositeOf inContext0f, 
19 reference child container: ContextualElement; 
20 attribute cardinality : Integer; 
21 
22 
23 abstract class SpinalElemcnt extends Modeffilement 
24 reference solvedBy [*] container: SolvedBy oppositeOf parent; 
25 reference inContext0f [*] container: InContextOf oppositeOf parent; 
26 
27 
28 abstract class LeafSpinalElement extends SpinalElemcnt 
29 
30 
31 class ReferenceSpinal extends LeafSpinalElement 
32 reference pointsTo : SpinalElement; 
33 
34 
35 abstract class ContextualElement extends ModelElement 
36 attribute contextStatus : ContextStatus; 
37 
38 
39 class ReferenceContextual extends ContextualElement 
40 reference pointsTo : ContextualElement; 
41 
42 
43 class Goal extends SpinalElement, PackageableElement 
44 attribute goalStatus : GoalStatus; 
45 attribute isGoalPublic : IsGoalPublic; 
46 
47 
48 class AwayGoal extends LeafSpinalElement, ContextualElement 
49 reference argwnentModule: ArgumentModule; 
50 
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51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
class Solution extends LeafSpinalElement ( 
attribute solutionStatus : SolutionStatus; 
class Strategy extends SpinalElementj 
attribute strategyStatus : StrategyStatus; 
} 
class Context extends ContextualElement 
I 
class AwayContext extends ContextualElement j 
reference argumentModule : ArgumentModule; 
class Bounds extends ContextualElement 
attribute target : String; 
attribute limit: String; 
class Justification extends ContextualElement 
class ModuleSolution extends LeafSpinalElement 
reference argumentModule : ArgurnentModule; 
class ModuleContract extends ArgurnentModule 
class ContractSolution extends LeafSpinalElement 
reference moduleContract: ModuleContract; 
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85 
86 class InheritedContext extends ContextualElement 
87 reference inherits [*] container: ReferenceContextual; 
88 
89 
90 class Factor extends ModelElement 
91 attribute approachOnFactor String; 
92 reference affects [*] : Goal; 
93 reference inFactorlnstance [*] container: FactorInstance oppositeOf 
94 fromFactorlnstance; 
95 
96 
97 class FactorInstance extends ModelElement 
98 reference impactsOnGoal. [*] container: ImpactOnGoal; 
99 reference fromFactorlnstance : Factor oppositeOf inFactorlnstance; 
100 
101 
102 class Decision extends PackageableElement 
103 reference influencedBy [*] : FactorInstance; 
104 reference decisionlmpactOnGoal [*1 container: DecisionlmpactOnGoal; 
105 
106 
107 class DesignDecision. extends Decision 
108 reference systemElements SystemElement; 
109 
110 
III class ImpactOnGoal. extends ModelElement 
112 reference goal : Goal; 
113 attribute typeOflmpact: TypeOflmpact; 
114 attribute magnitudeOflmpact : MagnitudeOflmpact; 
115 
116 
117 class DecisionlmpactOnGoal extends Modeffilement 
118 attribute tolerabilityClassification : TolerabilityClassificaiton; 
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119 reference goal : Goal; 
120 reference statementOflmpact: ArgumentModule; 
121 
122 
123 
124 class DependabilityAttribute extends PackageableElement 
125 reference concern [*] container: Concern oppositeOf concemOfAttribute; 
126 reference typicallssue [*] container: Issue oppositeOf issueOfAttribute; 
127 
128 
129 class Concern extends PackageableElement 
130 reference addressedInGoal : Goal; 
131 reference concemOfAttribute : DependabilityAttribute oppositeOf concern; 
132 reference causedByFailureCondition FailureCondition oppositeOf 
133 compromisesConcern; 
134 
135 
136 class Issue extends ModelElement 
137 reference issueOfAttribute : DependabilityAttribute oppositeOf typicallssue; 
138 reference revealedBySuitableDeviation SuitableDeviation oppositeOf 
139 revealsIssue; 
140 
141 
142 class Guideword extends PackageableElement 
143 
144 
145 class SysternModel extends PackageableElement 
146 reference containsSystemElement SystemElement oppositeOf 
147 elementAppearsInModel; 
148 
149 
150 class SystemElementType extends PackageableElement 
151 reference systernElements [*] : SystemElement oppositeOf isOfsystemElementType; 
152 reference suitableDeviation [*] : SuitableDeviation oppositeOf systemElementType; 
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153 
154 
155 class SystemElement extends PackageableElement 
156 reference appcarsInDeviation [*] : ApplicableDeviation oppositeOf 
157 deviationOnSystemElcment; 
158 reference elementAppearsInModel SystcmModel oppositeOf 
159 containsSystemElement; 
160 reference hasDependabilityProfile container: DependabilityProfile oppositcOf 
161 systernElement; 
162 reference isOfSystemElementType : SystemElementType oppositeOf 
163 systemElements; 
164 
165 
166 class SystemTask extends PackageableElement 
167 
168 
169 class TaskIssue extends PackageableElemcnt 
170 attribute tasklssuelsAConccm : TasklssuelsAConcem; 
171 attribute aggregated : Aggregated; 
172 reference systcmTask: SystemTask; 
173 reference issue : Issue; 
174 
175 
176 abstract class Deviation extends PackageableElement 
177 reference guideword: Guideword; 
178 
179 
180 class SuitableDeviation extends Deviation 
181 reference revealslssue [*] : Issue oppositeOf revealedBySuitableDeviation; 
182 reference systernElementType SystemElementType oppositeOf suitableDeviation; 
183 attribute deviationIsApplicable DeviationIsApplicable; 
184 
185 
186 class ApplicableDeviation extends Deviation 
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187 reference manifestsAsFailureCondition : FailureCondition oppositeOf 
188 causedByDeviation; 
189 reference deviationOnSystemElement: SystemMement oppositeOf 
190 appearsInDeviation; 
191 
192 
193 class FailureCondition extends PackageableElement 
194 attribute effect : String; 
195 reference causedByDeviation: ApplicableDeviation oppositeOf 
196 manifestsAsFailureCondition; 
197 reference effectTrace [*] container: TraceabilityOfEffect oppositeOf 
198 traceBelongsToFailureCondition; 
199 reference causedByFailureConditionEffectTrace TraceabilityOfEffect 
200 oppositeOf resultsToFailureCondition; 
201 reference compromisesConcern [*] : Concern oppositeOf 
202 causedByFailureCondition; 
203 reference dependabilityRequirement : DependabilityRequirement oppositeOf 
204 faitureCondition; 
205 
206 
207 abstract class TraceabilityOfEffect extends ModelElement 
208 reference traceBelongsToFailureCondition : FailureCondition oppositeOf 
209 effectTrace; 
210 reference resultsToFailureCondition FailureCondition oppositeOf 
211 causedByFailureConditionEffectTrace 
212 
213 
214 class TextualTraceabilityOfEffect extends TraceabilityOfEffect 
215 
216 
217 class DependabilityProfile extends Modeffilement 
218 reference systernElement : SystemElement oppositeOf hasDependabilityprofile; 
219 reference dependabilityRequirement [*] container: DependabilityRequircment; 
220 
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221 
222 class DependabilityRequirement extends ModelElement 
223 reference addressedByGoal : Goal; 
224 reference failureCondition : FailureCondition oppositeOf dependabilityRequircment; 
225 
226 abstract class ModelElement 
227 attribute description String; 
228 attribute name : String; 
229 reference taggedValue [*] container: TaggedValue; 
230 
231 
232 class TaggedValue 
233 attribute key: String; 
234 attribute value: String; 
235 
236 
237 class Package extends PackageableElement 
238 reference content [*] container: PackageableElement; 
239 
240 
241 abstract class PackageableElement extends ModelElement 
242 
243 
244 datatype String; 
245 datatype Boolean; 
246 datatype Integer; 
247 
248 enumeration TypeOflmpact 
249 literal NotDefined; 
250 literal Negative; 
251 literal Positive; 
252 
253 
254 enumeration MagnitudeOflmpact 
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255 literal NotDefined; 
256 literal High; 
257 literal Medium; 
258 literal Low; 
259 
260 
261 enumeration Severity 
262 literal Catastrophic; 
263 literal Critical; 
264 literal Marginal; 
265 literal Negligible; 
266 
267 
268 enumeration GoalStatus 
269 literal Normal; 
270 literal ToBeDeveloped; 
271 literal ToBeinstantiated; 
272 literal SolvedByContract; 
273 literal ToBeDevelopedAndlnstantiated; 
274 
275 
276 
277 enumeration ContextStatus 
278 literal Normal; 
279 literal ToBeInstantiated; 
280 1 
281 
282 enumeration SolutionStatus 
283 literal Normal; 
284 literal ToBeInstantiated; 
285 
286 
287 enumeration StrategyStatus 
288 literal Normal; 
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289 literal ToBeDeveloped; 
290 literal ToBeInstantiated; 
291 
292 
293 enumeration IsGoalPublic 1 
294 literal False; 
295 literal True; 
296 
297 
298 enumeration DeviationisApplicable 
299 literal NotDcfined; 
300 literal False; 
301 literal True; 
302 
303 
304 enumeration DeviationSeverity 
305 literal NotDefined; 
306 literal Minor; 
307 literal Substantial; 
308 literal Major; 
309 
310 
311 enumeration TolerabilityClassificaiton 
312 literal Unconstrained; 
313 literal Probable; 
314 literal Potential; 
315 literal Hesitant; 
316 literal Ineligible; 
317 
318 
319 enumeration TasklssueIsAConcem 
320 literal NotDefined; 
321 literal itisConcemExistinglnltsOwnRight; 
322 literal ItIsAFailureCondition; 
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323 
324 
325 enumeration Aggregated 
326 literal NotDefined; 
327 literal True; 
328 literal False; 
329 
330) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
2. Samples of Scripts Used in the Dependability Case 
Creation of Task Issues from Typical Issues and Tasks 
VARIABLES 
def systemElementsInDC: Sequence; 
def issues : Sequence; 
def tasks: Sequence; 
def packages : Sequence; 
def systernTasks : Sequence; 
--INITIALISATION OF VARIABLES 
systemElementsInDC := SystemElement. alllnstanceso; 
issues := Issue. allInstanceso; 
systemTasks := SystemTask. alllnstanceso; 
packages := Package. allInstanceso; 
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22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
ý8 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
--MAIN PROGRAM---- 
-COUNT SYSTEM ELEMENTS 
(systemElementsInDC. sizeo +Total System Elernents')-> printlno; 
(issues. sizeo +' Specified Typical Issues')-> printlno; 
(systemTasks. sizeo +'Overall System Tasks)-> printlno; 
def tipackage : new Package; 
tipackage. name := Task Issues'; 
packages. sclcct(plp. name='DDA! ). firsto. content. add(tipackage); 
dcf taskIssueCounter: Integer; 
-tipackage. printlno; 
for (i in issues) I 
for (st in systemTasks) 
def ti : new TaskIssue; 
taskIssueCounter := taskIssueCounter + 1; 
ti. name i. name +': + st. description; 
ti. issue i; 
ti. systemTask := st; 
ti. tasklssueIsAConcem: = TasklssuelsAConcem#NotDefined; 
tipackage. content. add(ti); 
('Created'+ taskIssueCounter+' Issue Instances)->printlno; 
DC. store(DC. modelFile. replace('ecore', 'copy. ecore')); 
Creation of Deviations 
-----VARLABLES- 
def systemElementsInDC: Sequence; 
def packages - Sequence; 
def issues: Sequence; 
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7 
8 
9 
to 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
def suitableDeviations : Sequence; 
def guidewords Sequence; 
def efforCount Integer; 
def wamingCount: Integer; 
def suppressWarnings : Boolean; 
def createApplicableDeviations : Boolean; 
def loopCounter: Integer; 
----INITIALISATION OF VARIABLES 
systeniElementsInDC := SystemElement. alllnstanceso; 
issues := Issue. allInstanceso; 
packages: = Package. alllnstanceso; 
suitableDeviations := SuitableDeviation. allInstanceso; 
guidewords: = Guideword. allInstanceso; 
---CUSTOMISATION VARIABLES- --- 
suppressWamings := false; 
createApplicableDeviations := true; 
-----MAIN PROGRAM---------- 
'Starting deviations checking ....... >printlnO; 
'Opening File... '->printlno; 
(DC. modelFile)->printlno; 
'Done. '->printlno; 
"->printlno; 
wamingCount: = 0; 
'Examining deviations ...... >printlno; 
'Checking issues for suitable deviations... ->printlno; 
for (i in issues )( 
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41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
if ( i. revealedBySuitableDeviation. sizeo=O) I 
if (not suppressWarnings) I 
C #WARNING-Issue + i. name + "', has not been associated with any 
suitable deviatioif)->printlno; 
wamingCount := wamingCount + 1; 
'Issues checked 1! '->printlno; 
"->printlno; 
'Checking suitable deviations... '->printlno; 
def errorFound : Boolean; 
-efforFound is a flag indicating that there is an error in the definition of a suitable deviation 
-if an error is found the script will not attempt to create name for the sd 
for (sd in suitableDeviations) ( 
def errorFound : Boolean; 
errorFound : =false; 
if (sd. systemElementType. sizeo = 0) 
(' #Effor-Suitable deviation "' + sd. name + lias not been associated with any System 
Elements. ')->printlno; 
efforCount: = efforCount + 1; 
efforFound := true; 
I 
if (sd. guideword. sizeO = 0) 1 
C #Error-Suitable deviation + sd. name +has not been associated with a 
Guideword. ')->printlno; 
errorCount: =errorCount +1; 
errorFound := true; 
} 
if (crrorFound = false) I 
-if the suitable deviation is defined correctly create name 
-and check wethcr applicability has been defined 
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76 sd. name: = sd. guideword. name +':: '+ sd. systemElementType. name; 
77 if (sd. deviationIsApplicable. name =NotDefine&) 
78 if (not suppressWarnings) ( 
79 #WARNING-Define if suitable deviation + sd. name + 
80 ... is applicable! )->printlno; 
81 
82 wamingCount: = warningCount + 1; 
83 
84 
85 -sd. printlno; 
86 
87 'Suitable Deviations checked !! ý->printlno; 
88 'Storing Model... ->printo; 
89 DC. storeo; 
90 'Done! '->printlno; 
91 
92 if (createApplicableDeviations) 
93 "->printlno; 
94 'Creating Applicable Deviations...! ->printlno; 
95 ffound'+ suitableDeviations. sizeO +' suitable deviations for the attribute issues speciried. ')- 
96 >printlno; 
97 loopCounter: = 0; 
98 for (sd in suitableDeviations) ( 
99 if (sd. deviationIsApplicable. name = True') 
100 loopCounter := loopCounter + 1; 
101 
102 
103 C of which'+ loopCounter +have been defined as applicable. )->printlno; 
104 def adPackage : new Package; 
105 packages. select(plp. name='Deviations'). firsto. content. add(adPackage); 
106 adPackage. name : =Applicable Deviations'; 
107 --create a new package below the package deviations to add the applicable 
deviations 
108 loopCounter: =O; 
109 for (sd in suitableDeviations) I 
110 if (sd. deviationIsApplicable. name = True') 
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III for (se in sd. systemElementType. systemElements) ( 
112 --for every type instance associated with a suitable deviation 
113 def ad: new ApplicableDeviation; 
114 ad. name: = sd. guideword. name +':: '+se. name; 
115 --ad. name->printlno; 
116 ad. deviationOnSystemElement: = se; 
117 ad. guideword: = sd. guideword; 
118 loopCounter := loopCounter + 1; 
119 adPackage. content. add(ad); 
120 
121 
122 
123 ('Created'+ loopCounter +'applicable deviations')->printlno; 
124 
125 
126 
127 ". printlno; 
128 DC. store(DC. modelFile. replaceCecore', '2. ecore)); 
129 ('Storing Model as: ')->printlno; 
130 C'+ DC. modelFile. replace('ecore', 2. ecore)) ->printlno; 
131 ". printlno; 
132 
133 (warningCount +'Wamings. ')->printlnO; 
134 (errorCount +'Errors. ')->printInO; 
135 if (suppressWamings) fTo see the warnings change the "suppressWamings" variable in the script. '- 
136 >printlno; ) 
137 
138 FINISHED **'->printlno; 
139 ------- 
140 
Creation of Failure Conditions 
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2 --VAFJ"LES 
3- 
4 def applicableDeviations : Sequence; 
5 def packages : Sequence; 
6 def failureConditions : Sequence; 
7 
8 def errorCount : Integer; 
9 def wamingCount: Integer; 
10 def loopCounter: Integer; 
11 
12 
13 
14 applicableDeviations := ApplicableDeviation. alllnstanceso; 
15 packages := Package. alllnstanceso; 
16 failureConditions := FailureCondition. alllnstanceso; 
17 
18 
19 
20 -create a package to add failure conditions 
21 def fcPackage : new Package; 
22 packages. select(plp. name=DDA'). firsto. content. add(fcPackage); 
23 fcPackage. name : ='Failure Conditions'; 
24 'Created Failure Conditions Package under DDA->printlnO; 
25 
26 -create a failure condition ofr every deviation 
27 loopCounter :=1; --counter will be used to ID failure conditions 
28 for (ad in applicableDeviations) 1 
29 
-check if there already is one 
30 if (ad. manifestsAsFailureCondition. isDefmedO)f 
31 fcPackage. content. add(ad. manifestsAsFaitureCondition); 
32 loopCounter := loopCounter + 1; 
33 
34 if (not ad. manifestsAsFailureCondition. isDefinedo) 
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35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
II 
def fc : new FailureCondition; 
fc. causedByDeviation := ad; 
fc. name := TC+ loopCounter; 
fcPackage. content. add(fc); 
loopCounter := loopCounter + 1; 
} 
CCreated'+ (loopCounter-1) +'failure conditions)->printlno; 
'! ->printlno; 
'Combining failures... '->printlno; 
for (fc in failureConditions) 
fc. printlno; 
fc. causedByDeviation. guideword. printlno; 
if (fc. causedByDeviation. guideword ='ornission) 
FINISHED ***'->printlno; 
Creation of GraphViz File for Failure Map 
def failureConditions : Sequence; 
def deviations: Sequence; 
def systemElements: Sequence; 
def traces : Sequence; 
def applicableDeviations : Sequence; 
def out : String; 
def shapeCase : String; 
def count: integer; 
failureConditions := FailureCondition. alllnstanceso; 
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12 applicableDeviations := ApplicableDeviation. alllnstanceso; 
13 systemElements := SystemElement. alllnstanceso; 
14 traces := TraceabilityOfEffect. alllnstanceso; 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 ------MAIN- -- 
20 
21 'digraph G ('. printlno; 
22 -begin digraph 
23 'Dependability Deviation Analysis Automated Graph Extractiolv->printlno; 
24 'Process started! '->printlno; 
25 'Digraph created! ->printlno; 
26 "->printlno; 
27 'ranksep 2'. printlno; 
28 'nodesep 0.7'. printlno; 
29 
30 ('Identified'+ failureConditions. sizeO +'failure conditions. ')->printlno; 
31 ('Identified '+ applicableDeviations. sizeO +' deviations. ')->printlno; 
32 ('Identified'+ systemElements. sizeo +'systern elements. )->printlno; 
33 ('Identified'+ traces. sizeO +'associations. ')->printlno; 
34 "->printlno; 
35 
36 
37 'Drawing failure conditions'->printlno; 
38 
39 for (fc in failureConditions) 
40 shapeCase : ='rectangle'; 
41 ('fc+ failureConditions. index0f(fc) +'( I +'shape ='+ shapeCase +, label- + 
42 fc. name+W+ (fc. description). formatTexto +""+', color='+ ((fc. effectTrace). sizeo). colourFCO + 
43 style = filled'+']; ). printlno; 
44 )-endfor 
45 
46 "->printino; 
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47 
48 
49 
so 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
'Drawing deviations->printlno; 
for (d in applicableDeviations. select(dld. manifestsAsFailureCondition. isDefinedo)) 
("'t + d. name + "" +Icolor ='+ 
(d. deviationOnSystemElement. isOfSystemElementType. name). colourSystemElemento +, fontcolor 
+ (d. guideword. name). colourDeviationo +']'). printo; 
'. '->printo; 
-d. guideword. name->printlno; 
} --endfor 
"->printlno; 
'Drawing failure condition associations'->printlno; 
for (f: in failureConditions) 
-fc. name->printlno; 
for (et in fc. effectTrace. select(etlet. resultsToFailureCondition. isDefinedo)) 
-C'+et. name)->printlnO; 
for (fc2 in et. resultsToFailureCondition) 
'. '->printo; 
('fc'+ failureConditions. index0f(fc) +'->'+'fc'+ 
failureConditions. index0f(fc2)). printlno; 
-(' '+fc2. name)->printlno; 
} 
)--end for 
I -end for 
"->printlno; 
'Drawing deviation associations'->printlno; 
for (d in applicableDeviations. select(dld. manifestsAsFailureCondition. isDefinedo)) 
Coll + d. name + 111 -> fc' + 
failureConditions. index0f(d. manifestsAsFaitureCondition)). printlno; 
'. '->printo; 
-d. guideword. name->printlno; 
) -endfor 
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82 ')'. printlno; 
83 "->printlno; 
84 'Digraph closed! '->printlno; 
85 
86 out. store(DC. getN4odelFileo. replace('. ecore, '. DDA. col. grapif)); 
87 'DDA. graph file created! ->printlno; 
88 'Process complete'->printlno; 
89 "->printlno; 
90 
91 
92 operation Any printIno 
93 out := out + self + W; 
94 
95 
96 operation Any printo 
97 out := out + self; 
98 
99 
100 operation String colourSystemElement 0 String 
101 def inString : String; 
102 def outString : String; 
103 
104 -inString = self. toCharSequenceo; 
105 
106 inString : =self; 
107 
108 if ( inString ='Information Exchange') 
109 outString : =Tbrestgreen' 
110 
III if (not (inString ='Information Exchange)) 
112 outString: ='blacle; 
113 
114 return outString; 
115 
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116 
117 
118 operation String colourDeviation 0: String 
119 def inString : String; 
120 def outString : String; 
121 
122 -inString := selftoCharSequenceo; 
123 inString : =self; 
124 
125 if (inString ='Omission) 1 
126 outString : =deepskyblue2'; 
127 
128 if (inString ='Earl3e) 
129 outString := 'darkorange4; 
130 
131 if (inString ='Less') 
132 outString : ='firebricle; 
133 
134 if (inString ='Late) 
135 outString : =goldenrod!; 
136 
137 if (inString ='Fake') 
138 outString : =dodgerbluel'; 
139 
140 if (inString ='Value') 
141 outString : ='darkorchid2; 
142 
143 if (inString ='Public') 
144 outString : =gray; 
145 
146 if (inString ='Damage') 
147 outString := 'comsilk3'; 
148 
149 return outString; 
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150 
151 
152 operation Integer colourFC 0: String 
153 def outString : String; 
154 
155 if (self = 0) 
156 outString : =green3'; 
157 
158 if (self = 1) 
159 outString : ='olivedrab3'; 
160 
161 if (self = 2) 
162 outString : =yellowl'; 
163 
164 if (self= 3) 
165 outString : =orangel'; 
166 
167 if (self >= 4) 
168 outString : ='orangeredl'; 
169 
170 return outString; 
171 
172 
173 
174 operation String formatText 0: String 
175 -formats the text according to the number of words and the length of the sentence 
176 
177 def length : Integer; 
178 def charCounter: Integer; 
179 def inString : Sequence; 
180 def wordCount : Integer; 
181 def outString : String; 
182 def wordPointer: Integer, 
183 
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184 '. ->printo; 
185 -TEST- self->printlno; 
186 inString - self. toCharSequenceo; 
187 length: = inString. sizeo; 
188 -TEST- length->printlno; 
189 wordCount : =I; -Start from the I st word not Oth 
190 -count the words 
191 -TEST-'Counting Words... ->printlno; 
192 for (c in Sequence (O.. Iength) 
193 if (inString. at (c+l) = 
194 wordCount := wordCount + 1; 
195 -TEST-'Space found! ->printlno; 
196 
197 
198 -TEST- C# of words+ wordCount)->printlno; 
199 
200 -Formatting 
201 if (wordCount < 10 and length > 25 
202 for (bin Sequence (O.. Iength) 
203 outString := outString + inString. at(charCounter); 
204 if (inString. at(charCounter+l) =') ( 
205 wordPointer := wordPointer + 1; 
206 -TEST- CWorpointer+ wordPointer)->printlno; 
207 if (wordPointer = 4) ( 
208 wordPointer: = 0; 
209 outString := outString +' \W; 
210 -if a space is found jump to the next char by increasing the 
211 counter 
212 charCounter := charCounter + 1; 
213 
214 
215 charCounter := charCounter + 1; 
216 
217 
218 
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219 
220 if (wordCount >= 10 )( 
221 for (b in Sequence (O.. Iength) 
222 outString := outString + inString. at(charCounter); 
223 if (inString. at(charCounter4-1) = ") ( 
224 wordPointer := wordPointer + 1; 
225 -TEST- CWorpointee + wordPointer)->printlno; 
226 if (wordPointer = 5) ( 
227 wordPointer: = 0; 
228 outString := outString +'\\n`; 
229 -if a space is found jump to the next char by increasing the 
230 counter 
231 charCountcr := charCounter + 1; 
232 
233 
234 charCounter := charCounter + 1; 
235 
236 
237 
238 if (wordCount < 10 and length < 25 
239 --this is for shapes with small words; we don't want to break them 
240 for (bin Sequence {0.. Iength) )( 
241 outString := outString + inString. at(charCounter); 
242 if (inString. at(charCounter+l) ='I) ( 
243 wordPointer := wordPointer + 1; 
244 -TEST- CWorpointee + wordPointer)->printlno; 
245 if (wordPointer = 5) ( 
246 wordPointer :=0; 
247 outString: = outString +\W; 
248 -if a space is found jump to the next char by increasing the 
249 counter 
250 charCounter := charCounter + 1; 
251 
252 
253 charCounter := charCounter + 1; 
290 
Appendix C- DCAf 
254 
255 
256 -TEST- self->printlno; 
257 return outString; 
258 
259 
Creation of GSN GraphViz File 
1 def out: String; 
2 def shapeCase : String; 
3 def count : Integer, 
4 def spinalElements : Sequence; 
5 def contextElements : Sequence; 
6 
7 
8 spinalElements := DO SpinalElement. alllnstanceso. select(seinot se. isKind0f(ReferenceSpinal)); 
9 contextElements : =DC! ContextualElement. allInstanceso; 
10 
11 
12 'digraph G(I. printlno; 
13 node [shape=record, fontname=Tahoma, fontsize=61; '. printlno; 
14 edge [fontname--Tahoma, fbntsize=8]; '. printlnO; 
15 'rankdir = TB; '. printlno; 
16 center--true; '. printlno; 
17 
18 
19 'Formating! ->printo; 
20 for (se in spinalElements) 
21 
22 if (se. inContext0fisDefmedo) 
23 ('Subgraph sameLevelAV + spinalElements. index0f(se) (). printlno; 
24 'rank = same; '. printlno; 
25 
26 -create nodes and shapes for all spinal elements 
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27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
if (se. isType0f(Goal)) ( 
shapeCase : ='rectangle'; 
Cse'+ spinalElements. index0f(se) +'['+'shape ='+ shapeCase +, label- 
+se. description +W + (se. name). fonnatTexto +'" ]; J. printlno; 
if (se. isType0f(Strategy)) ( 
shapeCase := 'parallelogranY; 
('se'+ spinalElements. index0f(se) +'['+'shape ='+ shapeCase 
label="'+se. description +ý\rf + (se. name). fonnatTexto + "']; ). printlno; 
if (se. isType0f(Solution)) ( 
shapeCase : =circle'; 
Cse'+ spinalElements. index0f(se) +'[ I +'shape ='+ shapeCase +, '+ 
label=", +se. description +ýW + (se. name). formatTexto + "']; '). printlno; 
-ýse. inContextO"rintlno; 
for ( ce in se. inContext0f) ( 
('ce'+ contextElements. index0f(ce. child) +'['+'shape = octagon, label- + 
ce. child. description +W + (ce. child. name). formatTexto +'"]; ). printlno; 
Cse'+ spinalElements. index0f(se)+'->+ce'+ 
contextElements. index0f(ce. child) +'; '). printlno; 
')'. printlno; 
if (not se. inContext0f. isDefinedo) ( 
-create nodes and shapes for all spinal elements 
if (se. isType0f(Goal)) ( 
shapeCase : ='rectangle'; 
('se'+ spinalElements. index0f(se) +'['+'shape ='+ shapeCase +', label- 
+se. description +ýW+ (se. name). fonnatTexto '). printlno; 
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62 
63 if (se. isType0f(Strategy)) 
64 shapeCase := 'parallelogram'; 
65 Cse'+ spinalElements. index0f(se) +'['+shape =+ shapeCase ++ 
66 label="' +se. description +W + (se. name). fonnatTexto + "']; ). printlno; 
67 
68 
69 if (se. isType0f(Solution)) 
70 shapeCase : ='circle'; 
71 ('se'+ spinalElements. index0f(se) +'['+'shape ='+ shapeCase +', + 
72 label="' +se. description +ýW + (se. name). fonnatTexto + "']; '). printlno; 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 "->printlno; 
78 'Added Spinal Element Nodes -- OK! ->printlno; 
79 -Tormating! ->printo; 
80 -ADDING CONTEXTUAL ELEMENTS 
81 -for (ce in contextElements) ( 
82 - if (ce. isType0f(Context)) 
83 - shapeCase : ='octagoif; 
84 - ('ce'+ contextElements. indexORce) +'['+'shape shapeCase label- 
85 +ce. description +NW+ (ce. name). formatTexto + "' ]; ). printlno; 
86 
87 
88 
89 -%>printino; 
90 -Added Context Element Nodes - OK! ->printlno; 
91 
92 
93 
94 "-printlno; l. printlno; I f. printlno; l. printlno; 
95 
96 -CONNECTING SPINAL ELEMENTS 
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97 for (se in spinalElements) 
98 for (sb in se. solvedBy) 
99 -sb. child->printlno; 
100 -print the parent spinal element 
101 Cse'+ spina]Elements. index0f(se)). printo; 
102 
103 --if child is reference point to target 
104 if (sb. child. isType0f(ReferenceSpinal)){ 
105 ('->'+'se+ spinalElements. index0f(sb. child. pointsTo) +'; '). printlno; 
106 
107 -and if it is not reference print the child index in the spinal elements container 
108 if (not sb. child. isType0f(ReferenceSpinal)) ( 
109 C ->'+'se'+ spinalElements. indexOgsb. child) + ; ). printlno; 
110 
112 
113 'Added spinal connectors -O1C->printlnO; 
114 
115 ')'. printlno; -Close the digraph G 
116 
117 - write file 
118 out. store(DC. getModelFileo. replaceC. ecore', '. GSN. grapif)); 
119 
120 operation Any printlno 
121 out: = out + self + W; 
122 
123 
124 operation Any printo 
125 out: = out + self; 
126 
127 
128 operation String formatText 0: String 1 
129 
-formats the text according to the number of words 
130 
- the point is that the greater the number of words is the more 
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131 -words each line should have in order to maintain the ratio 
132 -of the shapes 
133 
134 def length : Integer; 
135 def charCounter: Integer; 
136 def inString : Sequence; 
137 def wordCount: Integer; 
138 def outString : String; 
139 def wordPointer : Integer, 
140 
141 '! ->printo; 
142 -TEST- self->printlno; 
143 inString := selftoCharSequenceo; 
144 length: = inString. sizeo; 
145 -TEST- length->printlno; 
146 wordCount : =I; -Start from the I st word not Oth 
147 -count the words 
148 -TEST-'Counting Words... ->printlno; 
149 for (c in Sequence (O.. Iength) 
ISO if (inString. at (c+l) = 
151 wordCount := wordCount + 1; 
152 -TEST-'Space fbund! ->println0; 
153 
154 
155 -TEST- C# of words'+ wordCount)->printlno; 
156 
157 -Formatting 
158 if (wordCount <8 and length > 25 
159 for (bin Sequence (0.. length) 
160 outString := outString + inString. at(charCounter); 
161 if (inString. at(charCounter+l) = ") ( 
162 wordPointer := wordPointer + 1; 
163 -TEST- CWorpointer+ wordPointer)->printlno; 
164 if (wordPointer = 3) ( 
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165 wordPointer :=0; 
166 outString := outString + '\W; 
167 -if a space is found jump to the next char by increasing the 
168 counter 
169 charCounter charCounter + 1; 
1 70 
171 
172 charCounter : =ý, charCounter + 1; 
173 
174 
175 
176 
177 if (wordCount >= 8 
178 for (bin Sequence (O.. Iength) 
179 outString := outString + inString. at(charCounter); 
180 if (inString. at(charCounter+l) = ") ( 
181 wordPointer := wordPointer + 1; 
182 
-TEST- CWorpointee + wordPointer)->printlno; 
183 if (wordPointer = 5) ( 
184 wordPointer :=0; 
185 outString := outString +' \W; 
186 -if a space is found jump to the next char by increasing the 
187 counter 
188 charCounter := charCounter + 1; 
189 
190 
191 charCounter := charCounter + 1; 
192 
193 
194 
195 if (wordCount <8 and length < 25 
196 -this is for shapes with small words; we doift want to break them 
197 for (bin Sequence (O.. Iength) )( 
198 outString := outString + inString. at(charCounter); 
199 if (inString. at(charCounteri-1) = ") ( 
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200 wordPointer := wordPointer + 1; 
201 -TEST- CWorpointee + wordPointer)->printlno; 
202 if (wordPointer = 5) ( 
203 wordPointer: = 0; 
204 outString := outString +' \W; 
205 -if a space is found jump to the next char by increasing the 
206 counter 
207 charCounter charCounter + 1; 
208 
209 
210 charCounter := charCounter + 1; 
211 
212 
213 -TEST- self->printlno; 
214 return outString; 
215 
GSN Constraints Using EVL 
I pre I 
2 def numberOfFANIN: Integer; 
3 def numberOfSolutionFANIN , Integer; 
4 
5 
-6 post 
7 
8 
9 context AwayGoal 
10 
11 constraint IlasArgumentModule 
12 self. argumentModule. isDefinedO 
13 fail: 
14 'Away goal'+ selfname +'has no associated argument module' 
15 
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16 constraint NamesMatch : 
17 self. name = self. argumentModule. name 
18 
19 
20 context SolvedBy 
21 
22 constraint I lasChild 
23 selEchild. isDefinedo 
24 fail : 
25 'Element'+ self eContainero. description +does not have a solution! 
26 
27 
28 context ReferenceSpinal 
29 
30 constraint PointsToNonReference 
31 not selfpointsTo. isType0f(ReferenceSpinal) 
32 fail : 
33 'Reference Spinal points to another Reference Spinal under: ' 
34 + self. eContainero. eContainero. name 
35 
36 constraint ShouldnotPointToGoal 
37 not selfpointsTo. isTypeOf (Goal) 
38 fail ( 
39 numberOtGoalFANIN: = numberOfFANIN + 1; 
40 return 'Goal'+ selfeContainero. eContainero. description + 
41 'Fans-in to goal'+ selfpointsTo. description; 
42 
43 
44 constraint ShouldNotPointToSolution: 
45 not selfpointsTo. isType0f(Solution) 
46 fail ( 
47 numberOfSolutionFANIN := numberOfSolutionFANIN + 1; 
48 return'Fan-in at solution'+ selfpointsTo. description + 
49 ' under goal I+ selfeContainero. eContainero. description; 
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50 
51 )-END OF ReferenceSpinal Constraints 
52 
53 context Goal 
54 
55_ constraint I lasUniqueName 
56 Goal. alllnstances. forAll(glg. name selEname implies g= self) 
57 fail : 
58 'Duplicate Goal name: I+ selfname +' at '+ self description 
59 
-60 constraint I lasUniqueDescription 
61 Goal. alllnstances. forAll(glg. description = selfdescription implies g selo 
62_ fail: 
63 'Goal'+ selEdescription +'has not unique ID' 
64 
65 
66 END GOAL CONSTRAINTS 
67 
68 context LeafSpinatElement 
69 
70 constraint IsNotDecomposed 
71 selfsolvcdBy. sizeo 0 
72 fail : 
73 'Goal solution'+ selEdescription +'is illegally decomposed' 
74 
75 
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GraphViz Failures Map for the AGO 
digraph G( 
f; O[ shape = rectangle, label= " FC I\nDisclosure of aircraft position " color - green3 , style - filled 
f; I[ shape = rectangle, label= " FC2\nSlow transmission of target \ndata " color - yellowl , style 
filled ]; 
fc2[ shape = rectangle, label= " FOViArtillcry receive fake target \ndata with malicious intent " color 
orange I, style = filled ]; 
fc3[ shape = rectangle, label= " FC4\nEnemy receives firing intent \nand target information " color 
green3 , style = filled ]; 
fc4[ shape = rectangle, label= " FC5ViArtillery will not receive \nany target data " color - orangered I, 
style = filled ]; 
fc5[ shape= rectangle, label=" FC6\nArfillery will receive the \nwrong location/order " color-yellowl 
, style= filled ]; 
fc6[ shape = rectangle, label= " FC7\nDelay or possibly loss of \nrequest of target order and \ntarget 
information " color = olivedrab3 , style = filled ]; 
f; 7( shape = rectangle, label= " FC8\nThere is no patrolling function \navailable, cannot notify of enemy 
Worces " color = olivedrab3 , style = filled 
]; 
fc8[ shape = rectangle, label= " FC9\nUsers mistakenly identify enemy " color = orange I, style - filled 
1; 
fc9[ shape - rectangle, label= " FC I O\nA location is not supressed \nwhilst it is being expected What it 
does " color = olivedrab3 , style = filled ]; 
fclO[ shape -rectangle, label=" FCI I\nA location is suppressed \nwhen it should not" color- 
olivedrab3 , style = filled ]; 
fcll[ shape= rectangle, label=" FC12\nDelays in supressing enemy" color= olivedrab3 style -filled 
1; 
"Public:: Needline 1"[color = blue, fontcolor = deeppink4]"Overload:: Needline 7"[color - blue, fontcolor 
= deeppink4]"Fake:: Needline 7"(color = blue, fontcolor = deeppink4]"Public:: Needline 7"[color = blue, 
fontcolor = deeppink4]"Omission:: Needline 7"[color = blue, fontcolor = deeppink4]"Value:: Needline 
7"[color = blue, foritcolor = deeppink4]"Late:: Needline 7"[color = blue, foritcolor - 
deeppink4]"Omission:: Activity 4"[color = blue, fontcolor = forcstgreen]"Mistake:: Activity 4"[color - 
blue, fontcolor = forestgreen]"Mode:: Activity 6"[color = blue, fontcolor = forestgrcen]"Late:: Activity 
6"[color = blue, foritcolor = forestgreen]"Public:: Needline 1 &0 
"Overload:: Needline 7" -> fc I 
"Fake:: Needline 7" -> &2 
"Ilublic:: Needline 7" -> f: 3 
"Omission:: Needline 7" -> fc4 
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"Value:: Needline 7" -> fc5 
"Late:: Needline 7" -> fc6 
"Omission:: Activity 4" -> fc7 
"Mistake:: Activity 4" -> fc8 
"Mode:: Activity 6" -> fc9 
"Mode:: Activity 6" -> fc 10 
"Late:: Activity 6" -> fc II 
fcl -> fcl I 
fc2 -> fc8 
fc2 fc 10 
fc4 fc6 
fc4 fc9 
fc4 fcll 
fc5 fclo 
fc6 fc8 
fc6 fc9 
fc6 fcl I 
0 fc4 
fc8 fc4 
fc8 fc5 
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